

HIGH COMMAND IN THE WORLD WAR

WILLIAM DILWORTH PULESTON

The

Honorable

Claude A. Swanson

Secretary of the Navy

with the compliments
and best wishes of

William D. Puleston

Captain U. S. Navy

Office of Naval Intelligence.

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
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in the World War

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By

WILLIAM DILWORTH PULESTON

Captain, United States Navy



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A



TO
MY WIFE

PREFACE

THIS book is intended for the average American who is already familiar with the leading facts of the World War, in the confident hope that its contents will reveal to him the real reason for the costly failures of Europe's democracies in waging war, and will help him and his children to avoid some of the needless horrors of the next war.

It requires a large amount of temerity to sit in judgment on eminent statesmen, distinguished admirals and renowned generals; certain credentials for the task should be presented to a reader, and I offer mine. From July, 1914, to December, 1916, I was at our Naval War College, closely following the events of the war as they developed. The year 1917 I spent in the Asiatic Fleet, visiting Japan, China and Vladivostok, where I saw the results of the war in the Far East; from January to December, 1918, I served with the American destroyers in European waters. Two leave-periods enabled me to visit the Western Front and the Grand Fleet; so I had a bird's-eye view of several fronts of the war as it ran its course.

After the war, four years at the Army War College gave me a better picture of the land war and an opportunity to study and compare many of the books written on the war and to listen to lectures on the war by some of the principal actors, civil and military.

Most of all, this time at the Army War College afforded many opportunities to discuss the land warfare with army officers thoroughly familiar with the many campaigns. It is impossible to give individual credit to the numerous officers who patiently explained the intri-

cacies of land campaigns to me; so I take this occasion to thank them all.

Commander H. H. Frost, U. S. N., and the late Major C. W. Jenkins, U. S. A., were my roommates at the Army War College when the bulk of this work was done. Almost daily we discussed phases of the Great War. I gained much information from their extensive knowledge of the war and hereby record my appreciation. In the sketches descriptive of Jutland, I followed the same conventions and methods so successfully developed by Commander Frost and Mr. G. J. Hazard in their *Jutland*.

I am under obligations to Major Meyer, U. S. A., Colonel Percy Bishop, U. S. A., and Major General John W. Gulick, Chief of Coast Artillery, for their many helpful ideas.

I was assisted by Rear Admiral Arthur St. Clair Smith, U. S. N., who made many useful suggestions. I am particularly indebted to Rear Admiral Thomas S. Hart, U. S. N., for his helpful criticism and for suggestions published by him in an article "What Might Have Happened at Jutland."

While expressing my gratitude for the help received from friends in the army and navy, I do not wish to commit them to any of the comments or facts in this book. I alone am responsible for the statements and opinions given therein.

W. D. PULESTON.

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CHAPTER I

METHOD OF DEVELOPMENT

Method of Development—The Attitude of the Reader—The Major European Powers—Europe's Policies—Rearrangement of Alliances—Memoirs of the Leaders—Pre-war Statesmanship—Difficulty of Preserving the Peace—European Resources

A RIGID chronological development of the World War would offer some advantages to the writer and readers, but the political factors, the land and naval operations were world-wide in scope, and were from beginning to end inextricably intermingled. A strict seriatim system of development would therefore have forced the reader to move continuously from imperial conferences to cabinet meetings, from ocean to ocean, from land battles in Europe to those in Asia and Africa, with grave danger of losing the necessary continuity and perspective.

The path which will lead the reader with the least interruption through the maze of events of the World War, is that marked out by the diplomatic decisions made by the civil rulers of Europe in their pre-war diplomacy that led to the war; the peace-time strategical dispositions of the European fleets and armies made by the military authorities to support these decisions, and the decisive naval and military events that followed after the declaration of war.

By concentrating our attention, first upon the statesmen in the capitals, then upon the admirals and generals in the main theatres, we can first follow and understand the events in the main theatres of the war and then con-

sider the happenings in the minor theatres that were sufficiently important to influence the decision in the main theatre.

The departure from a chronological development introduces new opportunities to mistake effect for cause. To reduce the chances of such errors, some repetition is necessary to obtain a reorientation; therefore restatements of facts occur at various places throughout the book.

THE ATTITUDE OF THE READER

If the reader really desires to understand the last World War, he should first dispossess his mind of many of the notions extant concerning it, such as its uniqueness, its surpassing horrors and its relative magnitude. If he will also forget the national slogans used by the leaders to inspire the fighting spirit of their peoples he will be mentally prepared to see the war in its true perspective as a very violent temporary phase in the highly competitive life of a continuously growing civilization, when Europe, unable for the time to find a peaceable solution to the problems of the world's life, resorted to the sword.

If such a reader will remember that a state is simply an aggregation of people bound together more or less closely by a community of interest, little better and little worse than its individual citizens; that statesmen are but selected leaders seeking for the most part to advance the interests of their fellow citizens; he will appreciate better the continuity of the world's life with its alternating periods of peace and war.

If he at first becomes indignant with the world statesmen for involving their citizens in war, with further knowledge he will realize that the statesmen only embodied the ambitions of their own nationals. If he then

turns his indignation upon the peoples themselves, whose selfish ambitions were the ultimate causes of the war, he will find his anger disappearing in admiration of the courage and endurance of these same selfish people once the war began. He will begin to appreciate the great paradox that war, begot by the public selfishness of peace-time, begets mass unselfishness. For the ambitions, the jealousies, the selfishness engendered during peace, produce war during which millions of otherwise commonplace selfish individuals raise themselves to the pinnacle of unselfishness. Under the inspiration of war, people of all countries cheerfully undergo the greatest amount of hardship, find the necessary courage to look death in the face day and night, and at their appointed hour depart. Some go exultantly, some solemnly, nearly all somewhat reluctantly, and all with the noble dignity that accompanies the supreme sacrifice made that others may live.

If a reader delves deeper into the operations of war he will discover that great numbers of men, mostly young, go to war heedless of its causes as to a great adventure for the joy of the conflict itself. These find in combat with fellow men their supreme sport. If they could, they would not live forever content with the pale pleasure of peace. Happily for themselves, they can compress all the emotions they desire from life in a brief highly charged existence.

In a book devoted to the leaders little more will be said of the individuals who composed the fleets and armies of the World War. Their splendid courage gave the lie to the statement, often made before the World War, that improved weapons had increased the horrors of war until the flesh of man could not endure them. The men of the World War showed they were still masters of and unafraid of the weapons civilization had produced.

THE MAJOR EUROPEAN POWERS

During the World War the navies of Great Britain, Germany, France and Japan largely determined the course of naval operations. The naval contributions of Italy and Austria were comparatively negligible. The navy of Turkey in the fall of 1914 had some effect on the Caucasus campaign, after which it faded out of the picture. Russia's navy, after January, 1915, controlled the Black Sea.

The navy of Japan gave the allies control of the western Pacific and assisted in controlling the Indian Ocean, an important naval contribution. But in the main naval theatre, the eastern Atlantic, the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas, the naval operations were determined by the fleets of Britain, Germany and France. On land, the military operations were dominated by the armies of Germany, France, Russia, Austria, Turkey, Great Britain and Italy. To understand the development of the great struggle, it is necessary to recall the pre-war policies of these states.

EUROPE'S POLICIES

During the early nineties, Mahan's books on the influence of sea-power on history became the naval text-books of the world. They created an intense interest in naval affairs all over the world. Europe, in the midst of an era of economic expansion, suddenly became restive under the mild British naval yoke that it had endured submissively for over a century. There followed a rapid increase in European naval programs that soon made it difficult for England to maintain a navy equal to the two next strongest navies. The European naval situation was rudely shaken.

In 1905 Japan defeated Russia and exposed to an astonished Europe the military feebleness of this previously dreaded industrially backward state. France was left to face the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria and Italy in Europe practically alone and the military equilibrium of Continental Europe was upset almost simultaneously with the abrupt change in the naval conditions.

REARRANGEMENT OF ALLIANCES

It was obviously necessary to rearrange the European alliances to preserve the balance of power, and European leaders began various preliminary conferences groping towards a new alignment. During this diplomatic manoeuvring, it was natural that each state should be guided by its own interests, and that each group as formed would support the claims of its individual members. This was the background of the European situation in the decade preceding the war, during which there occurred the Algeciras crisis of 1906, the Austrian seizure of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, the Agadir crisis of 1911, the Italian attack on Tripoli in 1911 and the attack by the Balkan coalition on Turkey in 1912.

The statesmen of Europe were able to preserve the general peace throughout these five critical situations, but each crisis drew the lines more tightly and convinced more people that a general European war was inevitable. In 1905 the three principal alliances were England-Japan—Russia and France—and Germany-Austria-Italy.

By 1914 the political developments necessary to preserve the peace had integrated these three groups into two, the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria and Italy) and the Triple Entente (England, France and Russia). Japan, by her alliance with England, became a limited member of the Triple Entente; Italy, on account of her

ancient hatred of Austria, remained an uneasy member of the Triple Alliance.

In October, 1911, Turkey, alarmed by the proposal of Russia for freedom to use the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, made a final appeal to her traditional friend, England, and offered an alliance. Previous British commitments to Russia forced her Foreign Office to make an evasive reply. This treatment turned Turkey towards Germany and paved the way for her entrance into the war as an ally of the Central Powers, where she did much to compensate for the defection of Italy.

The Balkan states, misgoverned for centuries by Turkey, alternately supported and abandoned by the Great Powers, and torn by their local jealousies had learned much political wariness. After the Balkan War of 1913, Serbia and Montenegro looked definitely to Russia; Bulgaria to Germany and Austria. Rumania and Greece were frankly waiting to join the winning side.

After the Second Balkan War, Bulgaria, disgusted by the treatment she had received from her former allies, concluded a secret treaty of alliance with Turkey. This involved an alliance with Germany and forged the last link in the chain of states that finally formed the Middle Europe bloc. The only bit of real sentiment shown in the entire Balkan tragedy was the determination of the Pan-Slavs in Russia that the Serbian Slavs should be bullied no longer by Austria.

MEMOIRS OF THE LEADERS

The civil and military leaders of the pre-war decade have almost without exception contributed an account of that eventful era. Their memoirs were written with two groups of readers in mind, first those of the home country who must be convinced that their leaders were wise

enough to foresee the possibility of war and make suitable preparations, next those of other countries who must be shown that these same leaders did not endeavor to bring on the war.

The most important of these memoirs were written by men sagacious enough to realize that, with the premature opening of European archives that was forced by the precipitate publication of the Russian documents by the Bolshevik regime, knowledge of the real facts could be delayed only for a short time. They knew that for the long view it was wiser to be factually exact. And they simply retailed their actions as they appeared to them.

As few, if any, of these gentlemen desired war their consciences were doubtless clear and they could write freely. One of the highest-minded of them all, Sir Edward Grey, sadly remarked that the outbreak of war made him feel that his life work was a complete failure. All the evidence indicates that Bethmann-Hollweg worked as sincerely for peace as did Sir Edward Grey.

A comparative study of these illuminating memoirs indicates clearly that no particular statesman or military clan deliberately planned to bring on the war in 1914. An individual here and there harbored an ambitious desire to forward the interests of his state so he might get some personal recognition from his sovereign. A few others scarcely realized the terrific possibilities of an European war.

PRE-WAR STATESMANSHIP

But for the most part Europe's ministers took their responsibilities seriously and walked warily lest a false step bring on the dreaded war. They would not sacrifice any of the vital interests of their states except in the face of greatly superior strength. In which event they withdrew as softly as they could, cushioning their falls

with those ambiguous diplomatic phrases that often occasion a smile to those outside the charmed circle but which serve many useful purposes.

That statesmen of the Triple Entente sincerely desired peace in 1914 is shown by their complete rearrangement of alliances in the short space of ten years, in their desperate efforts to restore the balance of powers in Europe; for their experience had shown that this political equilibrium was the only possible European method of preserving peace. In this regrouping of states old feuds were forgotten by France, England and Russia. A spirit of real conciliation was shown by these former rivals which was partly inspired, it must be stated, by a fear of the growing power of Germany.

It is also to the credit of England and Germany, the real leaders of their respective groups, that they repeatedly sought a formula that would bridge the gap between the two hostile European camps. The only just criticism that idealists can make of these European statesmen is that they did not hesitate to sacrifice the interests of the smaller and backward states to those of the Great Powers, and they were extremely suspicious of their Allies as well as of their rivals.

Probably the completest refutation of the charge that any European statesmen brought on the war is the fact that in the summer of 1914 there was no statesman in a responsible position in Europe with sufficient rashness to provoke a general European war with its unforeseeable results.

The gravest charge that a disinterested student can bring against European statesmen is that they were unable to prevent Europeans from going to war in 1914. In reply they can justly urge that their diplomacy and their system of alliances *did* preserve the peace of Central and Western Europe for forty years.

It is also true that, although rivals at home, when circumstances demanded Europe's pre-war statesmen could work together abroad and the concert of the five great European Powers dominated the Eastern Hemisphere. Under their regime European prestige was at its zenith and European culture spread around the world. Under Europe's present regime its influence scarcely extends beyond its own continental limits.

A true summary of their efforts is that the great majority of Europe's statesmen strove to safeguard the interests of their own state and to preserve the peace. They also observed continuously their own and their neighbor's armaments, for they were resolved that their fellow citizens should not be exposed to the horrors of war unprepared. With their general attitude little fault can be found. Unfortunately the armaments and alliances considered necessary for the security of one state almost automatically became a threat to the security of its neighbors. A tense, unfriendly atmosphere was created.

On many critical occasions European statesmen were equal to moderating the ambitions and calming the passions of their nationals. They brought Europe peacefully through many crises.

In the summer of 1914 they could no longer reconcile the conflicting ambitions of Eastern and Western Europe. The alliances formed to preserve the peace did postpone the war but eventually enlarged its orbit, while Europe's high-spirited people, its modern armaments, its disciplined soldiers and sailors, and its skillful leaders increased the fierceness and duration of the struggle.

Present-day statesmen who seek to preserve the peace of the world, if they really desire to understand the magnitude of the task they have undertaken, should ponder the efforts of these former European statesmen. For if

they realize that their European predecessors strove manfully to maintain the peace, they will not underestimate the international rivalries that are continuously tending to produce war. Neither will they fail to appreciate the difficulties that confront an upright statesman who seeks to preserve the legitimate ambitions of his own people without trespassing upon the rights of his neighbors.

DIFFICULTY OF PRESERVING THE PEACE

The following incidents illustrate the difficulties of preserving the peace of Europe. In February, 1913, with the Balkan War still glowing, General Sir Henry Wilson visited General Foch at Bourges; on his return to England he informed the Under Secretary of State, Sir Arthur Nicolson, that some of the leading French officers believed that it would be better for France if the expected European conflict were not too long delayed.

These French officers believed that Russia was exceedingly strong both financially and militarily. That as Russia's strength increased, she would be more inclined to act independently and might fail to respond to her treaty obligations with France if the cause of the war originated in Western Europe and did not directly concern her. Therefore these French officers welcomed the possibility of an outbreak in the Near East, where Russia's interests were directly concerned. Grey and Nicolson at the Foreign Office both realized that such views did not represent the ideas of the French Government, which was distinctly nervous lest France be drawn into a war with Germany over the Balkans in which France was not directly concerned.

Sir Arthur Nicolson, whose service as Ambassador to Russia gave him a clear idea of the many conflicting forces at work at Petrograd and their effect on the Czar,

never felt quite safe about the entente with Russia. Although convinced that the entente between Russia, France and England offered the best chance to preserve the peace of Europe, he was always apprehensive that Germany might succeed in detaching Russia from the Entente. And in 1905 Emperor William did actually obtain the Czar's signature to an agreement, subsequently disavowed, that would have nullified the Franco-Russian alliance.

On another occasion Russia sought a secret understanding with Austria about the division of the Balkan states independently of their respective allies. These were really small intrigues instigated by individuals and in the end had no effect on the two European alliances except to breed suspicion and make diplomats fidgety and foreign ministers more nervous. Even the rulers of autocratic Russia dared not ignore the Pan-Slavic movement in favor of Serbia, and in Western Europe public opinion dictated foreign policies.

EUROPEAN RESOURCES

After its long peace Europe was well prepared to support war and her growing wealth obviously required and justified large military protection. A strong feeling of nationalism made European peoples willing to support their armies and navies. It should have been plain that a contest between two huge European alliances containing such material resources and millions of high-spirited people would be long sustained. Yet most prophets predicted a short war, primarily on account of the cost, and their voices drowned the solemn warning of von Moltke, uttered in 1890, that the next European war might last seven years, or even thirty years.

CHAPTER II

BASIC CAUSES OF THE WAR

Basic Causes of the War—Clémenceau and King Edward—Economic Rivalry between Germany and England—In the East—Britain's Position in the Persian Gulf—Russia and Britain Partition Persia

IN Western Europe the controlling factor in the pre-war situation was the danger to England if Germany overran France and established her powerful navy on the English Channel. This peril was so real, and by 1914 was so generally understood throughout England, that informed English public opinion was prepared to join in the defense of the French Channel coasts, no matter what the cause of a Franco-German war. The difficulty in England was that the bulk of her people were scarcely conscious of their peril. The question was too delicate for full discussion in the Parliament or press, and leaders in England, aware of their danger, were afraid Germany would be able to overrun France before public opinion would support Parliament in intervening.

J. A. Spender, for years editor of *The Westminster Gazette*, a friend and counsellor of Asquith, expressed this view very clearly. He said: "It is nevertheless true—and perhaps the most important part of the truth about the old Europe (of 1914)—that if Germany had been incontestably in the right and her conduct of the war irreproachable, the reasons compelling this country (England) to take sides against her (Germany) would have been just as strong, and its position just as perilous, if it had failed to do so. . . . Whatever the issue . . .

a victorious Germany in possession of Belgium and the Channel ports and commanding all the fleets of Europe must have been a deadly menace to the British Empire. . . .”

CLÉMENTEAU AND KING EDWARD

A great Frenchman, Clémenceau, fully aware of the situation, gave the same reason as the determining factor that obliged Great Britain to support France in the World War. In August, 1908, he told King Edward: “If war comes (with Germany) and we are smashed for want of timely help from you . . . you will have to bow your necks to the victor.” He developed this argument from the French viewpoint by asking what help the British fleet would be to France during an overwhelming German invasion of France through Belgium and reminded his royal listener that Germany had no fleet in 1870, yet the German army captured Paris.

Clémenceau warned King Edward that “if by some imprudence on the part of English public men” a conflict between Germany and England was precipitated, “German armies will invade France by way of Belgium, and Germany will seek in France an indemnity for the losses she is likely to suffer on sea at the hands of England.” He therefore urged that England exercise the greatest caution in dealing with Germany, lest *France* be destroyed.

Assuming that England’s policy still aimed to prevent the domination of Europe by any one Power, Clémenceau asserted that England could no longer do so without an adequate army, reminding Edward that it was not the brilliant naval victory of Trafalgar but the small land battle of Waterloo that overthrew Napoleon.

This conversation between King Edward and Prime

Minister Clémenceau is one of the frankest on record, and while it must have hurt the pride of the English sovereign to be told that in 1908 the English entente with France not only failed to assist but actually jeopardized that country, he was too well informed to question the accuracy of the statement. Clémenceau then pointed to the remedy, "England cannot maintain her position in Europe . . . unless she has an adequate army."

King Edward, convinced of the justness of Clémenceau's observation, said, "Clémenceau is a true friend of his own country and of ours." Clémenceau had previously expressed these same sentiments to the Prime Minister, Campbell-Bannerman, and the Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey.

On his return to England, King Edward placed his influence behind Haldane, Wilson, French, Haig, Hamilton and other army leaders who were busy preparing the British Expeditionary Force to assist the French in resisting a possible German invasion.

ECONOMIC RIVALRY BETWEEN GERMANY AND ENGLAND

Concurrent with the actual German threat to the British insular security was the German economic menace to British overseas markets. Neutralizing to a great extent their economic rivalry was the large exchange of trade between Britain and Germany, each being the other's best customer. And during the last days of peace, leading financiers and industrialists in both Germany and England diligently sought a peaceful solution of the perplexing problem of Europe.

The next large factor in the pre-war situation was the rapid growth of the German fleet. Germany's building program had made it financially burdensome for England to maintain a fleet equal to the combined fleets of

any two other European states. In recompense for British military and naval assistance, France was in a position to assist Great Britain in the Mediterranean with her fleet by maintaining communications with British overseas garrisons and possessions. In the decade before the war, a few leaders in France and England completely understood this situation, and were guided throughout that troublesome period by the realization that, come what would, France and England must stand together or they could be defeated in succession by Germany.

IN THE EAST

In Eastern Europe the basic cause of the war was the rivalry between Austria and Russia for the former Turkish provinces in the Balkan peninsula.

Russia supported and Austria opposed the Serbian aspirations. Germany was seeking special privileges in Turkey, mainly in Mesopotamia, to enable her citizens to finish the Constantinople-to-Bagdad railway, and for the time opposed any breakup of the Turkish Empire. Germany was bound to support Austria, her feeble but faithful ally, for the identical reason that England had to support France. If Russia crushed Austria and absorbed Serbia by a protectorate, Germany would be enveloped by Russia, and left practically alone in Central Europe to resist the Slavic advance westward.

In addition to Germany's commercial and naval rivalry with England, these states had a specific dispute over the proposed Berlin-Bagdad railway, which, when completed, would penetrate Mesopotamia, previously under England's sole commercial control through her monopoly of the steamers plying the Euphrates and Tigris. But Grey and Bethmann-Hollweg had agreed upon a peaceful solution for this dispute in the spring of 1913.

These simultaneous rivalries between two European groups, including five great Powers, were the two root causes of war which existed in Eastern and Western Europe in 1914. The European atmosphere was tense, suspicion was general and there was an almost universal fear of the future. The murder of an unpopular Austrian archduke at Sarajevo at another time would not have jeopardized the peace of the world. But in the atmosphere of 1914, with the existing alliances, this crime was the spark that ignited the powder train to Europe's magazine.

BRITAIN'S POSITION IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Although in possession of Mesopotamia over four centuries, the Turks have never completely subjugated the Arab tribes. A century and a quarter after the Turks took possession of this land the British East India Company contracted with the Shah of Persia to keep two men-of-war constantly in the Persian Gulf for police duty. The British Government inherited this obligation and for about three centuries the British have been in practical control of the Persian Gulf, and they have had the same difficulty controlling the Arabs on the islands and coasts of the Persian Gulf that the Turks have had on the mainland.

The special position of the British in the river and the gulf was acknowledged by certain treaties with Persia, Turkey and the Arab tribes, and was generally acquiesced in by the rest of the world until about 1900, when, as previously stated, it was challenged by the German proposal to build and control the Bagdad railway and extend it to a water terminal on the gulf.

The safety of India has been the primary concern of Britain's Eastern policy for over a century; it automati-

cally involved a latent hostility to Russia, whose expansion in Asia made her India's nearest European neighbor until 1907, when the Anglo-Russian convention reconciled the long-standing differences between these two empires, and Britain's old enemy became her quasi ally.

Turkey then became the nearest possible enemy and India's relations with Turkey grew still more complicated. While the British Foreign Office controlled the negotiations between Great Britain, Turkey and Persia, the Indian Government controlled affairs on the Persian Gulf through a Political Resident stationed at Bushire on the southwest coast of Persia. The Political Resident also acted as British Consul General to the nominally independent Persian cities, and exercised an ill-defined but large power over the Arab tribes around Muscat, Bahreen and Kuwait and along the coasts. His decisions were enforced by vessels of the Indian marine.

RUSSIA AND BRITAIN PARTITION PERSIA

In 1907 the British Government established a protectorate over the southern part of Persia; Russia over the northern part. The central part remained a nominally independent buffer state. Theoretically, British and Russian interests in the Middle East were reconciled, and the establishment of a neutral and British zone effectually prevented the construction of a trans-Persian railway by Russia to connect with her railways in Caucasia and Turkestan.

Operating through the Indian Government, the British Government continued to strengthen its control of the Persian Gulf. In the spring of 1914 Sir Edward Grey felt that, without prejudice to British interests, he could permit the Germans to construct the Berlin-Bagdad railway, provided its terminal was Basra, and the Turkish

and German Governments acknowledged Britain's concessions on the Mesopotamia rivers, its privileged status in the Persian Gulf, and its right to build a railway from a point on the gulf to Bastra if it ever desired to do so. This was the basis of the agreement practically reached between Lichnowsky, German Ambassador to London, and Grey, shortly before the murder at Sarajevo precipitated the struggle between Russia, Serbia and Austria.

A study of the map will show that Grey had fully protected the interests of Great Britain. He secured for his country the water terminals on the Persian Gulf of any railway through the Near East. By partitioning Persia he prevented Germany from advancing the railway from Bagdad overland to Teheran and also thwarted the plan of his ally Russia for a trans-Persian railway. Regarded as a matter to be settled solely between three empires, without considering the wishes of the local inhabitants, the two agreements made a fairly even division of the spoils and were satisfactory to London, Saint Petersburg and Berlin.

The Turks and the Persians soon learned of the Anglo-Russian agreement. It was the basic reason for Turkey's joining the Triple Alliance. Persia, surrounded by the Russian army on the north, the British army in India, and the British navy in the Persian Gulf, was helpless, but she was resentful and when the war commenced, turned to the Central Powers for relief.

CHAPTER III

EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY AND WAR

European Diplomacy and War—The Advent of the German Fleet—
Emperor William and Admiral von Tirpitz—Effect of International Tensions on Peace-time Dispositions of European Fleets

IN the forty years preceding the World War, the study of war and diplomacy had been systematically carried on in all the leading states of Europe. With the exception of a few self-assured statesmen, a better understanding existed between European statesmen, admirals and generals than ever before. The theory of Clausewitz that war is a continuation by force of peace-time policy was accepted generally throughout Europe. Mahan had recalled to a short-sighted world the value of sea-power. Among the great Powers there was close liaison between the Foreign Office, the Admiralty and the War Office. Consequently, there was a rapid reaction of armies and fleets to any changes in the diplomatic situation.

Throughout Europe there was loose talk of striking before declaration of war. Thus Fisher proposed, jocosely it is said, to "Copenhagen" the German fleet, while it was still small. Some English army leaders believed that if they introduced conscription in England, Germany would attack them at once. And France lived in fear, from 1905 to 1912, that Germany would seek some pretext for a sudden blow. Sir Edward Grey warned the British Admiralty in 1911 that he hoped to preserve the peace, but "the fleets should always be in such condition and position that they would welcome an attack by Germany." At the same time Germany really dreaded the

steadily increasing Russian army with its enormous reserve of man-power, and was determined should a crisis arise to anticipate their comparatively slow mobilization. European armies and fleets became so alert after 1911 that there was practically no opportunity for a surprise attack ashore or afloat.

The first von Moltke had shown in 1870 the advantage of preparation and a proper peace-time disposition of troops. His ideas were copied in fleets as well as armies, and from 1905 to 1912 the fleets of Europe successively took peace-time stations to facilitate the naval concentrations and operations necessary to carry out the various treaty obligations.

THE ADVENT OF THE GERMAN FLEET—EMPEROR WILLIAM AND ADMIRAL VON TIRPITZ

The German army had created and maintained the German Empire, it had first claim on the resources of the grateful German people. Nevertheless the Reichstag had been very generous to the fleet, as its rapid growth in the decade before the war showed. The German Navy League, the joint creation of Emperor William and Admiral von Tirpitz, revived the old Hanseatic traditions. The fleet became the pet of Germany and personified the united empire even more than the German army, which was composed of the individual armies of the various German states that retained their local state pride and, in some instances, organization.

Mahan's books on sea-power were, by the Emperor's order, translated into German and placed in every naval library; the desire for sea-power spread to the inland German states. Von Tirpitz embodied this German navalism. And as Mahan had shown that the British Empire arose over the successive ruins of Spanish, Dutch

and French sea-power, von Tirpitz urged his countrymen to be on guard lest their foreign trade and their young but flourishing merchant marine be blotted out in some future war by Britain's fleet.

Ostensibly, von Tirpitz did not aspire to a fleet equal to Britain's. Nor could Germany, already supporting the world's best army, afford the world's largest fleet. Von Tirpitz limited his projected fleet to one that the largest fleet in the world, that is, Britain's, would hesitate to attack; he asserted Germany's fleet would thus have a formidable "alliance" value. In his enthusiasm he overlooked the fact that Great Britain was already in alliance with Japan and very friendly with France, whose fleets were really powerful, while the navies of the European states open to negotiations were negligible.

Von Tirpitz, employing the Navy League and other civilian associations, was able to mold German opinion; he enjoyed the confidence of the Emperor, who also looked beyond the sea to a Greater Germany. Thus, von Tirpitz exercised an immense influence on the policies of Germany, and at times overbore the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg.

EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION ON PEACE-TIME DISPOSITIONS OF EUROPEAN FLEETS

As early as 1904, Lord Fisher commenced to concentrate British battleships in their home waters on account of the growing German fleet. By 1909 the European situation was so threatening that Germany permitted no large detachment of the German High Seas Fleet to cruise farther from the North Sea than Norway. Germany also encouraged Austria to build a fleet, and together with Italy agreed upon the concentration areas of the fleets of the "Triple Alliance."

Germany suffered a serious diplomatic defeat during the second Morocco crisis in 1911. Tension became so acute that Grey told the Admiralty that the Foreign Office would inform their navy instantly of "any unfavorable turn in the negotiations between France and Germany," but German action might follow rapidly on such development. This crisis revealed to Germany that England had grown very close to France. Admiral von Tirpitz advocated an accelerated naval program, insisting to the Kaiser that Germany would continue to be overborne by England and France until her fleet was stronger. Von Tirpitz was supported by German public opinion and although opposed by Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, the Kaiser and the Reichstag approved the increased German naval bill.

Thoughtful people in England and Germany were shocked when they realized how closely the two countries had come to war in 1911; unofficial measures were taken by influential citizens in both countries to assist their governments to reach an understanding. The Emperor authorized the Chancellor to seek a naval agreement with England; the British Government responded favorably and sent Haldane to Germany in February, 1912, to negotiate a naval holiday. Both governments sincerely desired peace, but only on their own terms. England was not willing to surrender its naval superiority nor to abandon France. Germany would not concede continued predominance at sea to Britain unless Britain would acknowledge Germany's predominance in Europe, and sought to detach Britain from France.

The Emperor offered to cease naval competition provided England would agree to remain neutral in the event Germany went to war. Haldane could not make this promise in view of the previous engagements with France and Russia. This meeting in Berlin was friendly

and the Kaiser gave Haldane a copy of his new naval program, but it was impossible to find a basis for an Anglo-German naval ratio. Germany considered that England was now definitely committed to France and energetically pursued her naval development, and continued her efforts to detach Russia from the Entente. No further attempt was made by Germany and England to limit their navies by mutual agreement.

CHAPTER IV

GREAT BRITAIN'S PREPARATIONS

Great Britain's Preparations—Preparation of the German, French and Russian Armies—Organization of Europe's Armies—Rapidity of Mobilization—Joffre and Plan XVII—British Fleet Abandons the Mediterranean in 1912

IN England, the navy under Admiral Sir John Fisher and Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, was slow to appreciate the European military situation. Admiral Wilson, First Sea Lord, was not in close contact with his own War Office and in the late summer of 1911 was planning, in the event of war with Germany, to land small army expeditions on the German Baltic coast or on the sandy islands that fringe the German North Sea coast, following the same futile tactics that Pitt used in the first part of the Seven Years' War, when he was serving his novitiate in the War Ministry.

This naval plan still existed in the fall of 1911, after the army had completed its plan to land an Expeditionary Force of one cavalry and six infantry Divisions in France. Following an explosive meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defense in 1911, Haldane, England's able Minister of War, refused to remain at the War Office unless the Admiralty revised their war plan. Prime Minister Asquith relieved McKenna, the First Lord, and Admiral Wilson, First Sea Lord, by Winston Churchill and Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg, and gave Churchill orders to establish a naval staff and to provide a proper liaison with the army that would permit the government to carry out its promises to France.

After this Cabinet shift, Asquith, Grey, Haldane and Churchill co-ordinated the diplomacy and the navy and army of Great Britain. During the last two years of peace, the Permanent Under Secretary of State, Nicolson, Sir Henry Wilson, Director of Operations of the War Office, and Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, were in continuous consultation.

Haldane has given us their pre-war conception of Britain's rôle as follows: "England's might lay in final analysis in her sea-power. She needed also a small but very perfect army, capable of high rapidity in concentration by the side of the great French army in order to prevent the coasts of France, close to our own, from being occupied by an enemy invading French territory." This strategical conception naturally followed from Clémenceau's conversations with King Edward in 1909. As War Minister, Haldane prepared the Expeditionary Force to meet this requirement.

PREPARATION OF THE GERMAN, FRENCH AND RUSSIAN ARMIES

In the summer of 1911, when the Agadir crisis was at its height, the French Government made Joffre chief of staff and prospective commander-in-chief of the French army on mobilization. General Pau had been the first choice of the French Government for command, but he would not accept unless he could have complete liberty in the selection of general officers. This authority the War Minister, Messimy, and the government, were unwilling to concede to their real choice for general in chief.

Joffre assumed command under the conditions unacceptable to Pau. Almost immediately he found himself hampered, for General Foch, his first selection for his

leading assistant, was not in favor with Messimy. Joffre was obliged to take General de Castelnau, an excellent officer, but his second choice for the position.

The Agadir crisis quickened the military preparations all over Europe, and in 1912 Germany made a large increase in her army. France, hampered by her Socialists, who opposed any increase in the military establishment, finally, late in 1913, passed the three-year law, which added to the covering forces one active army corps.

After their manœuvres during the summer of 1911, the Russian General Staff promised Joffre to expedite their mobilization and concentration in every way possible. They also agreed to begin their offensive when "their first line forces were in position" without waiting to complete their concentration. It was the Russian staff's estimate that their advance forces could cross the German frontier on the sixteenth day of mobilization.

ORGANIZATION OF EUROPE'S ARMIES

The leading European armies were organized on the same general pattern, and were modelled after the German. The infantry division is the basic unit of an army and is the smallest command whose normal organization contains a compartment of all arms except cavalry and air corps. In addition it has its own services, such as engineers, medical troops, quartermaster troops and its own supply trains. It is self-contained, self-sustaining and is capable of independent action.

In European armies, divisions were approximately equal, totalling about 18,000 men for an infantry division, of whom, roughly, 12,000 were infantry. In addition, armies had cavalry divisions, each being considerably smaller than an infantry division, totalling between 4,000 and 6,000 men, made up mainly of mounted troops

and horse artillery which would furnish about 4,000 sabres. During the war, first Germany, second France, and afterwards the other European armies, reduced the number of infantry battalions in a division by one-quarter to one-third. The battalions thus made available formed the infantry component of newly raised divisions. As the battle lines stabilized, the ratio of heavy and light artillery to the infantry continuously augmented. The number of machine guns in the units of all armies increased steadily until the armistice.

These divisions were grouped upwards into army corps of two or more divisions. Armies of two or more corps, and, finally, groups of armies, of two or more armies. The normal unit subject to effective control in combat by an individual officer was the battalion of infantry, composed of four companies of approximately 250 men each. Thus a battalion at full strength in 1914 could be counted as a thousand rifles.

The European divisions, being about the same size, furnished a convenient unit of comparison, and were used for comparing the strength of European armies, just as contemporary battleships are used to compare fleets. The Continental armies in 1914 were huge. The chain of command beginning with General Headquarters extended through the field armies and army corps to the lowest echelons. The smallest unit usually considered by General Headquarters was the army corps. To facilitate command it became necessary during the early part of the war to create a new echelon, the group of armies next below the General Headquarters.

RAPIDITY OF MOBILIZATION

By 1912 the Russian mobilization had been improved, so that on the fifteenth day it was calculated that eight

or nine army corps would be facing East Prussia from Kovno to Warsaw, while seven army corps would face Austria in Galicia. In another five days Russia would add two army corps to each front, with a reserve army of four army corps at Brest-Litovsk. Within three weeks, twenty-four of Russia's twenty-seven active army corps would be ready, and within four weeks the bulk of her twenty-eight reserve divisions would be in their concentration zones. Russia substantially accomplished this estimate in August, 1914, and it is only necessary to contemplate the enormous numbers of moujiks at the Czar's command to realize that they did constitute a continuous menace to Germany, and that the fears of the German General Staff for their eastern frontiers had a substantial basis in fact.

The French and Russian leaders both believed that Germany would employ the bulk of her army to strike at France first, in the hope of quickly destroying the French army, and then turning eastward to destroy the Russian army. To meet this threat of being defeated separately, the French and Russian leaders agreed to take the offensive simultaneously at the earliest possible moment, the Russians in East Prussia, the French in Alsace-Lorraine.

Joffre endeavored from 1912 on to prepare the army for this offensive campaign by indoctrinating every branch and echelon of the army with the offensive spirit. The means he used were the various army schools, map exercises and terrain exercises. Joffre succeeded in getting his idea accepted by the French army, whose personnel took very kindly to the theory of the offensive; but he found that the "French army, long compressed in a defensive mold, possessed neither doctrine nor instructions. . . . Officers high in command showed themselves as skeptical as they were helpless." Unfortunately

the few remaining months of peace left to Joffre would not permit the instruction of this army in the military technique essential for a successful offensive.

JOFFRE AND PLAN XVII

In addition to the restrictions placed upon Joffre by the politicians and the instability of French Cabinets, Joffre was further handicapped by the necessity of avoiding even the suspicion of violating Belgium's neutrality. A large section of Belgian opinion inclined towards Germany; the bulk of the Belgian population desired most of all to be left undisturbed by the belligerents.

During the pre-war period, in the vain hope of preserving her neutrality, Belgium scrupulously held aloof from any commitments to France or Germany. Nor would she even hint her intention to England or take precautionary measures to insure co-operation with France or England in the event Germany violated her territory. To all questioners she reiterated her determination to protect her neutrality against all comers.

The group in England led by General Sir Henry Wilson, which was anxious to see Britain join France at the earliest possible moment, warned Joffre against any, even apparent, violation of Belgian neutrality by France, for such action would so affect British public opinion that all hope of immediate participation of the British army on the side of France would be lost. Joffre realized that any tactical advantage France might gain by advancing through Belgium would be dearly purchased if it occasioned any delay in the arrival of the British army, so he very carefully refrained, even in his secret plans, from considering the march through Belgium.

He did discuss the Belgian problem with certain members of the French Cabinet and obtained their permission

to operate in Belgium if Germany advanced through that country to invade France. And Joffre arranged his first concentration under Plan XVII, so that he retained a limited freedom of action that would enable him to operate in eastern Belgium.

By 1913 the general staffs of England and France believed they could not only protect France but, swayed by the optimistic ideas of Foch and his disciples, the French general staff came to the sanguine conclusion that the French army could take the offensive against Germany in Alsace and Lorraine.

BRITISH FLEET ABANDONS THE MEDITERRANEAN IN 1912

In May, 1912, the British Admiralty considered it necessary to withdraw all battleships from the Mediterranean to their home waters in order to maintain the essential naval superiority over Germany in the North Sea. The British army immediately inquired if the communications of its garrisons in the Mediterranean could be guaranteed under the new naval dispositions. The navy could not give the necessary assurance. This acute army-navy problem forced the Cabinet to consider the critical position of the empire's communications. The fleet of Britain's ally, Japan, secured British communications in the Far East. The British fleet could hold the North Sea and Atlantic, but could not control the Mediterranean, which was not only important of itself but was the essential waterway that connected the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean.

The Foreign Office, already thoroughly informed of the situation, advised the Cabinet that there were three courses of action open to the government. It could come to an understanding with Germany; or it could increase

the British navy so that the fleet in home waters could dominate the German fleet and have sufficient surplus ships to maintain the empire's sea communications in the Mediterranean, or it could entrust British interests in the Mediterranean Sea to France. The first course involved recognizing Germany as the dominant Continental Power and was rejected as repugnant to British interests. The second involved larger expenditures on the fleet and increased taxation; it was rejected for economic reasons. The third course definitely committed Great Britain to guard French interests in the Atlantic in exchange for French assistance in the Mediterranean and was accepted as the least objectionable procedure open to the government.

In early October, 1912, the whole British Cabinet learned of the conversations that their Foreign Office and War Office had been carrying on with France since 1906. Members insisted that the situation be defined and reduced to writing. The resulting written agreement between France and England provided that in any future crisis threatening the peace of Europe the governments of the two states would hold an immediate discussion in order to be prepared to take measures in common. This written pact contained a qualifying clause that the discussion between military and naval agents did not constitute "an agreement that commits either government to action in a contingency that has not arisen."

As finally drawn this agreement pleased both governments; the French leaders believed Britain had pledged her support to France in writing. Most of the British Cabinet, relying upon the qualifying clause, considered that Britain had preserved entire liberty of action and at the worst had promised France naval support only. Legally perhaps neither state was bound to come to the assistance of the other, but after 1912 honor and military

necessity compelled them to unite in order to face a powerful and ambitious Germany.

In the spring of 1913 when the British fleet concentrated in the North Sea and the French in the Mediterranean, the new naval dispositions disclosed the naval plans of the two states to thoughtful naval observers as fully as the German strategic railways revealed the plan of the German army to advance through Belgium. From this date Great Britain was committed to the Entente.

CHAPTER V

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN 1914

The British Government in 1914—Intervention or Neutrality—Prime Minister Asquith—Grey's Responsibility—Asquith's Decision—The Critical Day

PRIME MINISTER HERBERT ASQUITH headed the Liberal Cabinet that governed the United Kingdom in July, 1914. He had succeeded another Liberal Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, early in 1908. Campbell-Bannerman, who led the Liberal party to victory in December, 1905, had openly opposed the Boer War and was regarded as an anti-imperialist or Little Englander. He was supported in these views by Lord John Morley, Sir John Reid (afterwards Lord Loreburn), David Lloyd George and the majority of the Liberal members of Parliament.

A small but powerful group of Liberals led by Lord Rosebery, Sir Edward Grey, Richard Burton Haldane (afterwards Lord Haldane) and Herbert Asquith, put patriotism above party and supported the Conservative government during the Boer War. The feeling between these two groups of Liberals was very bitter during the Boer War, and although time and subsequent issues tempered their wrath, the cleavage in the party was never entirely closed.

Asquith, even in his younger day, was a master of the art of conciliation and he managed to work with the Liberal imperialists without offending Campbell-Bannerman, leader of the opposite group. In consequence, when Campbell-Bannerman came into power he made Asquith

Chancellor of the Exchequer and the logical successor to the Premiership.

Campbell-Bannerman brought into his Cabinet the two groups, Liberal imperialists and the Little Englanders. They were fairly united on domestic issues, but held radically different views on Britain's foreign policy, and it required the tact, patience and political sagacity of their leader to hold them together.

Sir Edward Grey had served as Under Secretary of State in the Foreign Office as assistant to Lord Rosebery in the last Gladstone administration. During his tenure, Rosebery, presuming somewhat on Gladstone's age, had taken an independent attitude towards the remainder of the Cabinet and did not deign to explain the intricate negotiations of the Foreign Office to all his colleagues. This course of action had many advantages, because in the early stages of international negotiations it is often not desirable to indulge in public discussion of the affairs under consideration. Rosebery had ample British precedent for this procedure.

When Grey, who was naturally reserved and reticent, became Foreign Secretary under Campbell-Bannerman, he followed the custom of Rosebery and did not keep his colleagues entirely informed of foreign affairs. During his two years as Prime Minister, Campbell-Bannerman acquiesced in Grey's procedure. When Asquith became Prime Minister in 1908, he also allowed Grey, who enjoyed his entire confidence, to continue this practice.

Grey appreciated that he must keep the navy and army fully informed of the international situation and communicated freely with the Secretary of State for War, Richard B. Haldane, who was also a personal friend, and the First Sea Lords, Reginald McKenna and Winston Churchill. Thus it developed that a small group of

the Cabinet, consisting of Campbell-Bannerman, Asquith, Grey, Haldane, McKenna and later Winston Churchill, were always informed of the international situation, while the remainder were only occasionally taken into Grey's confidence and partly informed. Of the members left in the semi-darkness, the most important was David Lloyd George.

INTERVENTION OR NEUTRALITY

When Winston Churchill first joined the Cabinet, he and Lloyd George were closely associated and both of them opposed the appropriations for the navy. Churchill was transferred to the Admiralty in 1912, his responsibility for the efficiency of the fleet quickly caused him to change his views and he became a supporter of the navy. His lively intelligence soon convinced him that Great Britain could not stand aside during an European war. He knew the danger of delaying the decision, and as soon as the situation on the Continent became acute he openly advocated intervention. On 30 July he opened negotiations through F. E. Smith, afterwards Lord Birkenhead, with the leaders of the Conservative party, to ascertain the attitude of the party in opposition.

Churchill was the logical mediator between the two parties, for he had been reared a Conservative, and his family connections gave him easy access to many prominent Conservatives.

Another active and effective advocate of immediate intervention, although not in the Cabinet, was General Sir Henry Wilson, afterwards Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson. He was in charge of the army's mobilization plan, a confidant of General Ferdinand Foch, and was fully aware of the danger of any delay in the despatch of the British Expeditionary Force to Europe. He was

an ardent Ulsterite and had almost compromised himself by open rebellion during the Curragh incident. He had much influence over Sir Edward Carson, leader of the Ulsterites, and other influential Unionists. During the crisis he canvassed the West End of London, urging the necessity of immediate intervention.

While the advocates of intervention were active, the majority in the Cabinet were at first opposed to war, and turned to Lloyd George for the necessary leadership. He accepted the task. Ranged behind Lloyd George were Lord Morley, Mr. John Burns, Sir John Simon, Lord Beauchamp and Mr. Hobhouse. They were for an immediate declaration of neutrality. Churchill was the only open advocate of immediate intervention. At first Grey was non-committal. Asquith, ably seconded by Lord Crewe, was seeking a solution that would hold the government together.

The permanent officials at the Foreign Office, led by Sir Arthur Nicolson, afterwards Lord Carnock, and Sir Eyre Crowe, were convinced that intervention was inevitable and they feared that if the government hesitated over long, it might enter too late to save France from destruction. In addition, Nicolson felt that the United Kingdom by accepting French naval aid in the Mediterranean was in honor pledged to go to the assistance of France. He was in continuous communication with General Wilson; both of them were Ulsterites and, by their personal contacts, soon learned that the Unionists would support intervention.

PRIME MINISTER ASQUITH

The decision of the government eventually lay with Prime Minister Asquith, and in accordance with his temperament and training he allowed the Cabinet to

deliberate, and retained the detached view traditional with his office while his colleagues sought a mental meeting-ground. Critics of this method allege that the real reason for such deliberation is to enable the party-whips to canvass public opinion. It is obvious, however, that a representative government cannot outrun the general public opinion, and pronounced interventionists admitted that this crisis was developing so rapidly there was danger that good average citizens would not appreciate the situation and the necessity of a prompt decision.

GREY'S RESPONSIBILITY

Asquith's two closest confidants in the Cabinet were Grey and Haldane, and he was in continuous communication with them. By 29 July officials in both Russia and Germany had charged that England was jeopardizing the peace by refusing to take a definite stand. This was not a new charge. In fact it had been made by some very distinguished Englishmen, including Sir Arthur Nicolson, who urged before 1914 that the entente with France and Russia be extended into a formal alliance. He believed the combination of these three great Powers would overawe Germany and effect a peaceful solution to the European situation.

Nicolson's hypothesis was based on the assumption that, in the face of an open alliance between Great Britain, France and Russia, Germany would not dare to go to war. It was open to the objection that while it might tend to restrain Germany, it would almost certainly encourage the French and Russian chauvinists. Grey had seen the bad effect of Germany's giving Austria unconditional support in 1908. He had no intention of underwriting in advance the decisions of France and Russia.

Some Germans charge that Grey deliberately con-

ceased Britain's intentions until Germany was completely involved in order to encompass her destruction. Some of his own countrymen have charged that Grey led them into an unnecessary war by a failure to take a more pronounced stand; others have charged that he committed his country on his personal responsibility and then demanded that the country redeem a pledge it would not have made had it been kept fully informed.

There is a very small evidence to support any of these charges. There was no lack of effort to preserve the peace by Grey, nor was there any Machiavellian machination on his part to accomplish the destruction of Germany. Nor was Grey responsible for the dangerous delay in reaching a decision. The vacillation of Great Britain was due to the nature of its government. The parliamentary system, headed by a large, unwieldy Cabinet, could not control effectively the foreign policy of the government during the critical years before the war, nor during the tense period immediately before war occurred. The responsible members of the government were aware of this weakness and vainly attempted to coordinate the diplomacy and the armed forces of the British Empire.

ASQUITH'S DECISION

The world has given Grey the credit or discredit for the foreign policy of Great Britain, yet he was always the loyal subordinate of Asquith and particularly throughout the entire European crisis. Asquith, in two books, has given a very illuminating account of the period.

On 26 July, Asquith wrote that "It is the most dangerous situation of the last forty years" and further stated that Austria has a good case against Serbia. The state-

ment about Austria is very significant. British sympathy first went to Austria; the British public have little love for political assassinations. A previous British Government had refused for years to recognize a Serbian dynasty that succeeded to the throne by a royal murder. But in 1914 Britain and Austria were in opposite camps. Sentiment must be laid aside. On 29 July Russia began mobilization and Germany proclaimed a state of "immediate danger of war." Asquith consulted with Grey and Haldane and authorized the "precautionary period" for the British army and navy.

On 30 July Monsieur Paul Cambon, French Ambassador, called Grey's attention to the British promise to consult with France when the peace of Europe was threatened. On 31 July, Asquith, after a Cabinet meeting, authorized Grey to tell Cambon that Britain was under no obligation to France, could give no pledges, and that the future action of the government must depend upon the course of events and the reaction of public opinion.

On 1 August Germany declared war on Russia, France ordered mobilization. Even then Asquith agreed with Lloyd George, who was all for peace. Grey informed Asquith that he would resign if an out-and-out policy of non-intervention was adopted. Asquith, on this day, determined that if Grey resigned, he too would "go and the whole thing (the government) break up." When Grey informed Nicolson, his Assistant Secretary of State, that the government would not move, Nicolson replied, "You will render us a by-word among nations." Had Nicolson been aware of his chief's statement to Asquith perhaps he would not have used such bitter words.

For a few days Lloyd George held the key to the Cabinet situation. A majority of the Cabinet were still for peace, and as long as Lloyd George led them they could control the situation. Asquith, Grey, Haldane and

the few others who opposed a declaration of neutrality, could only resign and leave the country to face this situation with a leaderless government. Resignation under such circumstances might involve the country in a political chaos. A less prudent statesman than Asquith might well pause. Even if Asquith could have carried the Cabinet with him on 1 August, it was doubtful if a majority of the Parliament would have supported the Cabinet. If Parliament failed to support the government under the Parliamentary system, a general election would become necessary, and before it could be completed the military decision in France would probably be reached. All these possibilities confronted Asquith as he continued to take stock of the Cabinet's mind.

THE CRITICAL DAY

On 2 August Asquith faced a still darker situation. Germany was at war with France and Russia. Luxembourg had been invaded; Belgium was threatened. Lichnowsky, German Ambassador, made a tearful appeal to Asquith to remain neutral. Asquith replied that Germany could make British intervention remote by not invading Belgium and by not attacking the north coast of France.

This 2d day of August was the critical day for the Cabinet, which again almost split on the question of intervention. It became plain that at least a part of Belgium would be violated, nevertheless Lloyd George resisted all arguments for intervention, asserting that only a diminutive portion of a small state would be harmed and that Germany could and would make ample restitution. A compromise agreement finally authorized Grey to tell Cambon that the British fleet would not permit the German fleet to make the English Channel a base

of operations against France. Lord Crewe bore a prominent part in holding the Cabinet together.

As late as 2 August, Asquith considered that the British were under no obligation to give France or Russia military assistance, but he was convinced that it was against British interests to allow France to be destroyed, or Belgium to be absorbed by Germany. While Asquith was thus struggling to hold his own party together, he received a communication from Bonar Law and Lord Lansdowne, leaders of the Conservative (Unionist) party, stating that "it would be fatal to the honor and security of the United Kingdom to hesitate in supporting France and Russia in this present juncture." This assurance greatly strengthened Asquith's hands, for he was now certain of a Parliamentary majority, even if many of his own Cabinet colleagues deserted him. He could take a stronger line, but he was a devoted Liberal and the party leader. He had fought these Conservatives since his youth and he did not relish the idea of depending upon their support. He sought to bring a united party as well as a united country into the war.

On the evening of 2 August the German ultimatum was sent to Belgium; on the morning of the 3d King Albert appealed to King George and the British people. Germany declared war on France. A majority of the Cabinet was now convinced that intervention was inevitable. Grey laid before the Cabinet his proposed speech to the House of Commons, explaining the aims and purposes of the government, and it was approved. The Cabinet also sanctioned the mobilization of the fleet, already accomplished, and the immediate mobilization of the army.

In the afternoon of 3 August, Grey made his now famous speech in the House of Commons and was applauded as he sat down. The reception of Grey's speech

greatly encouraged the members of the government who believed in intervention. It is quite possible that Asquith and his Cabinet overestimated the opposition in Parliament and the country to intervention. One experienced observer, Wickham Steed, predicted before Grey's speech was made that "he [Grey] has only to tell the truth and he will have the House and the country with him."

However that may be, and politicians often underestimate the patriotism and stamina of the electorate, Germany made the rest of Asquith's task easy. On 4 August the Cabinet learned that the Germans had entered Belgium. Asquith said: "This simplifies matters." Grey's speech had secured the government support of the House, the invasion of Belgium and King Albert's appeal brought it the full support of the people of the United Kingdom.

Asquith, with the backing of the country and the House of Commons, was finally free to act decisively. He did not lack courage and, on his own responsibility as Prime Minister, despatched the British ultimatum, prepared by Grey, to Germany. No answer was expected, nor received. At midnight, 4 August, Great Britain was at war with Germany. On 5 August Asquith installed Field Marshal Lord Kitchener as War Minister, and held a war council. On 6 August the Cabinet authorized the despatch of four infantry divisions and one cavalry division to France.

CHAPTER VI

MOBILIZATION OF BRITISH FLEET

Mobilization of British Fleet—The Transition from Peace to War by the British Fleet—British Lack of North Sea Bases—Efforts to Preserve Peace—The Naval Dispositions of the German Government on the Eve of War—Germany Goes to War—The Mediterranean Area—Japan's Navy

IN October, 1913, the British Admiralty determined to substitute a test mobilization in the summer of 1914 for the usual summer manœuvres of the fleet. The test provided for the concentration at Spithead of the 1st, 2d and 3d British Fleets. The 1st Fleet, composed of the latest and most powerful vessels of all types, was always fully manned in time of peace; on mobilization it simply proceeded to the concentration area. The 2d Fleet, of the older but still useful ships, was partly manned by nucleus crews in peace time. In war time they needed to be filled to complement. The mobilization plan provided the additional men from trained reserves who lived in the immediate vicinity of their home ports. After filling the crews they would proceed to the area of concentration. The 3d Fleet was composed of the oldest ships still considered of possible value in war time; in time of peace these were not manned, and on mobilization required full crews and considerable training before they could be of value. Reserve crews of former men-of-war-men were allocated to the 3d Fleet.

On 15 July, 1914, the 1st, 2d and 3d British Fleets mobilized in accordance with plan and by 17 July had concentrated at Spithead, where they were reviewed by

the King. On the 19th the combined fleets put to sea for manœuvres. By Saturday, 25 July, the test mobilization was completed and the 3d Fleet dispersed. But the 1st and 2d Fleets, by far the greatest part of the British navy, were still assembled and were scheduled to remain so until 27 July, when the 2d Fleet would resume its usual peace-time status, while the 1st Fleet was due to disperse by squadrons to various ports for "manœuvre" leave.

On Sunday, 26 July, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, was in the country spending the weekend. Prince Louis of Battenberg, First Sea Lord, was at the Admiralty in London. Austria and Serbia mobilized, the situation in Europe appeared more threatening and, on his own responsibility, Prince Louis ordered the 1st and 2d Fleets not to disperse. When Churchill returned to the Admiralty, he confirmed the decision taken by Battenberg. On Monday, the 27th, the 1st Fleet was ordered to remain at Portland, while vessels of the 2d Fleet were ordered to their home ports to remain in immediate contact with their reservists.

Thus, without the necessity of obtaining the sanction of the Cabinet or House, and at very little expense, the bulk of the British fleet was kept practically on a war footing. It was this fortunate and in large measure fortuitous chain of circumstances that placed the British fleet between the United Kingdom and the probable enemy fleet and enabled the Cabinet to sit in safety for thirteen days seeking a common understanding among its many members.

THE TRANSITION FROM PEACE TO WAR BY THE BRITISH FLEET

On 27 July, the Admiralty cabled all ships on foreign stations that the situation was critical and they were to

be ready to shadow unobtrusively all ships of the Central Powers.

By 28 July, the status of the fleet was officially published, thus notifying Europe that Britain was alert. On the same day Austria declared war on Serbia. The British War Office completed its preparations. British Admiralty naval patrols and local defense flotillas completed their crews and stores. The British 1st Fleet (the nucleus of the Grand Fleet) was ordered to Scapa Flow in the Orkneys.

On 29 July war measures directed by the British War Book for all government departments to execute "preparatory to war" were commenced, the 1st Fleet was en route to Scapa Flow, and in the afternoon the precautionary signal was sent to all vessels—war and merchant. By 30 July, three (3) battle cruisers, four (4) armored cruisers, four (4) light cruisers, assembled at Malta, with one (1) light cruiser watching the southern entrance of Messina straits for the German cruisers *Goeben* and *Breslau*, known to be in the Adriatic.

Until 31 July all naval measures taken, except the mobilization, were those that could be secretly executed. On 31 July concealment was abandoned, officers and men openly recalled from leave, merchant vessels diverted in accordance with the war plan, naval patrols and examination areas established.

The navy of Britain was ready and either on station or en route. Never in her history had Britain's navy been so quickly made ready for war as in 1914. To the clear vision and courage of Prince Louis of Battenberg, First Sea Lord, and Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, the major credit belongs; Sir Edward Grey and Asquith also bore a large part of this major achievement.

BRITISH LACK OF NORTH SEA BASES

Not since she destroyed the Dutch navy had Britain needed a base on the North Sea; during her many wars with France she created bases on the English Channel. During the decade preceding the World War it became apparent that in a war with Germany the British fleet would need naval bases on the North Sea. But this was the period of intense competition in shipbuilding with Germany; every penny was needed for the fleet, and no money was appropriated for North Sea bases. So, in this respect, Britain entered the war unprepared.

Scapa Flow, a large roadstead in the Orkneys with three entrances, had been selected as the main base for the fleet during war. No repair or supply facilities had been provided, nor had any protective measures been taken against the entry of submarines or to protect the fleet from night attacks by destroyers. Repair and supply ships were rapidly forwarded to Scapa and a large floating dry dock was towed to Invergordon, Cromarty Firth. Temporary under-water obstructions, supported by trawlers, furnished the first protection against enemy submarines at Scapa, Invergordon and the Firth of Forth. Old battleships were anchored near the entrance to prevent enemy destroyers from attacking the fleet while fueling or repairing. Twelve-pounder guns, landed from the fleet, furnished additional protection against raids on these nets or against an enemy destroyer attack. Immediate and vigorous measures were taken to increase the facilities and protection of these fleet bases.

EFFORTS TO PRESERVE PEACE

With its fleet mobilized, the British Cabinet still sought to avoid the war, but on 2 August, as already stated, it

notified the French Government that "if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coast or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power."

Thus England, although not yet at war, redeemed her promise to guard French interests in the Atlantic. This decision relieved France from any fear of German descents upon her north and west coasts. This action also convinced General Joffre, then deploying the French army along the northeastern frontiers, that it would not be long before the British army appeared in France, and he made his plans accordingly. On 3 August the British and French naval authorities were authorized to put into effect the joint plan for the defense of Dover Straits. Thereafter the British naval dispositions were such that their Expeditionary Force could at any time be dispatched to France.

There is an inevitable but dangerous lag between policy and war in Parliamentary or Congressional states, and there was intense agony in the inner circles of England as well as in France in those three days in August while the Cabinet hesitated to act. For England was doomed as surely as France if Germany established herself on the English Channel.

The German ultimatum to Belgium crystallized British public opinion and enabled Prime Minister Asquith to intervene on 4 August promptly and with full effect. But it should be remembered that forty-eight hours before the British declaration of war British vessels had their orders to protect the shipping and the north and west coasts of France from German attack and unobtrusively to shadow all German war vessels at sea. Collision between the British and German navies could not have been delayed long. The actual result of the Ger-

man invasion of Belgium was to hasten the inevitable intervention of Great Britain and assist Prime Minister Asquith to bring a united party, a united government and a united people into the war.

THE NAVAL DISPOSITIONS OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT ON THE EVE OF WAR

It is now necessary to consider the German naval dispositions. On 5 July the German Emperor, having already promised Austria support in her punishment of Serbia, held a war council at Potsdam with the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg; Minister for War General von Falkenhayn; Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs Zimmermann; and the chief of the Military Cabinet, von Luncker.

The Emperor believed Serbia would give way to Austria, but thought Germany should be prepared for the other contingency; he did not believe the Czar would intervene to help the assassins of a prince, and considered Russia economically and militarily unready for war; he thought France would hold Russia back on account of France's financial condition and lack of heavy artillery; and he did not consider that England would intervene where her interests were not directly involved.

The German Chancellor, after the Sarajevo murder and the conference at Potsdam, endeavored first to give tottering Austria enough support to enable her to take swift and stern measures with Serbia, and second to limit the conflict to Austria and Serbia.

On the advice of Bethmann-Hollweg, the German fleet carried out its routine summer cruise to Norway in July. Prince Henry of Prussia and the German Ambassador to London, Lichnowsky, both expressed the opinion that England would probably remain neutral. The

German naval attaché at London was more correctly informed; he believed England would join France, he attentively followed every naval development and kept the German Admiralty advised of the condition of the British fleet and its movement during the last of July and first of August.

GERMANY GOES TO WAR

On 26 July the High Seas Fleet left Norwegian waters for Germany. Germany proclaimed a state of "immediate danger of war" on the 29th and the fleet concentrated in Kiel for the final preparations for war with France and Russia. These measures had been carefully planned and were rapidly effected.

The over-optimistic Lichnowsky, misled by the personally friendly atmosphere of London, never sensed the latent opinion of Great Britain until Grey, on 29 July, warned him that if France were attacked, England would not long stand aside. He hastily informed Berlin, and the German leaders made a last futile effort to halt Austria. But Russia commenced mobilization on the same day, whereupon the German Government sent an ultimatum to Russia and began mobilization.

On the 30th the attitude of England was considered menacing by Germany and the German fleet commenced its passage through the Kiel Canal into the North Sea. By 1 August, England was considered the principal naval enemy, the bulk of the German fleet was concentrated in the Jade, while Prince Henry, with the older ships, held the Baltic against the inert Russians.

Russia ignored the German ultimatum. France dispatched the covering forces of her armies to their stations on the 31st, and on the same day Germany inquired what were the intentions of France in the event of war

between Russia and Germany. The French Cabinet gave no answer and on 1 August authorized Joffre to issue the mobilization order with 2 August the first day of mobilization. Italy had announced her intentions to remain neutral on this day, so the 14th and 15th French Army Corps, originally designated to cover the southeast frontier of France, were held at concentration points and later re-assigned to the 1st and 2d Armies, respectively.

The German authorities, with their thoughts mainly on the army, did not use energetic measures in the Baltic, which they controlled. They could have menaced the Russian coast with feints at landing and perhaps delayed the Russian invasion of East Prussia. If the German Baltic Fleet, by threats against the Russian Baltic ports, had delayed the Russians, von Kluck need not have been deprived of three army corps just before the battle of the Marne.

Thus the German navy was not only inferior in strength and position to the British, but it was further handicapped by the uncertain movements of its largest unit, the High Seas Fleet, and the failure of the army general staff to appreciate some of the possibilities of a weaker fleet during the early days of the war.

THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA

The immediate task of the French navy which controlled the Mediterranean Sea was to protect the passage of the north African troops, including the famous Algerian Army Corps, to France; the British naval contingent in that sea had two tasks, one to assist in covering the French Colonial Force, the other to shadow the German battle cruiser *Goeben*, and light cruiser *Breslau*, commanded by Admiral Souchon, temporarily operating in that sea.

The French mobilized three dreadnought and eleven predreadnought battleships, plus a number of armored and light-cruiser divisions. The British had three battle cruisers, four armored cruisers and four light cruisers, with a few destroyers based on Malta. In return for the English naval detachment in the Mediterranean, France stationed some cruisers, destroyers and submarines in the English Channel.

The French naval authorities assumed that the ships of Austria, Italy and any German ships in the Mediterranean would concentrate and operate against their communications with Algeria. They planned to cover their transports from Africa by an offensive operation with their battle fleet against the combined fleet of the Triple Alliance, which would give them the mastery of the western Mediterranean. The transports were directed to proceed at maximum speed, singly and unescorted, on dates fixed, along the prescribed routes for Cette, the French port of debarkation. The French War Office assumed the responsibility for all risks, as they needed these troops as early as possible.

On 3 August the French admiral learned of the proximity of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, abandoned the first plan, and dividing his fleet into three groups directed one toward Oran, one to Algiers and one to Philippeville. On 4 August he learned that the *Goeben* and *Breslau* had bombarded Philippeville and Bona. Presuming they would continue their demonstrations toward Algiers, he ordered the Philippeville group to rejoin him off Algiers. When his two groups arrived off Algiers the German vessels were well to the eastward. The admiral then ordered the three groups to escort the transports from the three embarkation ports, leaving the pursuit of the German cruisers to the British.

The naval plan of the Triple Alliance did provide

for a concentration of the combined fleet at Messina to operate against the French communications with Africa. However, in August, 1914, Austria would not declare war on France, decided that her fleet was unready for war, and held it at Pola. Italy declared her neutrality on 3 August and when the *Goeben* and *Breslau* appeared at Messina, Italy refused to let them remain longer than twenty-four hours, and the German Admiralty ordered them to Constantinople.

On 1 August the British admiral in the Mediterranean was informed that Italy would probably remain neutral; on 2 August that England would protect French interests in the Atlantic, and he was ordered to detach two battle cruisers to shadow the *Goeben*; on 3 August he was directed to watch the mouth of the Adriatic; by 8:30 P.M., on 3 August, the British Admiralty, fearing the *Goeben* and *Breslau* were heading for the Atlantic, ordered the admiral to send two battle cruisers to the Straits of Gibraltar.

By 3 August it was apparent that the only naval opposition to the allies in the Mediterranean would be offered by the *Goeben* and *Breslau*. On the forenoon of 4 August the battle cruisers *Indomitable* and *Inflexible* sighted the *Goeben* and *Breslau* and followed them, but with orders not to attack until the ultimatum to Germany expired at midnight. The Germans outdistanced their pursuers and disappeared during the night. On 5 August the German admiral was ordered to Pola, but almost immediately afterwards was ordered to operate at discretion.

On 5 August, England was at war with Germany, but there was considerable delay in establishing liaison with the French and English commands. The British Admiralty, still apprehensive of the *Goeben* escaping into the Atlantic, ordered the concentration of the three battle cruisers in the western Mediterranean. The armored

cruisers and light cruisers scouted to the eastward and made contact with the *Goeben* but did not consider themselves strong enough to attack, while the British battle cruisers were thrown to the westward and could not overtake the *Goeben*.

Exercising his own discretion, the German admiral, Souchon, coaled in one of the Ægean Islands, and then proceeded to the Dardanelles, arriving on August 10. Enver Bey authorized him to enter the Straits. The German cruisers were welcomed by the Turks in Constantinople, and their arrival caused great excitement throughout Turkey.

A proper system of scouting or the willingness to accept a little loss would probably have enabled the British to bring these two cruisers to action and defeat them. The *Goeben* and *Breslau* delayed for a day or two the arrival of the Moroccan contingent in France, hastened the advent of Turkey into the war, and kept one, and sometimes two, British battle cruisers in the Mediterranean on blockade duty. But the absence of the *Goeben* was felt by the German fleet in the North Sea.

JAPAN'S NAVY

Soon after England declared war Japan disposed cruisers along some of the Far East trade routes with orders to protect British as well as Japanese vessels, thus faithfully complying with her treaty obligations. Naval arrangements were soon completed with Britain that improved the Allied situation in the Far East and released British ships for other waters. Japan rendered effective naval assistance throughout the war in escorting troops and protecting commerce in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Japan issued an ultimatum to Germany on 15 August and soon after that captured Tsingtau, depriving Ger-

many of an overseas base in the Far East. Thus England's own naval superiority was augmented by her allies in the Mediterranean and the Far East while the German navy received practically no naval assistance during the war.

To obtain a correct idea of the great value to the Allies of the Japanese assistance it is only necessary to consider the additional strain that would have been placed on Allied sea-power had Japan remained neutral and Germany been left in possession of Tsingtau, her fortified naval base in China.

CHAPTER VII

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AT WAR

The British Government at War—Field Marshal Kitchener—Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg—Admiral Lord Fisher—Civilian Strategists

ALTHOUGH Asquith had made every reasonable effort to avoid going to war, he lost from the Cabinet two confirmed pacifists, the scholarly Lord Morley, whose immense knowledge of government and history had not taught him that some wars are unavoidable; and John Burns, labor leader, who was perfectly willing to engage in civil war for his trade unions, but could not bring his mind to contemplate fighting for a national purpose. Their defection was more than compensated by the support Asquith received from the leaders of the Conservative party, Bonar Law and Lord Lansdowne, who had previously informed him of the support of their party in the event of war.

When the European crisis arose Asquith was acting as Secretary for War as well as Prime Minister. When England declared war Field Marshal Kitchener was at home on leave from Egypt, where, under the nominal title of British Consul General, he exercised the powers of a British Governor General. It was plain that Asquith could not carry the double burden during war; he therefore called Kitchener to the Cabinet to preside over the War Office. Kitchener's selection was extremely popular in England and gave the British people all over the world added confidence in their government. Kitchener made two stipulations about joining the Cabinet: first,

he should not be regarded as a party man; second, that his position in Egypt should be kept open for him.

The Cabinet soon proved too unwieldy to direct the war, and surrendered its constitutional rights to the War Council, composed of Prime Minister Asquith, Foreign Minister Sir Edward Grey, War Minister Field Marshal Kitchener, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill, Chancellor of the Exchequer Lloyd George, Secretary of State for India the Marquis of Crewe, Lord Haldane the Lord Chancellor, former War Minister and creator of the Territorial Army, and Arthur Balfour, former Prime Minister, and unofficial observer for the Conservative party.

This War Council was attended by three military advisers, Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg, First Sea Lord, who was later succeeded by Admiral Lord Fisher; Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson; and General Sir James Wolfe Murray, chief of the Imperial General Staff. Unfortunately, Admiral Fisher and Admiral Wilson were overborne by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, who became the spokesman of the navy, and General Murray was completely overshadowed by Kitchener.

It soon developed that all the strictly technical advice given the War Council was that furnished by Kitchener, who, although well versed and generally experienced in the science of war, had had little war service except in Egypt and Africa, and was entirely unacquainted with modern staff methods and the technique of mobilization, supply and movement of large armies.

FIELD MARSHAL KITCHENER

These deficiencies handicapped Kitchener, but should not cause us to forget his large vision, his undoubted and

selfless patriotism or his energy. His world-wide prestige was also an asset to Great Britain. Kitchener, with keener insight than the British General Staff, was skeptical of the ability of the French army to take an immediate offensive in accordance with Plan XVII. It was Kitchener who immediately foresaw the long duration of the war and realized the necessity of preparing a suitable army, and only Kitchener could have persuaded the British people to raise and support such an army.

Thus Kitchener changed the British army plan from a limited to an unlimited participation in the Continental war, for he realized at once what it took the first Pitt several years to learn, that to be successful the Allies must succeed in the main European theatre of war as well as on the outskirts of the empire. And Kitchener proposed to have the largest army in Europe when the peace conference convened to divide the spoils, in order that Britain's rights would be safeguarded. But for Kitchener there would have been no British army to step into the breach, first in July, 1916, and again in the spring of 1917, when the French army had been all but destroyed by the German.

ADMIRAL PRINCE LOUIS OF BATTENBERG

At this point it is convenient to anticipate the resignation of Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg, which occurred in October, 1914. It deserves attention of itself, and because it resulted in Admiral Fisher's return to the Admiralty as First Sea Lord. Prince Louis was a kinsman of King George, and undoubtedly owed some of his early advancement in the British navy to his royal relatives. He was a very intelligent and extremely industrious officer, who had served creditably from his youth in all the ranks of his profession. As already related, he had been

chosen First Sea Lord to succeed Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson in order that the Admiralty might be reorganized to secure necessary co-operation with the army.

His devotion to Great Britain was unquestioned by those who knew him; he had assumed the responsibility for keeping the British fleet mobilized during the last week of July; he was responsible for the expeditious transfer of the Expeditionary Force. Yet, on the outbreak of war, some of the public press did not hesitate to accuse him of "pro-Germanism" on account of his German ancestry. No one in authority came forward to defend him, in spite of his previous honorable service.

During the early months of the war, while Prince Louis was First Sea Lord, the British navy suffered two minor reverses: the sinking of three armored cruisers, the *Cressy*, *La Hogue* and *Aboukir*, in the North Sea by a German submarine; and the loss of the superdreadnought *Audacious* by a German mine. The loss of the cruisers was unnecessary and exposed the Admiralty to attack. Critics became more virulent and accused Prince Louis of being in the pay of Germany.

To relieve the government of the ensuing embarrassment, Prince Louis sent in his resignation, which was promptly accepted. With the war hysteria prevailing in the United Kingdom it was wise to accept the resignation of Prince Louis, for any serious naval reverse would have been attributed to him.

ADMIRAL LORD FISHER

Churchill selected Admiral Lord Fisher, a former First Sea Lord, distinguished while on the active list for his energy and determination, as Prince Louis' successor. Admiral Fisher was over seventy years old when recalled to the Admiralty. The English press and public,

unaware that age had sapped his strength, welcomed him to his former position. At this particular time the prestige of Fisher was a valuable asset to Churchill, who was being criticized for the naval reverses already alluded to, for his futile intervention at Antwerp that had caused unnecessary losses among the untrained Naval Division and for his boastful threat to dig the German rats out of their holes.

In his prime Fisher was an energetic administrator, but, like Admiral Wilson, he had not been a deep student of war. Fisher's favorite strategic plan in 1914 was a proposed invasion of Germany's Baltic coast by a British fleet escorting an army to be furnished by Russia. This plan would not bear analysis, and his defense of it reduced the force of his opposition to the various unsound plans subsequently proposed by Churchill. Age had weakened his resolution and, although he disagreed with many of Churchill's proposals, he allowed Churchill to "out-argue" him.

Fisher had a strong sense of loyalty to the civilian First Lord, which led him to remain silent at the War Council even when he disagreed with the naval plans advanced by Churchill. He did inform Prime Minister Asquith, in the presence of Churchill, that he was not in favor of the latter's plan for a naval attack on the Dardanelles, but subsequently he did not state his objections to the War Council. The remaining members accepted his silence as indicating his approval, although both Asquith and Churchill knew that Fisher did not approve.

CIVILIAN STRATEGISTS

To add to the inherent difficulties of running the war by a committee, two of the leading members of the War Council, Lloyd George and Churchill, both considered

themselves strategists of a high order and were quite prepared to overrule the Cabinet's military advisers. On short notice either of these gentlemen was capable of producing plausible papers on the war that pointed to comparatively easy ways of beating Germany. By December, 1914, both of these able advocates were convinced that the war could be won more easily in the Near East than on the French and Russian fronts; then and thereafter they circularized the Cabinet with their paper projects and continued to urge that a defensive rôle be taken in France and the major British effort be made in the Near East. They found support for this idea among some civilian members of the French Cabinet, notably Briand.

CHAPTER VIII

THE TASKS CONFRONTING THE BRITISH NAVY

The Tasks Confronting the British Navy—Favorable Geographical Position of the United Kingdom—The Effect on Naval Operations of Modern International Law and New Weapons—Britain's Defense of Overseas Trade—The Tasks Confronting Germany's Weaker Navy—Initial Dispositions of German Fleet

THE mission of the British navy was:

1. To insure for British vessels the unimpeded use of the sea.
2. To deny enemy vessels the use of the sea.
3. To cover the passage, to support the landing of and to protect the communications of all oversea expeditions.
4. To prevent invasion of British territory.

These tasks could best be accomplished by the prompt defeat of the enemy fleet. If the enemy could not be brought to action, it would be necessary to contain the enemy main fleet and employ the surplus strength to insure to British vessels and to deny to enemy vessels the use of the sea.

The invasion of British territory would be automatically prevented if the enemy fleet was contained or defeated.

These four tasks have been traditional with British naval leaders for over two centuries, and in the past they have met the situation by, first, securing their home waters, particularly the Channel and the sea approaches to London; and, second, projecting their sea-power, as their strength permitted, to the bay of Biscay, the western Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Baltic and the Far East.

British naval history is for the most part a record of long, dreary watching off enemy ports, relieved at rare intervals by decisive battles. But these naval battles usually came late in the war after the economic pressure on the enemy began to be unbearable, or because the enemy attempted to invade England.

In 1914 the limitations on the operations of the British Grand Fleet were: first, it would not fight in the south-eastern part of the North Sea where the Germans might lead them over mine-fields or submarines; and, second, Admiral Jellicoe decided in October, 1914, that in a naval engagement he would turn *away* from a torpedo attack. This last decision, submitted to and accepted by the Admiralty, made almost impossible a decisive action with the German fleet. For the German naval command expected a battle with the superior British fleet and in their peace-time exercises particularly trained their fleet to manœuvre to break off an engagement.

Jellicoe stated that his margin of superiority did not justify the acceptance of the German torpedo menace on account of the limited reserve behind the Grand Fleet and the possibility that the Grand Fleet might confront a more dangerous situation later. This last cryptic reference has never been explained and may have referred to the very remote possibility of our entry into the war on account of British interference with our commerce.

The lack of protected bases and Jellicoe's fear of German torpedoes caused him to abandon the North Sea in the early months of the war, except for periodic sweeps with the fleet. On the 9th and 10th of August, when the transfer of the British Expeditionary Force began, the Grand Fleet was cruising west of the Orkneys and only entered the North Sea on 15 August for a southern sweep when the absence of any news from the German fleet led the Admiralty to suspect that a German invasion of Eng-

land was under contemplation. It was not until the beginning of 1915 that the bases at Scapa Flow and Invergordon were properly protected.

FAVORABLE GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

The position of the United Kingdom in the North Sea facilitated British control of the trade routes of Northern Europe. The battle of the Marne and the subsequent race to the sea prevented German troops occupying the French channel coast, and when England was relieved of this threat she was able by basing her Grand Fleet on Scapa Flow and Rosyth, to control the northern exits of the North Sea. A line of cruisers between Scotland and Iceland intercepted all vessels attempting the northern route between America and Europe. Other cruisers hovered off important ports like Boston, New York and Hampton Roads to protect their own and capture enemy trade. The force of cruisers and destroyers based on Harwich, the mine-fields and the destroyer patrols enabled Britain to hold the Dover Straits against minor surface raids.

The Baltic Sea, two of whose narrow entrances were mined by Denmark and the third controlled by Germany, became a German lake and was the only large waterway controlled by Germany. It provided the Germans direct communication with Scandinavia, which became a valuable depot for their trade with the outside world. Neither Germany nor Britain protested against the Danish mine-fields, although they afterwards had an immense effect on the naval situation, because in the early part of the war both belligerents considered the mine-fields helpful to their war plans.

The British Grand Fleet, based in its own home waters,

by containing the German High Seas Fleet, protected its own trade routes except into the Baltic and cut the German trade routes at the same time. It was not necessary for England to declare a blockade of Germany. Except for the limitations of the London Conference, international law permitted the seizure on the high seas of all German ships, all contraband destined for Germany and all conditional contraband destined for the armed forces of Germany. By extending the list of contraband articles, and by reviving the doctrine of continuous voyage, England, on account of her geographical situation, would be permitted by international law to apply practically the same pressure to Germany as if she had formally blockaded the German coasts. She increased the severity of this procedure by sending neutral ships into English ports for examination, on the ground that submarines and the increased size of merchant ships made effective examination at sea impracticable.

By seizing the mail bags routed to Germany on steamers and by cutting the cables landing in Germany, the British navy practically denied Germany communications with the outside world except via adjacent neutral countries or by radio. Her lack of communications became an increasing handicap on Germany's efforts to maintain normal diplomatic intercourse with the neutral world, and adversely affected her relations with neutral nations. German isolation increased as the war proceeded and made it difficult for the government to keep informed of world affairs and public opinion outside of Central Europe.

THE EFFECT ON NAVAL OPERATIONS OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NEW WEAPONS

The exercise of sea-power, however mild and legal, invariably arouses resentment among neutral traders. In-

ternational Law as it existed in 1914 was the resultant of the previous precedents established by custom or Admiralty Court decisions, mainly British and American, and a series of international treaties. Various international conferences had sought to effect an agreement between the leading naval powers and to codify the provisions of International Law applicable to naval warfare.

Before 1856 a naval vessel could in time of war:

(a) Capture enemy goods or vessels except in neutral waters.

(b) Capture neutral ships attempting any unneutral service, or to break a blockade, or for carrying contraband of war, or for failing to submit to search.

The Declaration of Paris in 1856 provided: "The neutral flag covers enemy's merchandise with the exception of contraband of war." In 1871 Lord Salisbury correctly said this proviso made the British fleet valueless except to prevent invasion of England.

The Declaration of London in 1909 reduced belligerent rights still more; it divided goods into three classes:

(a) Absolute contraband, such as guns and explosives.

(b) Conditional contraband—such as fuel, food, and clothing.

(c) Free-list articles which could never be considered contraband. On this list were raw cotton, nitrates, metallic ores, oil, seeds and rubber.

The Declaration of London further decreed that only absolute contraband was subject to seizure under all conditions; conditional contraband was subject to seizure only if destined for the enemy armed forces. Certain presumptions in favor of the neutral were added which rendered it practically impossible to condemn legally conditional contraband; the free list was always to be im-

mune although it contained numerous strategic raw materials such as cotton, rubber and nitrates.

German submarines, destroyers and mines prevented England from establishing a legal blockade of the German North Sea coasts. Even had a blockade of Germany's North Sea ports been practicable, it would have been of little service, because the Baltic ports of Germany were still open. By ostensibly routing supplies to the adjacent neutral states of Denmark and Holland, and having them reshipped to Germany, it was quite possible to keep Germany supplied from overseas as long as she could pay for the imported goods. The two international conferences of 1856 and 1909 had virtually nullified the belligerent's rights except against enemy ships. German merchant ships on the outbreak of war took refuge in neutral ports, where they were safe from seizure, while German goods and neutral goods destined for Germany, cosily sheltered themselves on neutral vessels.

Fortunately for British interests, the House of Lords had not ratified the Declaration of London, so the government refused to abide by it. The Grand Fleet could not establish a blockade, so the government extended the list of contraband, revived the doctrine of continuous voyage which the federal government had invoked against British blockade runners during our Civil War. In addition, on the ground that the increased size of steamers and the danger from submarines made the time-honored examination at sea impracticable, Britain claimed and exercised the right of sending neutral vessels into port for examination. In this way she stopped a great deal of cargo destined ultimately for Germany. When the seizure of the cargo could not be justified, it frequently was bought and paid for, thus shutting off still more supplies for Germany.

BRITAIN'S DEFENSE OF OVERSEAS TRADE

In addition to her main fleet in home waters, England had a large superiority in cruisers, and the Admiralty had prepared a comprehensive plan for their employment on the various trade routes to protect their own commerce and attack Germany's. As previously stated, several days before the declaration of war the warning signal was given to all British vessels, war and merchant, on foreign stations. While Jellicoe took station in the North Sea, the British admirals on foreign stations carried out these plans systematically and successfully. Within a week the German merchant marine had ceased to operate and British cruisers were pursuing German cruisers on all the high seas.

At the same time the Cabinet initiated various minor overseas expeditions such as the expeditions launched by Australia and New Zealand against German Samoa and other German possessions in the Far East. When England despatched the Expeditionary Force to France, she had fulfilled her pre-war engagements with France in the main theatre and was legally justified in employing her surplus forces in minor theatres.

Also, it was necessary to seize German oversea possessions that could be used as bases for submarines or surface raiders to operate against British commerce, so these small expeditions carried out with troops from the Colonies or the Indian army were justified. But Germany proved much stronger than had been estimated and, except for these minor operations and necessary garrisons overseas, it would have been wiser for England to have reserved every available regular soldier for the main theatre in France.

This extremely favorable strategic situation at sea, except in the Baltic, gave England all the advantages of

command of the sea without a battle, but it led to the very erroneous view in certain British circles that a naval victory was unnecessary and that battle should only be accepted on extremely favorable terms. To maintain and increase the Grand Fleet absorbed more and more men and money, so when Germany launched her submarine campaign England at first could not cope with it because her ship yards were busy augmenting the Grand Fleet. Gradually the opinion that the war would be won if England did not let the Germans destroy her fleet, supplanted the more robust idea that the surest method to win the war was to destroy the enemy fleet.

THE TASKS CONFRONTING GERMANY'S WEAKER NAVY

The German fleet was numerically inferior in every category of vessels to the British; furthermore, in vessels of the same class the German guns were usually of smaller calibre and the designed speed was less than the British.

The German ships were better compartmented, had superior armor protection, had more dependable armor-piercing shell and the guns could fire more rapidly. The German mines, searchlights and fire control system were superior to the British. In battle manœuvres and target practice the Germans were probably more thoroughly trained.

The mission of the German navy, as given by Admiral von Scheer, was "To support the army in its uphill task of fighting a superior enemy on two fronts, particularly by securing the army against any attack from the north."

It is important to note that while the German fleet was formally made an auxiliary to its army, the British and French fleets were also obliged to directly support their armies by protecting convoys of troops and supplies to

France. Thus from the very beginning of the war the fleets and armies of Europe were closely associated and the strategy of the World War was neither naval nor land, but joint. Therefore, only superficial students can be content with a separate study of either land or naval operations.

If the war was prolonged Germany expected to capture and hold the coasts of Belgium and France, which would improve her naval position, but she purposed to win the war with her armies on the Continent. Relieved then of her dangerous land neighbors she looked forward during the succeeding peace to creating a navy to secure her position overseas. For this reason the World War was sometimes referred to in Germany as their First Punic War.

Germany deliberately subordinated her navy to the army and gave it three tasks; first, to secure the Baltic; second, to protect her North Sea frontier; and, third, to reduce the British fleet with minor attacks; the third mission was strictly subordinate to the first two. To be ready to carry out these tasks, as already stated, the German High Seas Fleet proceeded from its summer cruising waters in Norway to its war station in Heligoland Bight in the last days of July. There it was rapidly augmented by its reserve squadrons, but it did not complete its mobilization until after the British fleet was concentrated at Scapa Flow.

INITIAL DISPOSITIONS OF GERMAN FLEET

It is probable that the German naval staff hoped to surprise the British fleet on the outbreak of the war, but, as stated, the British fleet had been carrying out a test mobilization in July, and the courage and foresight of Prince Louis of Battenberg and Winston Churchill kept

it on a war establishment until war was declared. A fast German mine-layer, on August 5, laid some mines in the mouth of the Thames; she was sunk on her return by a British cruiser that subsequently struck one of the German mines and also sank. The first naval honors were easy. On 6 August the Germans despatched ten submarines into the North Sea to attack British battleships.

The German naval command professed to believe that the British fleet would endeavor to bring on a major engagement, proceeding if necessary into the Heligoland Bight. The British had abandoned the idea of any such offensive at least five years before the war. Admirals Fisher and Wilson, who returned to the Admiralty in October, 1914, clung to the plan of a British Baltic expedition with the Grand Fleet, after mining-in the German fleet in Heligoland Bight. And early in the war there were definite British plans to seize Borkum, and to land on the Belgian coast to outflank the German line. These proposed Baltic and North Sea operations were never undertaken by the British.

The operating bases of the German fleet were the mouths of two rivers, the Elbe and the Weser; they were protected by the off-lying island, Heligoland. But to cross the bars of these rivers with the heaviest ships required high water, and two high waters were necessary to pass the entire fleet over the bars. This unfavorable condition made a quick sortie of the fleet impossible.

It was necessary for the Germans to maintain a naval patrol in the Heligoland Bight; this was initially composed of very light cruisers and destroyers until August 28, when the British raid forced them to employ stronger patrols and to increase their mine-fields. In addition to the vessels actually on patrol, the coal-burning capital ships had to keep steam in their boilers in order to be prepared to get underway on short notice. The shallow

river bottoms were hard on condensers and boilers so that some of the German fleet were always under refit, and at no time could the German admiral bring more than about 80 per cent of his fleet into battle.

Aside from the efforts of their mine layers, the sweep of their submarines, and the protective measures of their patrol vessels, the German fleet simply waited in Heli-goland Bight for the British to come over to attack.

On 14 August, the very day the flow of British troops to France neared its maximum, Admiral von Ingenohl, the German commander-in-chief, formally stated the plan of the High Seas Fleet as follows:

"The information of the enemy indicated that he will try to compel us to come to his coast to fight him. We will not oblige him, but will force him to come to us. At that time we must have all our battleships."

"Therefore our immediate task is to inflict loss on the enemy fleet by guerrilla warfare."

"This task will fall primarily upon our submarines, destroyers, light cruisers and mine layers."

"The battleships will keep themselves fit and in readiness for the grand battle."

This was the conservative conception of the German High Command at the moment when the British Admiralty, alarmed by the inactivity of the German fleet, concluded that the Germans were secretly assembling an expedition to invade England, and ordered Jellicoe from his station off the Orkneys into the North Sea, primarily, be it noted, to protect England from invasion, secondarily as additional cover for the British Expeditionary Force.

Both naval commanders were extremely cautious in their opening moves, only risking their small craft, and both admirals and Admiralties were conjuring up visions of enemy fleets that would not bear sober analysis. Thus Admiral von Scheer was expecting that the British would

sow mines in the mouths of their rivers, designed so they could drift up stream with the rising tide, sink to the bottom when the tide ebbed, rise again with the flood tide and thus work their way into the anchorage of the German fleet. No such wonderful mine existed except in the German imagination.

Von Scheer also anticipated that British submarines would penetrate into their rivers, although the shallow water would scarcely cover the conning tower of the submarine when submerged.

Jellicoe was equally apprehensive of German attacks and wondered why German submarines and destroyers did not attack his fleet while at anchor behind their improvised defenses. Yet Jellicoe never contemplated using his destroyers to attack the German fleet in its anchorage, nor did the German naval command ever consider an attack on the British fleet except with submarines. Jellicoe apparently realized the inconsistency of his attitude, for he carefully explains that the strength of the German defenses prevented any British attack.

These British and German admirals had been selected and trained for their positions. They were the outstanding naval officers of two highly efficient fleets. Yet Jellicoe, von Ingenohl and von Scheer felt, and honestly confessed, an almost extreme state of anxiety.

This excessive caution is the usual reaction of high commanders to the responsibility of war after a long period of peace. It is a fact for our naval officers to ponder, lest they too fail to rise to their responsibilities under the cruel test of war that has wrecked so many peace-time reputations patiently and prudently earned by years of excellent routine service.

CHAPTER IX

GERMAN SUBMARINE OPERATIONS IN 1914

German Submarine Operations in 1914—German Cruiser Warfare in 1914—The Effect on the German Fleet of the Battle off Heligoland—England's Dread of Invasion—The Passage of the British Expeditionary Force—Troop Movements—British Army on August 1—The Protective Measures by the British Fleet

THE German navy of 1914 was the creation of von Tirpitz, steadfastly supported by Emperor William.

Von Tirpitz concentrated his main effort on battleships and destroyers. The Germans, therefore, had only about twenty-four submarines at the outbreak of the war. Nominally they were slightly inferior to corresponding British submarines, but the Diesel engines in German submarines were superior to the British engine, and they were operated by an experienced and very competent personnel.

At the outbreak of the war the German navy did not fully appreciate the possibilities of submarines. The first task allotted them was the simple one of scouting the North Sea for the Grand Fleet; ten submarines were sent on 6 August with orders to seek battleship targets only on the outward-bound trip; on the return trip any man-of-war could be attacked.

The first submarine sweep lasted only three days, yet one submarine was forced to return on account of engine trouble, and two were sunk by enemy ships. They did not inflict any loss on the enemy, only obtained negative enemy information and had 20 per cent casualties. This operation emphasized two facts: first, that the submarine was the only type of vessel that could remain in

proximity to greatly superior naval forces with immunity; and, second, that its fuel capacity enabled it to remain at sea for a considerable period of time.

On 21 September, Weddingen, in the *U-9*, sank the *Aboukir*, *Hogue* and *Cressy*, three armored cruisers, almost simultaneously. These cruisers were unescorted and lying-to or steaming at slow speed when the *Aboukir* was torpedoed; the other two stopped and lowered boats to rescue survivors of the *Aboukir*, when they were sunk in rapid succession. This exploit first turned German attention to their submarines, for the earliest allusion to submarines by Admiral von Tirpitz in his published letters occurs on 25 September.

This dramatic sinking probably caused the Germans to overestimate the possibilities of submarine warfare. Weddingen was given a larger submarine and later set out to sink Admiral Jellicoe in the *Iron Duke*; in endeavoring to break through the anti-submarine screen he emerged on the bow of another battleship, was rammed and sunk.

On 2 October, when the British Government proposed to land the 7th Division and the 3d Cavalry Division in Belgium, it was necessary for the Admiralty to lay additional mine fields in the entrance to the North Sea to further protect its cross-Channel communications with France. The location was published in accordance with international law, but the field forced neutral traders to pass within the territorial waters of England, where they were subject to the domestic laws of England. On 2 November the British declared the North Sea a war zone.

Knowing that the submarine would be more effective against unguarded merchant vessels than against escorted men-of-war, and as a retaliatory measure against various alleged British violations of international law, the Ger-

man admirals in the High Seas Fleet in November recommended that German submarines blockade England and sink all merchant vessels that approached the British coasts.

The proposal was under consideration by the naval staff and the Chancellor for over two months. Its effect on neutral nations, particularly the United States, was carefully considered; thus the problem of submarine warfare against merchant ships from its birth was a political as well as a naval one.

GERMAN CRUISER WARFARE IN 1914

To compensate for its anticipated inactivity in the main naval theatre, the Germans had planned a vigorous cruiser warfare against British commerce. In August, 1914, outside of its home waters and the Mediterranean, Germany had two armored cruisers, the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, and three light cruisers, *Emden*, *Nürnberg* and *Leipzig*, in the Pacific; two light cruisers, *Karlsruhe* and *Dresden*, in the Atlantic; one light cruiser, the *Königsberg*, in the Indian Ocean. The volume and world-wide extent of British seaborne trade seemed to offer an unprecedented opportunity for cruiser warfare.

These German cruisers promptly commenced operations against Allied commerce. The *Emden* left the Marianas for the Indian Ocean. Under Admiral von Spee, the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg* made their way to Easter Island, where the *Leipzig* and *Dresden* joined them. This squadron defeated Admiral Cradock's armored cruiser squadron off Coronel on November 1. Whereupon Admiral Fisher dispatched Admiral Sturdee with two battle cruisers to the Falklands. Von Spee was brought to action and his squadron sunk on 8 December; only the *Dresden* escaped. The *Dresden* was sunk on March 14, 1915, at Juan Fernandez Island.

The *Emden* harassed Allied commerce in the Bay of Bengal for three months, then she was brought to action and sunk by the light cruiser *Sydney* at Cocos Island on 9 November, 1914. The *Karlsruhe* blew up by an internal explosion in the West Indies some time in November, but it was only known in England in March, 1915, that she was lost.

The *Königsberg* was located up the Rufigi River in East Africa on October 31, 1914, and blockaded; she proceeded still further up the river and was finally sunk by two monitors sent out from England for that purpose.

All the German naval cruisers were captured or destroyed by the middle of December. A few armed merchantmen remained at large after December 1, 1914, but they were run down, one after another, and either sunk or forced to take refuge in neutral ports. During the course of the war a few armed merchantmen escaped from Germany. One of them, the *Moewe*, had a successful career and succeeded in returning to Germany.

The *Emden* was the most successful raider among the regular men-of-war, and she gave considerable trouble to the Allies. But the Allied naval power was overwhelming and by 1 January, 1915, the cruiser warfare as an effective German naval measure had been overcome.

THE EFFECT ON THE GERMAN FLEET OF THE BATTLE OFF HELIGOLAND

About August 22, the first five divisions of the British army being already safely in France, on the recommendation of Commodore Roger Keyes, commanding the British submarine patrol operating off Heligoland, the British Admiralty organized a light cruiser raid into Heligoland Bight to attack the German patrol of destroyers and light cruisers. Jellicoe, learning of the plan, sent Beatty

with four battle cruisers to support the undertaking.

On August 28 this force penetrated into the Bight, sank two German light cruisers and two or three destroyers. The German fleet reacted very tardily to this attack. But the principal result was that the Kaiser, dismayed by these small losses, directed that the navy make no large movements without his permission. This drastic imperial order restricted the German High Seas Fleet to an even more passive defense and it only waged guerilla warfare with its light forces and submarines during the remainder of 1914.

ENGLAND'S DREAD OF INVASION

In spite of England's command of the sea, the danger of invasion haunted the minds of British officials throughout the war, and adversely affected the conduct of the war by causing the detention of large army forces in England. As it happened, this fear did not affect naval operations directly, for the disposition of the Grand Fleet to contain the German Fleet placed it in a favorable position to protect the English coasts from an invasion. And as a further protection Jellicoe stationed some predreadnought battleships and battle cruisers at Rosyth. But the fear of invasion materially reduced the number of men the British army sent to France.

In 1905 Mr. Balfour, when Prime Minister, said: "Serious invasion of these islands is not an eventuality which we need seriously consider." Field Marshal Lord Roberts attacked this view and in 1909 a subcommittee of the Committee of Imperial Defense re-examined the whole problem and concluded:

"1. That 'so long as British naval supremacy was assured, invasion on a large scale was impracticable.'"

"2. That if command of the sea is permanently lost the subjugation of the country to the enemy would be inevitable."

"3. Therefore, the Home Army should be maintained at such strength that the enemy will be forced to come in such strength that he cannot evade the fleet."

"4. That a force of 70,000 soldiers would be so large that it could not evade the fleet; therefore, the task of the Home Army was to maintain a properly organized and equipped Army sufficient to deal effectively with an invading force of 70,000."

In accordance with this policy, on August 5, 1914, it was decided to hold two of the six regular infantry divisions in England.

By 20 August the situation in France became so critical that the British sent the 4th Division from the East Coast to France. The 6th Division was the only regular division then left in England; Kitchener was most unwilling to part with his last regular division, but was compelled by the situation in France to dispatch it early in September; it arrived in time to take part in the first battle of the Aisne.

Generally speaking, after the race to the sea by the opposing armies in November, 1914, which prevented the Germans establishing their armies on the English Channel, soldiers for Home Defense had priority over British armies abroad. Other than strategic motives doubtless entered into this decision; for instance, Kitchener stated in the early days of the war that England must have the largest army in Europe at the time of the peace conference in order that she could dominate the conference, and Lloyd George held troops in England in 1917 and 1918 to prevent Haig from taking the offensive in France.

THE PASSAGE OF THE BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE— TROOP MOVEMENTS

It is now time to consider the passage of the British Expeditionary Force to France, which King Edward and

Clémenceau had agreed in 1909 was necessary to keep the Germans out of France.

BRITISH ARMY ON AUGUST 1

COMPONENTS	ROUND NUMBERS
Regular Army (Active)	247,000
“ “ (Reserve)	145,000
“ “ (Special Reserve)	64,000
Territorial (Comparable to our National Guard) .	269,000
TOTAL	725,000

Of the regulars, six infantry divisions and one cavalry division were in the United Kingdom and Ireland in all respects ready for rapid transfer to France; 120,000 were serving abroad, mainly in India; of these 90,000 were returned to England and formed into the 7th, 8th, 27th, 28th and 29th Infantry Divisions, and 3d Cavalry Division. They were replaced abroad by an equal or greater number of Territorial troops.

The main body of the Expeditionary Force, consisting of three infantry and one cavalry division, embarked at Southampton, while an infantry division stationed in Ireland embarked at Queenstown and Belfast. All divisions proceeded in transports to Havre independently and unescorted. Along their route in the English Channel were trawlers fitted for rescue work and flying the Red Cross.

THE PROTECTIVE MEASURES BY THE BRITISH FLEET

About fifty miles east of the line Southampton-Havre a squadron of nine predreadnought battleships was stationed; about the same distance west was another squadron of eight predreadnoughts. To each squadron of battleships was assigned four armored cruisers as scouts; the western group of scouts held that entrance of the Chan-

nel. The eastern group held the eastern entrance of the Channel, which, being more exposed to a German raid, was also mined and patrolled by destroyers and submarines.

A southern force of cruisers and destroyers operated from Harwich toward Heligoland. While the division from Ireland was at sea, a detachment of cruisers watched the two exits from the Irish Sea.

The time of passage between Southampton and Havre was six hours; therefore, given three hours' warning, the most exposed transports could return to port. The naval dispositions assured at least that much notice, so, except for a sporadic submarine attack, the transports were practically immune from attack. The German submarines were seeking the Grand Fleet off the Orkneys during this troop movement, so they did not even threaten the transports.

The Grand Fleet, whose base in the Orkneys was not protected from submarines, cruised to the westward of and between the Shetlands and the Orkneys, outside the North Sea, but ready to re-enter the North Sea if the High Seas Fleet came out to attack the transports. If any force less than the High Seas Fleet attacked the transports, the predreadnought squadrons were sufficient to defend them.

To attack the transports, the German fleet would have to proceed about 400 miles, followed by enemy submarines and light forces, pass through a mine field, be exposed to attack by seventeen predreadnoughts supported by French and British submarines and destroyers. It would either have to return through the mine field or westward of Scotland to its base with the Grand Fleet in an excellent position to attack it.

The troop movement began on 9 August and the first five divisions were across by the 22d. The biggest move-

ment was on the 15th, 16th and 17th—each day 137 passages were made with a daily transport tonnage of over half a million tons; about 19 August the situation in France was so threatening that another division, the 4th, was dispatched; this arrived in France by the 23d.

On the 22d, while this division was still en route, Winston Churchill, in one of his best moments, wrote to Kitchener: "The Admiralty is confident of its ability to protect the country from invasion, and if you wish to send the 6th (the last regular) Division to France, the Admiralty will accept the responsibility."

Kitchener hesitated until the situation in France forced his hand, and on 10 September the 6th and last Division of the original British Expeditionary Force, the "old Contemptibles," as they were afterwards affectionately called in England, landed in France.

On 16 August the Grand Fleet was in the North Sea, midway between Aberdeen and Skagerack, a little over 200 miles from Heligoland; a division of cruisers watched the Skagerack, with the battle cruisers forty or fifty miles ahead of the fleet.

It was 23 August before the movement of five Infantry Divisions and the 1st Cavalry Division had been completed, and five of these six divisions on this day fought the battle of Mons. On 10 September the 6th Infantry Division was sent over. Practically the same dispositions were made to cover the transports for these troops.

It was jocosely said by Lord Fisher before the war, that the Expeditionary Force would be used as bait to bring the High Seas Fleet to action; the British naval dispositions were such that the bait was always out of reach of the Germans, but if they struck at it, their fleet could almost certainly be brought to action.

Thus the British Government was able to and did provide the Fleet and Expeditionary Force she originally

promised France, and her day of mobilization was just three days later than the French day. She held back one army division for about a month. Otherwise England carried out her pre-war pledges to France on schedule. Eventually, England more than carried out her pledges, while France completely overestimated the capacity of her army to meet the German invasion. Even before the weakness of France became apparent to the world England, on Kitchener's advice, made plans for loyal and unlimited participation in the land war.

Late in August, on account of the retreat to the Marne, the navy shifted the army's base from the English channel ports to the Bay of Biscay. This was not a spectacular task but it was a tremendous one, and only splendid team-work of the British army and navy, abetted by their national nonchalance, made it successful.

CHAPTER X

THE FIGHTING IN FRANCE IN 1914

The Fighting in France in 1914—Foch's Doctrine of Attack—von Schlieffen's Plan vs. Plan XVII—Joffre's Initial Errors—von Moltke's Mistakes—Joffre Finally Realizes the German Intentions—Prepares a Counter-Attack—Failure of the British and the 4th and 5th French Armies—Joffre's Firm Resolve—von Kluck Turns Away from Paris—The Eve of the Marne—The Battle—The French and German Methods of Command—The Pursuit

ON the whole the long-expected European war found the French army comparatively unready. The unsavory Caillaux trial had left much party bitterness. The Viviani Cabinet of 1913-1914 was only half-hearted in its support of the army and was considering reducing the army service from three to two years. As late as July, 1914, two such undaunted patriots as Senators Humbert and Clémenceau were pointing to glaring deficiencies in the French military establishment.

Nevertheless, the French army took the field in August, 1914, with more than their usual *élan*, and the French people, inspired by the eloquent appeal of President Poincaré, entered the war with a serenity worthy of their great military history. By the 5th day of that month, outwardly, the prospect of France appeared fair indeed. Russia was already involved by a cause that appealed to her population, and insured her hearty co-operation. Italy had deserted the Teutons, while Britain had joined the Dual Alliance; surely, under these circumstances, the lost provinces of France could be regained.

But aroused by the metaphysical doctrine preached by

FOCH'S DOCTRINE OF ATTACK


Foch at their War College, that no one is defeated until he admits defeat, and allured by a fatal catchword, "attack, again attack, always attack," the French army had adopted Plan XVII and were committed to the offensive all along their front. This project embraced an immediate offensive on the east into Alsace and Lorraine, prepared a mass of manœuvre to meet the expected German advance from the northeastward, with rapidly thinning forces along the Belgian frontier tapering off at Mons, where the British Expeditionary Force would concentrate. Northwest of the British there were only French cavalry patrols and reserve divisions.

There was wisdom in the Russian-French decision to engage the Germans simultaneously. But there were many material and tactical factors that handicapped the proposed rapid advance of either army.

In fact, only one material consideration supported Plan XVII. Up to a certain date it was estimated that the French army mobilized somewhat faster than the Germans, and it was hoped that advantage could be taken of this temporary numerical superiority to attack and disarrange the mobilization plan of Germany. All the other reasons for Plan XVII, except the simultaneous employment of both Russian and French armies, were moral, such as the belief that the French fight better on the offensive.

VON SCHLIEFFEN'S PLAN VS. PLAN XVII

By a cruel coincidence the French Plan XVII fitted exactly into the von Schlieffen plan of invasion. The German army prepared to assume the defensive with its left along the French-German frontier in Alsace, to



pivot its centre on the Metz fortified area and to make a rapid advance through Luxembourg and Belgium with the bulk of their force on their right to envelop the left and rear of the French army.

Successfully executed, this German movement would have first enveloped and then mowed down the French troops with an iron scythe, whose curved blade would extend far west beyond Mons, where it would sharply re-curve south and east to inclose the entire French army. Therefore, the further north and east the French army advanced, the less marching would the western flank of the German army have to do to complete the envelopment.

The danger inherent with the German plan was that the French might break through at the eastern pivot, or even in the centre. Then all the German armies to the west of the rupture would be cut off from Germany. This risk had been foreseen and deliberately accepted by von Schlieffen, who depended upon fortress areas like Metz to give sufficient strength to the German divisions allotted to the pivot on the southeastern flank. Von Schlieffen increased the strength of his western army, which he expected would have the longest marches and the most fighting.

JOFFRE'S INITIAL ERRORS

Joffre had considered a possible German advance through Belgium, mainly south of the Meuse, but neither he nor any of his advisers contemplated the extensive and immediate use Germany made of her reserve divisions, which almost doubled the German effectives on mobilization. This underestimate of German troops available led Joffre into a further error, for when large German forces were identified in Belgium north of the

Meuse, he immediately ordered the 4th and 5th French Armies to undertake offensives south of the Meuse along the Belgian-French frontier, under the erroneous assumption that the German forces in that area must have been weakened.

VON MOLTKE'S MISTAKES

Fortunately for France, when General von Moltke the Younger succeeded von Schlieffen as Chief of Staff, he became alarmed for the strength of the German eastern flank, and detached some divisions from the western flank to strengthen the pivot. Therefore, in August, 1914, von Kluck commenced the campaign with the 1st German Army weaker than intended by von Schlieffen.

Also, Grand Duke Nicholas promptly began his offensive on 14 August, and when Joffre, in his first extremity, called upon Russia to take some of the German pressure off the French armies, the Grand Duke very loyally met his pre-war promise and commenced to invade Prussia before the Russian army had completed its mobilization. East Prussia was partly overrun by the Russians.

Although von Schlieffen's plan was based upon the campaigns of Frederick the Great, the German High Command in 1914 forgot that Frederick had allowed the ancestors of these same Russians to invade East Prussia and even to take Berlin, so he might be able to concentrate all his strength on his western or southern front against the French or Austrians, and took three army corps from the western army and entrained them for East Prussia. Thus, the 1st German Army, under von Kluck, that was called upon for the greatest exertions, was twice reduced in force. Once, in peace time, to ease the fears of von Moltke; next, in war time, to save the estates of the Junkers in East Prussia.

JOFFRE FINALLY REALIZES THE GERMAN INTENTIONS

The Germans easily repulsed the French advance in Alsace in the middle of August. By 21 August, Joffre had finally divined the German plan of marching through Belgium to envelop the west flank of the French army. Assisted by some German mistakes, and the disciplined coherence of his armies, Joffre proceeded in a methodical manner to withdraw his command from its dangerous position. He broke off contact with the Germans in the north and west and slowly retreated. By a series of closely calculated train-movements only possible with a highly skilled staff and a strategic railway net-work such as France had built, he shifted several army corps from the east to the west. Joffre also brought up the reserve divisions still forming in the south of France. By these movements he reinforced the 4th and 5th Armies and formed a new mass of manoeuvre, the 6th Army, on his extreme left to threaten the German western flank.

Joffre still looked anxiously towards Russia for the relief her advance would afford his hard-pressed armies. On 24 August he was informed that the "Russian offensive was being inflexibly pursued," again on the 27th he was told that the Russian offensive in East Prussia was proceeding satisfactorily. On 25 August Joffre prepared for a battle about 30 August, along the line Amiens-Rheims and he proposed to strike the German western flank with the newly constituted 6th Army.

PREPARES A COUNTER-ATTACK

The French 6th Army was organized on August 26, under General Manoury, who was given the staff of the Lorraine Army, VII Corps, 61st, 62d, 63d, the 55th and

66th Reserve Divisions. It was formed and disposed to operate on the extreme west of the French army with a view to enveloping the western flank of the German army if it continued its advance towards Paris. Joffre ordered General Manoury to "dispose his forces so that, once they were united, they could act offensively against the right flank of the enemy." This army was ordered to concentrate in the path of von Kluck's 1st Army, and it became necessary to shift its original detraining area southward to avoid premature contact with his rapidly advancing army.

The reinforcements sent to the 4th Army had made it unwieldy, so, on August 28, Joffre took from it two army corps, two reserve divisions and a cavalry division, which he formed into a detachment, under Foch, but still attached to the 4th Army. The task of this detachment was to maintain contact between the 4th and 5th Armies, and cover the 4th Army from enemy forces threatening its western flank. This detachment later became the 9th Army, and, under the inspiration of Foch, distinguished itself in the fighting in the swamps of Saint-Gond on the 9th and 10th of September.

FAILURE OF THE BRITISH, AND THE 4TH AND 5TH FRENCH ARMIES

But the British army and the French 4th and 5th Armies could not resist the German onslaught long enough to prepare for the manœuvre planned by Joffre, in which he sought to obtain superiority both in numbers and position. Immediately on reaching France, the British army had been concentrated too far forward; the day after the battle of Mons it had been dangerously exposed to destruction by the rapid withdrawal of the French 5th Army on its right (eastern) flank. For a time Sir

John French, the British commander, lost all confidence in the judgment or courage of his neighboring colleague, General Lanrezac, commander of the 5th Army.

As August drew to a close Sir John French proposed to withdraw towards Havre, and only the personal intervention of Kitchener, who came from England for the purpose, kept the British army in line. Even then the main preoccupation of Field Marshal French was to put the Seine between him and his pursuers so he could have time to reorganize his army; and during the retreat from Mons he kept one full day's march ahead of the French 5th and 6th Armies on his flanks. Sir John was oversanguine at the commencement of the campaign and gained Kitchener's reluctant consent to the British deployment in the exposed Mons area, but after his first reverse French quickly became unduly depressed.

JOFFRE'S FIRM RESOLVE

Baffled by the inability of the 4th, 5th and British Armies to respond to his demands, Joffre continued the retreat, but still kept his armies under control and free from the enveloping grip sought by von Kluck. He remained resolved to resume the offensive at the earliest practicable moment. He informed his army commanders of his intention and kept the morale of his soldiers high in spite of their long retreat.

VON KLUCK TURNS AWAY FROM PARIS

On 30 August the direction of von Kluck's advance wavered and then turned southeastward, away from Paris, in order to maintain contact with the German 2d Army. This change of direction was necessary, but by ordering the change von Kluck himself prepared the situ-

ation that Joffre had been unable to create. It was a piece of rare good fortune for Joffre. Luck had been mainly against him until then, so he was entitled to a change. But it was Joffre's fortitude and skill in handling the French armies that enabled him to take full advantage of this good luck, a week later, at the battle of the Marne.

THE EVE OF THE MARNE


On the same day Joffre learned from a German radio message that three Russian army corps had been destroyed at Tannenberg. As some compensation for this disaster, the next day he learned that two German army corps had been transferred from the Western Front to the Eastern. Actually, three German army corps, destined for von Kluck's 1st Army, had been diverted towards the Eastern Front.

His air service also informed him that there were no German formations in rear of von Kluck's army nearer than Maubeuge, so Joffre, early in September, realized that von Kluck was fully exposed to the blow that he was planning, with no reinforcements in easy marching distance to neutralize its effect.

THE BATTLE

On 6 September, the situation, indicated on the map in Joffre's headquarters, showed the French 3d, 4th, 5th, the British and the French 6th Armies, in the order named, extended in an irregular crescent, from Saint Mihiel to Paris, and, between the horns of the shallow sinuous crescent so formed, five German armies were pushing forward relentlessly.

Joffre was in position. The French steel trap was set; but those five German armies were superbly strong, they



Situation on
September 6 —
five German armies push
themselves into Joffre's
steel net

had driven the French and British armies steadily before them since the first contact. In the full flush of their victorious advance they hurled themselves confidently against the French lines.

The Germans preferred the envelopment as a form of attack, but they could employ with skill and gallantry the frontal attack on suitable occasions in an effort to break through and roll up the hostile lines. The question became, would the French trap hold? Perhaps the greatest German blow fell upon Foch's 9th Army, which gave ground but barely managed to resist. While on Foch's left, the 5th Army, under General Franchet d'Espérey, who had superseded General Lanrezac, found the gap between the German 1st and 2d Army, and made a rapid advance that forced the whole German line to retire on the 9th of September.

In addition to the assaults on the French army between St. Mihiel and Paris, on the 6th and 7th of September, the Germans made very violent attacks on the French 2d Army in the region of Nancy. A German break-through at that point would have compromised the entire French line. Joffre ordered General de Castelnau to hold on at all costs. On the 8th the French commander began to get the situation at Nancy under control.


By 9 September it was apparent that Joffre had won a great victory. Von Kluck's 1st Army, by prompt and resolute action, had fought itself free from the enveloping clutch of the French 6th Army, but only by leaving a wide gap between itself and the German 2d Army; and into this gap the French 5th Army, inspired by its new commander, Franchet d'Espérey, penetrated and widened the breach. This battle of the Marne was a victory by Joffre and the French army; the British army played a minor part, and took their station only after

repeated urging by Joffre. The British army participated loyally, but not in the prominent manner that has so often been presented to the American public.

THE FRENCH AND GERMAN METHODS OF COMMAND

An important feature of the battle of the Marne was the ability of Joffre, from his General Headquarters at Chatillon-sur-Seine, to control the course of the battle as it raged across the whole of France from the Vosges Mountains to Rouen. He succeeded in co-ordinating the efforts of one British and six French armies throughout that three-day battle, by the continuous use of the telephone, telegraph, and the trained staff officers whom he dispatched, as the occasions demanded, to the headquarters of his leading subordinates. These staff officers knew Joffre's mind and were able to impress his purposes and methods upon the subordinate commanders; in Joffre's view, they were the "exponents of the very brain and will of the commander-in-chief."

The German High Command, on the contrary, as the invasion proceeded, apparently was forced to abandon its attempt to co-ordinate the efforts of the six army commanders, who fought bravely and skillfully but with little unity of direction. This resulted partly because the General Headquarters in Luxembourg had lost touch with the army commanders during their rapid advance, but it was fostered by the von Moltke doctrine, developed in 1866 and 1870, that the supreme commander could bring his forces to the battlefield but must then leave the direction of the forces to his subordinate commanders. According to the German view, after the battle was joined, the commander-in-chief could only intervene by placing reserve formations at the disposition of subordinate commanders. This was diametrically op-



posed to the French view, that "in spite of all difficulties, a battle could and should be directed."

Another incident of the battle of the Marne throws into startling relief the methods of the German general staff. A lieutenant-colonel of the German general staff was sent forward by the German high command from Luxembourg to ascertain the conditions during the battle of the Marne. He went clothed with authority to order an advance or retreat. He ordered the army commander to retreat. That is to say, the gravest decision made on the Western Front by the German High Command was made in person by a general staff officer of the comparatively junior rank of lieutenant-colonel.

THE PURSUIT

Joffre made every effort to turn the German retreat into a rout, but the German command and their disciplined troops were equal to an orderly withdrawal. They made their first real stand on the Oise, where they resisted all frontal attacks. Manoury with the French 6th Army unsuccessfully attempted to envelop their western flank during the middle of September.

Then began the race to the English Channel, when both the German and the French commander simultaneously attempted to envelop the western flank of the enemy. The last ten days of September both armies transferred forces from the eastern to the western flank and the indecisive battle of Picardy followed.

Joffre then organized the 10th Army, under de Castelnau, to move further north and turn the German flank. De Castelnau's move was parried by German forces arriving from the eastern flank. The battle of Artois, during the first week of October, was as indecisive as the battle of Picardy had been.

CHAPTER XI

THE GERMAN REACTION TO THE MARNE

The German Reaction to the Marne—The Fall of Antwerp—The Battle for the Yser—Russia Continues the Offensive—The Battle of Flanders—General Exhaustion

ON the 14th of September, General von Falkenhayn, the German Minister of War, relieved the invalided von Moltke as chief of the German general staff, and, under the Emperor, directed the armies and fleets of Germany for almost two years. He assumed command immediately after the German army had retreated to the Oise and was endeavoring to establish its line in France.

Three of the army corps, originally assigned the German army in France, had been sent to the Eastern Front, and only one fresh army corps was available for the Western Front. The German headquarters was shifted from Luxembourg to Charleville-Mézières, and the bulk of the German 2d and 6th Armies were shifted from Alsace-Lorraine and the Woëvre fronts to northern France to prevent the envelopment of the German western flank.

As early as 20 August, when Joffre first appreciated that he could not advance to join hands with the Belgian army in Belgium, he suggested that the Belgian field army fall back and join the French and English armies in France. As this movement would have caused the Belgian army to abandon their own country King Albert refused the invitation, and the Belgian army, in accord-

ance with its own plan, had retired into Antwerp during the third week of August. It was there contained by some German reserve divisions; it made two sorties, August 24-26 and September 9-13. The last sortie caused General von Falkenhayn to prepare to reduce Antwerp; the besiegers were reinforced and furnished with Austrian 42-cm. howitzers, which began bombarding the outer forts on September 27.

On October 1 the Belgian War Minister said: "Antwerp could only be relieved by an outside diversion." On 2 October Kitchener was informed that Antwerp was about to be surrendered. Winston Churchill, on his own responsibility, had already landed a brigade of the British Royal Naval Division at Ostend with a vague idea of creating a diversion in favor of Belgium; at his own suggestion he was despatched by Asquith, Kitchener concurring, to Antwerp, and this brigade of the Naval Division went up from Ostend and Dunkirk to Antwerp. They were followed by the two other brigades of the Royal Naval Division.

THE FALL OF ANTWERP

On British urging, the Belgians agreed to make another effort to hold Antwerp; the French Government was persuaded to furnish a division to assist, and the British Cabinet, on 4 October, despatched the 7th Infantry Division and the 3d Cavalry Division to help defend Antwerp. The British contingent reached Ghent and Zeebrugge and began disembarking on October 6. On October 9 the infantry reached Ghent and joined hands with the French, only to learn that Antwerp had fallen.

There was much confusion of thought in England about the value of Antwerp as a base from which attacks

could be launched against German forces, and it was frequently likened to Lisbon during the Napoleonic wars. It was forgotten that both banks of the mouth of the Scheldt were Dutch and that Antwerp could not be reinforced by water without violating the neutrality of Holland. As the Allies were still denouncing Germany for violating the neutrality of Belgium, they could not afford to trespass against Holland; nor did they have sufficient soldiers to hold the Belgian bank of the river or to keep open the land communication with Antwerp.

The real reason Antwerp surrendered so promptly was to permit the Belgian field army to escape and to prevent the destruction of the city by the enemy artillery. The Belgian and English forces could have held the German infantry at bay for some time, but they would have eventually been cut off, and there was no way of preventing the German and Austrian artillery from destroying Belgium's richest city. As it was a fortress, it was fairly exposed to destruction. Had this situation been correctly appreciated in London, considerable unnecessary loss of life would have been avoided, and the Belgian and British forces used here would have joined Joffre's army sooner.

It was originally intended to return the 7th Infantry Division and 3d Cavalry Division to England, but the situation became so critical in Belgium that they were sent to Ypres, where they played a decisive part and suffered heavy losses in the successful defense of that town.

Troop movements in the Dover Straits toward Zeebrugge and Dunkirk were more exposed to German attack than on the route from Southampton to Havre. To protect their convoys in those waters the British mined the eastern entrance to the English Channel more densely.

THE BATTLE FOR THE YSER

With the fall of Antwerp, a new German 4th Army was constituted from the besieging forces plus four new army corps lately available from Germany. It was ordered to "advance against the Yser sector" and establish its right flank on the North Sea.

This was a formidable force and the object was worthy of its best efforts, for, having failed in its attempt decisively to defeat the French army, the next most valuable objective for the Germans was to establish their army on the English Channel ports, in order to assist their navy in the proposed minor attacks against England.

The chief of the German naval staff, after the naval battle of Heligoland, saw no prospect of any action by the German fleet to prevent the English blockade from eventually starving Germany. The minor naval attacks against the British fleet and operations against the traffic in the English Channel could be greatly facilitated if the Germans established themselves in the French ports along the English Channel, where they could base their submarines, airplanes and Zeppelins in easy distance to interrupt the water communication of the British army in France, the Channel traffic, and to make air raids on London. The Allies were alive to these dangers, and the stubborn fighting that ensued showed that both sides appreciated the importance of this narrow strip of land along the English Channel.

On 31 October, when von Falkenhayn was pouring all available Germans into the final fight for the Channel ports, Kitchener still feared a German invasion of England, and he kept the recently formed 8th Division at home. But on 5 November the situation in Flanders again became critical and this division was sent to join the badly battered British army in France.

RUSSIA CONTINUES THE OFFENSIVE

After the disaster at Tannenberg the Russians were able to continue the offensive against Austria so that German reinforcements had to be sent to the Eastern Front to prevent the collapse of Austria. Against these German reinforcements the Russians, profiting by their mistakes during the first offensive in East Prussia, made a very skillful defense of Warsaw, forcing the withdrawal of the German 9th Army. Von Falkenhayn's first task was to secure his Western Front, next to succor his hard-pressed ally, Austria. The necessity of keeping the Russians out of Silesia and sustaining the Austrian front combined to reduce the number of German divisions that could be allotted to the Western Front.

Thus the Russian armies continued throughout 1914 to take more and more pressure off their western allies, and thereby Russia contributed as much to the protection of London in November as she had done for the safety of Paris in August and September.

THE BATTLE OF FLANDERS—GENERAL EXHAUSTION

The battle of Flanders exhausted the German, French, British and Belgian armies for the time being. So complete was the exhaustion of the four armies that sailors, embodied in naval battalions from all four nations, were fighting side by side with their army comrades among the canals, sand dunes and flooded areas of Flanders.

The ammunition of both sides was depleted and the battle died down because the military forces of three large and one small state had literally fought themselves to a standstill. Joffre's army was spent and the British and Belgian armies were finished for the time being. But together they had turned back the most powerful army

Germany had ever produced or the world had ever seen.

With their armies exhausted, the many brilliant plans proposed in the Cabinets of France and England could not recover Belgium and northern France. By winter the Germans had established themselves firmly in northern France and Belgium. It took two long years of fighting before they were even budged. Nor could the French losses, unnecessarily large on account of offensives needlessly undertaken, be compensated.

The French irrecoverable losses in less than five months had been 420,000 men; ten months' fighting per year would take 840,000. At the end of 1914, France had 547,000 in her recruit depots. From the class of 1916 the maximum she could expect was 270,000, so during 1915 she could only add, by anticipating her 1916 draft, 817,000 men. Ten months' war would consume 840,000. Therefore, by the end of 1915 her white troops would be 30,000 less than at the end of 1914.

The Russian army had saved the French army from destruction, but at a terrific cost to itself, for, by taking the offensive before its mobilization was complete, it was exposed to a counter-stroke prepared, it is said, by General von Hoffman, but executed most successfully by von Hindenburg. In the Masurian Lakes and at Tannenberg, Russia expended fine soldiers to extricate the French army from the situation in which its numerical inferiority and a series of political and military errors had involved it. Russia's man-power was practically inexhaustible, but her officer corps was unequal to training the new recruits, and her industrial establishment could not provide replacements of arms and munitions.

In coming to the assistance of France, Russia was taking no more than her proper share of the war, for up to the middle of September the Germans had employed only 196,000 men on the Russian front, whereas a month

later their forces employed against the French army plus eight (8) British divisions was 1,700,000. Practically eight out of nine Germans were employed on the Western Front. By the end of December the German forces on the Eastern Front had risen to 500,000. Even then eight out of ten Germans were fighting on the Western Front.

So there can be no doubt that although the French army was loyally assisted both by the British and Russian armies, it was called upon to withstand practically the entire might of the German army for the first seven weeks of the war. And although Russia was also fighting Austria while France was engaged only on one front, there can be no question that in 1914 it was the French army that stood between Germany and domination of Europe.

CHAPTER XII

JOFFRE AND THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT DURING THE AUTUMN OF 1914

Joffre and the French Government During the Autumn of 1914—
Conscript French Legislators—Summary of Overseas Troop
Movements—The German High Seas Fleet at the End of 1914

It was generally admitted in France before the war that the French Constitution, as developed, interpreted and applied by parliamentarians, had not left the executive department sufficient authority to conduct a war; and that a Cabinet responsible to the two French chambers, subject to the questions of dissatisfied deputies and senators, was not a suitable agency to make war. Several futile efforts had been made in peace-time to agree upon an effective governmental agency which would come into being on mobilization. Nor did France, like England, possess a sea barrier and a superior fleet to protect her Cabinet while it made its decisions. The French Government must act promptly in a military crisis, or it will have the enemy army at the gates of Paris.

In the first burst of national enthusiasm after the declaration of war, the French Parliament authorized the government to make loans, the President to establish a moratorium, to suspend contracts and to extend the duration of the state of siege. The Parliament soon after adjourned, leaving the Cabinet and the President to conduct the war.

During the first days of the war, the Cabinet, through the Minister of War, Monsieur Messimy, controlled the zone of the interior and loyally supported Joffre, who

controlled the zone of the army. Messimy was somewhat theatrical, but he did not interfere with Joffre and only urged that any officers showing "weakness or cowardice" be treated with the greatest severity, and recommended that officers who failed in their duty be executed. He was succeeded on 27 August by Millerand, who also supported Joffre very loyally and intelligently.

The Cabinet then ran the government by decrees until the approach of the German army to Paris caused these gentlemen to depart in haste for Bordeaux. While the government was at Bordeaux, Joffre, as commander-in-chief, was entirely independent of the government and was practically a dictator. Prior to the war the French Parliament had refused to consider what change, if any, would be made in the form of their government on the outbreak of war. Events forced a decision that the legislators had failed to make.

After the government returned to Paris the legislature remained prorogued, the Cabinet was not hampered by questions, Joffre's prestige in France was high and the government, although bent upon recovering its powers, continued to support Joffre.

At Joffre's general headquarters it became necessary to enlarge greatly the personnel to administer the various functions of the government that had devolved upon the commander-in-chief. In fact, practically all the bureaus in Paris were duplicated at army general headquarters. This was a necessary development after the government had fled to Bordeaux.

Joffre believed that, as commander-in-chief, he was responsible to the government for everything in the zone of war; if the government lost confidence in him, it could remove him, but as long as he remained commander-in-chief, he insisted upon being granted full authority. He would not tolerate any independent inspectors from the

War Department or the government in the theatre of operations; he demanded that the government depend upon his reports entirely. In the last quarter of 1914 Viviani and Briand both supported Joffre's views. Messimy was succeeded as War Minister by Millerand, who, at Joffre's instigation, began to speed up production in the munitions factories.

After the victory of the Marne, Joffre was conceded to be the most prominent general on the Allied side; the French army was the most efficient and powerful of the Allied armies, and as commander of this army and creator of the Marne victory, Joffre became tacitly recognized as the generalissimo of the Allied forces. Field-Marshal French deferred to his opinions, and Grand Duke Nicholas sought and was guided by his views. This unofficial recognition enabled Joffre to impart some measure of unity of action to the French, Russian and British armies.

CONSCRIPT FRENCH LEGISLATORS

In the first days of the war the question arose: Is a member of the French legislature of draft age subject to conscription? For political reasons the members did not wish to vote themselves immunity from military service, so it was provided that deputies and senators would be liable to military service but could obtain furlough in order to take part in parliamentary proceedings. After January, 1915, the Parliament was theoretically in continuous session, so that legislators who were also in the army could come and go at will.

This was a poor solution of the problem, for a private or subaltern on one day could leave the trenches, return to Paris, air his grievances, and take up his share in making laws and controlling the government. One of the worst features of this visiting back and forth was

the cliques that were formed among certain legislators and certain generals.

An ambitious deputy in the same division with an inspiring general would combine for mutual advantage. Joffre charged that Clémenceau exerted his influence in behalf of an unworthy French general. And some of the generals in their intrigues for command forgot their country's desperate situation; thus Sarrail is reported to have accused Joffre and Foch of conspiring to re-establish a dictatorship to end the republic, while Clémenceau accused Foch of attempting to ingratiate himself with the legislators.

SUMMARY OF OVERSEAS TROOP MOVEMENTS

Early in October the British navy relieved two Indian infantry divisions and one cavalry division with English Territorials and landed the Indian divisions in the south of France. By the middle of October the navy had landed 25,000 Canadians in England. In November one Indian Division was landed in Mesopotamia. By December 15 two Indian divisions and the Anzac Corps of two divisions had been landed in Egypt and France had brought from Morocco her African contingents. No previous war had witnessed such gigantic troop movements over the oceans.

THE GERMAN HIGH SEAS FLEET AT THE END OF 1914

During the fall of 1914 the Germans attempted unsuccessfully to reduce the Grand Fleet by mines and submarines. The commander-in-chief, Admiral von Ingenohl, then asked for a freer hand. The naval staff refused, reiterating that the navy's rôle was to secure the Baltic and defend the coast of the North Sea.

Up to the battle of the Marne the German army was

apparently carrying out successfully its plan of overwhelming France and it was sound procedure for the German fleet to continue to carry out its part of the plan, namely, to guard the northern flanks of the army.

However, after the first battle of the Marne, the High Seas Fleet could have sallied from its base and offered battle to the Grand Fleet which was still deprived of many of its cruisers and destroyers to cover the passage of reinforcements for the Expeditionary Force. Even under these conditions the Grand Fleet materially was superior to the German fleet, but the German fleet was nearer material parity then than at any time thereafter. Moreover, it was somewhat better trained for battle and the variable weather conditions in the North Sea might have offered an opportunity to the weaker fleet to isolate detachments of the Grand Fleet and defeat them in detail.

Late in 1914 permission was granted the High Seas Fleet to make cruiser raids on the British coast in an effort to provoke the British fleet to come into the Heligoland Bight. These cruiser raids had no strategical effect, as the Grand Fleet was not drawn into the Bight, and, tactically, the Germans lost more ships than the British. However, bombardment of the British coast gave intense satisfaction to the German people.

CHAPTER XIII

THE NEAR EAST AND INDIA—THE POLICY OF TURKEY

The Near East and India—The Policy of Turkey—Situation in Mesopotamia in 1914—The Indian Army and Mesopotamia—Complex Organization of Indian Army—The Original Objective of the Mesopotamia Expedition (Force "D")—The Sudden and Successful Descent—Politicians Enlarge the Objectives—British Troop Movements

It is now necessary to return to the Mediterranean.

The dramatic arrival of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* in early August stirred the emotions of the people of Constantinople, who had been outraged when the British Admiralty requisitioned their two battleships building in England. These battleships had been ordered by Turkey to restore their naval superiority over Greece, their completion had been eagerly anticipated and their Turkish crews were in England on the point of commissioning these ships when the British Government authorized their seizure.

The relative dreadnought strength then existing between Britain and Germany forced the British Government to this extreme measure, and it had to accept the consequent increased ill-will of Turkey. A British naval mission under Admiral Limpus was in Constantinople assisting in the re-organization of the Turkish navy. When the German cruisers *Goeben* and *Breslau* were taken over by Turkey, the curious situation developed of a British admiral being in theoretical command of

two Turkish cruisers manned by German officers and men.

General Liman von Sanders, regenerator of the Turkish army, was anxious to complete its mobilization, which was even then proceeding slowly but effectively, before the declaration of war. The German embassy and the German naval officers on the two cruisers desired to precipitate hostilities.

Some of the English leaders wanted to anticipate Turkey's probable action, by getting Greece to join in an attack on Turkey. A British admiral, Mark Kerr, was commander-in-chief of the Greek navy and in close contact with King Constantine. He knew the real condition of the Greek army, and realized that it was not equal to a war with Turkey or Bulgaria unless it was strongly reinforced by an Anglo-French army. Kerr also was well informed through Greek sources of the situation in European Turkey and furnished this information to the Admiralty, which failed however to supply the data to General Hamilton when he was sent to the Dardanelles.

Kitchener wished to gain time to increase the defenses of Egypt and the Suez Canal; he feared also the effect on the Moslem population within and adjoining the British Empire if England should be the aggressor against Turkey. Russia raised objections to Greek participation in a campaign against Constantinople, so the Allies pursued a conciliatory attitude towards Turkey, and offered finally to guarantee Turkey's territories if she remained neutral.

The Turkish Government was dominated by a despotic but patriotic and comparatively efficient triumvirate, Enver Bey, Djemal Pasha and Talaat. The Turkish supply department was given to Ismail Hakki Pasha, intendant general.

Enver was the strongest member of the triumvirate, and he was deservedly popular among his countrymen, for his courageous conduct in the Second Balkan War did much to repair the Turkish defeats in the First Balkan War. As Prime Minister and Minister of War, he had in most cases supported the efforts of General Liman von Sanders to reorganize the Turkish army.

The sentiment in Constantinople became more and more favorable to Germany. The situation was too delicate to endure long; the British naval mission was dismissed. During October the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, under Admiral Souchon, made provocative cruises in the Black Sea designed to bring about hostilities with Russia. On 29 October the *Goeben* bombarded Odessa, and Russia declared war; the declaration of France followed quickly.

On 2 November, in a final desperate effort to frighten the Turkish authorities into remaining neutral, the British Mediterranean fleet bombarded the forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles. But the die had been cast, Turkey was permanently on the side of Germany, England finally realized the futility of her negotiations and her bombardment, and declared war against Turkey on 5 November.

The arrival of the German cruisers in Constantinople enabled the Turkish Government to carry out its secret treaty with Germany more promptly and with complete popular approval. But Turkish interests demanded, and its government had already agreed, that it should join the Central Powers, for if Turkey stood aside while the Central Powers were defeated, her territory would have been divided among the triumphant Allies much as Persia had been partitioned in 1907. Thus the arrival of the German cruisers in Constantinople had identically the same effect on Turkish public opinion that the German

ultimatum to Belgium had on British public opinion, and similarly it enabled the Turkish Government to carry out previous treaty engagements more promptly.

From August to November, while the diplomats were intriguing, Turkey carried out slowly and methodically the mobilization plan prepared by Liman von Sanders, and mobilized an army of over half a million men into at least thirty-eight infantry divisions with corresponding cavalry and other arms and services. These divisions were organized into thirteen army corps. In 1914 three armies were formed; the 1st Army, consisting of six army corps, for the defense of Constantinople; the 2d Army, consisting of two army corps, for the defense of Syria; the 3d Army, consisting of three army corps, for the offensive against Russia in the Caucasus. The 4th Army of five divisions, under Djemal Pasha, was afterwards formed to attack the Suez Canal.

Thanks to the leadership of von Sanders, the efficiency of the German system of training an army, and the brutal effectiveness of Quartermaster General Hakki, the Turkish army despite severe campaigns on four fronts, continued to increase its strength; during the summer of 1916 it mustered at least 600,000 men with fifty-four infantry divisions. The generous response of Enver to German calls for assistance led him to despatch the flower of the Turkish army to southeastern Europe during the autumn of 1916. The severe fighting in Europe and the desperate resistance to the advance of Grand Duke Nicholas in the Caucasus consumed the bulk of the Turkish army during the fall and winter, 1916, and paved the way for the successes of Allenby and Maude in Palestine and Mesopotamia during 1917 and 1918.

Turkey's accession to the Central Powers did much to restore the balance of military power in the Mediterranean and largely compensated for the neutrality of

Italy. Her geographical position formed a strong natural barrier between the Western Powers and their huge but inchoate ally, Russia. The strength of her reorganized army, stiffened by small detachments of German soldiers and led by such officers as Generals von der Goltz, Liman von Sanders and Colonel von Kressenstein, was at first grossly underestimated by the Allies.

SITUATION IN MESOPOTAMIA IN 1914

Two Turkish army corps of two divisions each mobilized in Mesopotamia; the 12th with headquarters at Mosul, the 13th at Bagdad. But Enver drew from Mesopotamia two (2) divisions for the Suez and one (1) for the Caucasus, leaving only the 38th Division with headquarters at Basra. He appointed a commander in Irak, and assigned him in addition to the 38th Division, one regular battalion and seventeen battalions of frontier guards and gendarmes.

Nine-tenths of the soldiers left in Mesopotamia were Arabs, poorly disciplined and unreliable. Their rifles were of an ancient model, and their few field batteries and their three machine guns were antiquated. In addition, Enver, relying on the optimistic reports he had received from the Pan-Islamites in Mesopotamia, called on all of the Arab chiefs in the delta to rally to the Moslem banner, but they are a practical piratical people and waited for developments. As the British were at first successful in the delta, they joined the British.

THE INDIAN ARMY AND MESOPOTAMIA

The Mesopotamia campaign was initiated by the Indian Government and largely carried out by the Indian army. The British understanding with Russia in 1907 permitted a reduction in the Indian army in which Kitch-

ener, then commander-in-chief, acquiesced. In 1914 the Indian army proper consisted of 74,000 British and 159,000 Indian troops. In addition, there were 23,000 imperial troops serving the independent native princes allied to Britain, 40,000 volunteers, 34,000 frontier militia and military police.

The Indian army was organized into two armies of 10 divisional and 4 brigade areas. It provided a field army of $7\frac{1}{3}$ divisions, 5 cavalry brigades plus certain army troops; but there was equipment for only 6 infantry divisions and for 6 cavalry brigades. There was no motor transport, no reserve of rifles, and in India only material sufficient to manufacture 4,000,000 rounds of small arms. The medical department had been neglected and was incommensurate with the combatant arms that it was supposed to serve.

On the outbreak of war, the Indian army mobilized and prepared for service overseas:

Force "A"—Two Infantry and two cavalry divisions, destined for Europe.

Force "B"—One reinforced brigade plus three imperial service battalions, East Africa, for defensive purpose.

Force "C"—Composition unknown, but small, East Africa, for offensive purpose.

In addition to furnishing these forces to Great Britain for use outside of India, the Indian army returned to England 32 of the 42 British battalions serving in India. These 32 battalions formed the bulk of the infantry of the 27th, 28th and 29th British divisions. In exchange, the 43d, 44th, 45th divisions of British territorials were sent to India for garrison duty. This enormous troop movement was accomplished by the British navy before January 1, 1915, and when it was completed, the Indian Government, besides troops in garrison, had left for the

defense of its northwest frontier, 3 infantry divisions plus 1 cavalry brigade.

Egypt, centrally located, was the intermediate depot of troops and made an excellent forwarding station for all points in the Middle and Far East.

COMPLEX ORGANIZATION OF INDIAN ARMY

The Indian army was under the direct control of the Viceroy of India, who was under the Secretary of State for India, a Cabinet officer, who in turn was responsible to the Cabinet and Parliament for the management of Indian affairs. The large enlisted British component of the Indian army, practically all the regimental officers and all the officers for staff and high command, were loaned to the Indian Government by the British War Office, which also provided guns, ammunition and military supplies. The Indian Government paid the cost of material and personnel.

In India there was a British field marshal as commander-in-chief of the Indian army subordinate to the military member of the Viceroy's council who acted as a quasi-Secretary of War. The communications between the Indian army and the chief of imperial general staff passed from the commander-in-chief in India to the military secretary, to the Viceroy, to the Secretary of State for India, to the Secretary of State for War, to the chief of the imperial general staff.

THE ORIGINAL OBJECTIVE OF THE MESOPOTAMIA EXPEDITION (FORCE "D")

The Secretary of State for India had a military secretary in his office at London who advised him on military affairs and maintained an official liaison between the

War Office and the Indian army. General Barrow of the Indian army held this position in 1914, and on September 26, when the relations with Turkey were seriously strained, he submitted to the Secretary for India an appreciation of the rôle India should play in the event Turkey entered the war.

He concluded with a recommendation to dispatch a force to the head of the Persian Gulf, before a possible Turkish declaration of war, "Ostensibly to protect the oil installations, but in reality to notify the Turks we meant business and the Arabs that we were ready to support them." He thought a reinforced brigade taken from Force "A" destined for Europe would probably keep the Arabs quiet unless Turkey actually declared war; in that case it would be necessary to occupy Basra, and that operation would require more troops. Kitchener and Lord Crewe, Secretary of State for India, approved the idea and the Viceroy was ordered on September 26 to be prepared to divert a reinforced brigade from the 6th Division for the purpose.

In view of Churchill's subsequent enthusiastic support of operations in minor theatres, his attitude on 1 September is of interest. On that date he endorsed a paper from the naval staff urging that troops be sent to protect the Persian oil wells, as follows:

"There is little likelihood of any troops being available for this purpose. Indian troops must be used at the decisive point. [*Note: They were destined for France at that time.*] We shall have to buy our oil from elsewhere. The Turks also can be better dealt with at the centre. I have told Lord Crewe [Secretary of State for India] that Europe and Egypt have greater claims than we [the Navy] have on the Indian Army."

Even after the capture of Qurna, it was again officially stated by the Viceroy that the retention of the oil wells

was only a secondary objective and was not to be allowed to jeopardize the possession of Basra, the retention of which was considered necessary to keep the Arabs from joining the Jabad, the religious war, that was being preached by Turkey at Germany's instigation.

THE SUDDEN AND SUCCESSFUL DESCENT

To carry out General Barrow's ideas, on October 16 the reinforced 16th Infantry Brigade of the 6th Poona Division, was taken from Force "A," destined for Europe, and placed under Brigadier General Delemain. It sailed from Bombay, ostensibly for Europe, but with secret orders for Bahrein, an island in the Persian Gulf, where it arrived on October 23. It was officially designated Force "D."

Great Britain declared war on Turkey on November 5, and on the same day leading elements of Force "D," a reinforced brigade aggregating 5,000 men and 1,300 animals, were led into the Shatt-el-Arab formed by the junction of the Tigris and Euphrates, by the sloop-of-war *Espeigle*.

When Britain declared war on Turkey the occupation of Basra was considered necessary; to carry out that task it was decided that Force "D" should be increased to an Indian division and a cavalry regiment; accordingly the remainder of the 6th Indian Division and 33d Cavalry left India on November 9 to strengthen Force "D."

Advancing rapidly, this British and Indian force secured at small cost the water gateway to Mesopotamia in the brief period of three weeks. The reasons for this complete victory were: (1) the feebleness of the Turkish defense; (2) the friendship of the Arab Sheik of Muhammerah, who allowed British naval vessels to use his ports and furnished valuable information of the Turks;

(3) the promptness with which the expedition was inaugurated; (4) the cordial co-operation between the British navy and army.

POLITICIANS ENLARGE THE OBJECTIVES

The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf region from 1904 to 1913 was Sir Percy Cox; in 1914 he became Foreign Secretary to the Indian Government and accompanied the first detachment of Force "D," the Indian Expeditionary Force, to Mesopotamia as chief political officer to the commanding general.

To carry out even the original limited objective in Mesopotamia required the occupation and political control of large areas of Arabian and Persian territory. It was essential to replace the Turkish civil government with a British civil government. Therefore it was a wise provision to supply the commanding general with a civilian aide, well acquainted with the natives, to administer such a civil government. Cox had numerous assistants, mainly former consuls, who were familiar with the country and in addition to their civil duties, frequently acted as officer-guides to leading army detachments. The members of this civilian corps took a large administrative burden off the high command, obtained important information, furnished excellent interpreters and in general formed a very useful organization.

Sir Percy Cox, their chief, deserves full credit for developing this auxiliary service. But he was permitted direct communication with the governor general in India, did not hesitate to extend his opinion to military problems, pressed his views on the senior naval officer present and recommended very ambitious projects to the commanding general and the governor general in India. He must accept a full measure of the responsibility for the subse-

quent expansion of the objectives and the consequent disasters of the campaign.

BRITISH TROOP MOVEMENTS

By 1 January, 1915, three territorial divisions had been landed in India. By April, 1915, the 27th and 28th Divisions, and six territorial divisions, had been landed in France in addition to the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th Regular Infantry and the 1st, 2d and 3d Cavalry Divisions of the reinforced original Expeditionary Force, while the 29th Division, the Royal Naval Division and the Anzac Corps had been landed on Gallipoli.

CHAPTER XIV

DIPLOMACY OF THE ALLIED POWERS DURING THE EARLY DAYS OF THE WORLD WAR

Diplomacy of the Allied Powers During the Early Days of the World War—Relations with America—Grey's Methods—Allied Relations with the Balkan States—Diplomacy of the Central Powers—British Trade with Germany During the War—Germany's Position

WHEN the five great European Powers went to war in August, 1914, Germany and Austria on the one side were bound by a treaty that made definite provision for common action during war. France and Russia had also agreed upon their war measures. Britain and France, through their army and naval officers, had agreed upon their war plans, and Britain and Russia had "naval conversations" in 1913 sufficient to synchronize their naval movements.

No formal alliance existed between Great Britain, France and Russia, and Grey, realizing the need of a definite agreement, negotiated early in September a secret treaty, known as the "London Pact," which provided, first of all, that none of these states would conclude a separate peace. The treaty also publicly proclaimed the reasons that caused these states to take up arms. This part of the treaty, presenting the Entente's view of the situation, was skillfully drawn and had a favorable effect on neutral opinion especially in the United States.

The clauses of the treaty that provided for the rearrangement of European territory, such as the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France and the eventual

bestowal of Constantinople on Russia, were not published. Certain modifications in the disposition of territory to be conquered were made for the benefit of Italy when she entered the war in 1915. The war alliance thus formed had an enduring basis. In spite of several German efforts to detach separate states, it held these states together until Russia collapsed in 1917, and enabled them to preserve their solidarity during two and a half years of unsuccessful land war.

It is true a state occasionally pursued its own selfish aims regardless of the effect on the common cause, but, in general, the Allies were loyal to this fundamental agreement, and individually they resisted various secret overtures by Germany to make separate peace.

This refusal of German offers was the most notable effect of Grey's pact, and it enabled the Allied states to present a united front to the German peace proposals made in December, 1916, at the most critical stage of the war.

RELATIONS WITH AMERICA

As the war developed it became apparent that the supplies and munitions from the United States were essential to the success of the Allies. Grey was quick to appreciate this fact, and took the lead in formulating the policies of the Allies, particularly in regard to the amount of interference with American overseas trade. Our Ambassador, W. H. Page, made no secret of his sympathy with the Allies, and lent his assistance to preserving good relations between the two countries.

While the close personal friendship of Grey and Page was of much assistance to Grey on many occasions, it introduced new dangers, for Page soon lost the confidence of President Wilson, ceased to reflect the views of the administration and unintentionally misled Grey more

than once concerning the views of the United States. Grey did succeed however in preserving good relations with Washington in spite of the natural resentment in this country over the British interference with our trade.

GREY'S METHODS

Grey made no effort to sustain a strict legalistic interpretation of International Law. He states that he permitted the British Admiralty to put just as much pressure on American commerce as he thought the American Government would endure and not retaliate by placing an embargo on munitions and raw materials destined for the Allies. This procedure is traditional with the British Government in the exercise of sea power; for it has always very wisely conditioned the severity of its measures against sea trade to the strength of the neutral government concerned.

ALLIED RELATIONS WITH THE BALKAN STATES

Grey was not so successful in handling the Balkan problem. It was a baffling situation and his representatives in Turkey and Bulgaria allowed themselves to be duped. Grey defends them, but they did not serve him well, nor did he act with his usual sagacity in his decisions regarding the Near East. Grey's failure is remarkable, for he was familiar with all the details of the Near Eastern situation, and in 1913 he had brought peace to the Balkans by skillful and straightforward handling of that always difficult Near Eastern problem.

Grey cannot be blamed for the failure of the Allies to gain neutral European states to their banner in 1914 and 1915. The Central Powers were everywhere successful on land. For two years no small European state whose land frontier bordered the territories of the Cen-

tral Powers dared to challenge those triumphant armies with prostrate Belgium and Serbia pathetic reminders of the ineffectiveness of the Allies on land. When armies succeeded, diplomats had no trouble in securing allies; when armies failed, enticing notes could not persuade responsible European statesmen to join an apparently losing side. With all his idealism Grey was practical enough to appreciate this fact.

Late in 1916, Rumania, half-bribed, half-coerced, bargained too long, joined the Allies, overreached herself in grasping at Transylvania, and was quickly destroyed by the Central Powers. Holland and Denmark with colonies at the mercy of the British navy and frontiers open to land attack from Germany, went through four anxious years, precariously balanced on the fence. Portugal's geographical position relieved her from any fear of the German sword and she could join England with some assurance of safety.

Grey gave the general direction to the policies of the Allies. England sought compensation in Palestine, Mesopotamia and Persia, for conceding Constantinople to Russia. France, though fully occupied at home, did not allow her consuming desire to recover Alsace-Lorraine to prevent her acquiring additional territory in the Near East. Her colonial ambitions in Northern Africa were guaranteed by the London Pact, and she took such interest in possible acquisitions in Syria that she supported the Salonika expedition at the risk of the Western Front itself. Domestic politics and the desire for territorial acquisition combined were able to overcome the original opposition of Joffre, and France dissipated in Macedonia a large share of her army that would have served her better at home. Italy was to be rewarded mainly at the expense of Austria in the Adriatic.

Russia sought Constantinople and an enlarged Serbia.

So intent was she on these objectives, and so suspicious of Grecian aspirations, that she would not permit Greece to participate in the war against Turkey, lest the Greeks anticipate her arrival in Constantinople. This short-sighted policy assisted Turkey to defeat the British and French armies at Gallipoli and to isolate Russia from her Allies.

DIPLOMACY OF THE CENTRAL POWERS

Germany dictated the policies of the Central Powers. There was sometimes an intentional arrogance and always an annoying brusqueness about German diplomacy that prejudiced neutral opinion. Germany's isolation placed her diplomats at a disadvantage in getting their point of view before the neutral world; so German diplomacy was never able to overcome the initial handicap resulting from the invasion of Belgium. But their powerful armies forced their smaller European neighbors to refrain from overt action.

Austria, Turkey and Bulgaria loyally supported the aims of Germany, and like the Allied Powers, the Central Powers presented a solid front to the outside world. Germany supplied the military leadership and contingents of troops to all her allies' armies.

Germany's acknowledged military superiority caused her allies to accept her general direction of the war, except on one or two notable occasions, thereby giving closer unity of purpose among the Central Powers than among their opponents. It is to Germany's credit that German officers and soldiers fought on every front and gave loyal and effective assistance to her allies. History has rarely, if ever, shown so much loyalty between allies as that existing between both the Allied Powers and the Central Powers during the World War.

BRITISH TRADE WITH GERMANY DURING THE WAR

In order legally to attack the commerce going into Germany via Scandinavia and Holland, England revived the doctrine of "continuous voyage" and claimed that when the ultimate destination of contraband cargo was Germany, she could seize it. However, England herself continued her traffic with these Scandinavian countries, while stopping neutral commerce, largely American. And it was American remonstrances to England that first disclosed to the world the enormous trade British merchants were still carrying on with their German customers via Scandinavia.

Rear-Admiral Consett, British naval attaché to Scandinavia during the war, has shown that Great Britain, by prohibiting the export from the United Kingdom to Scandinavia of coal, petroleum, fishing tackle, agricultural machinery and fodder, could have greatly increased the effectiveness of the blockade against Germany, for the German people were, in large measure, fed by the Scandinavian countries and Holland. British trade with Scandinavia was also a source of friction between the United States and Great Britain, because such articles as Singer sewing machines and American agricultural machinery were kept out of these countries, while similar English machinery was permitted to enter and afterwards found its way into Germany.

The British officials attempted to justify this trade with Scandinavia on the ground that they needed foodstuffs, certain kinds of steel and cryolite, from Scandinavia. However, to secure these articles, they allowed Germany to obtain more foodstuffs, particularly dairy products, fish, the greasy fats, coal and iron. The problem confronting the British authorities was one of relative gains,

and Germany benefited more than England by the Scandinavian trade.

Eventually, England permitted only a certain amount of strategic materials to go into the Baltic states and the overflow into Germany lessened. With the entry of the United States into the war the flow of American goods was controlled at the source. An extremely effective blockade of Germany quickly ensued. This result was accomplished by domestic laws rather than international law.

Mistakes, even those occasioned by high motives, often have a cruel way of recoiling in the faces of their authors. Sir Edward Grey, as Foreign Minister, piloted the ratification of the Declaration of London through the House of Commons in 1909 and 1910. Its passage required all the party discipline of the Liberal whips, for many members of Parliament were afraid its provisions would reduce the offensive value of their fleets.

Largely as the result of opposition originated in the House of Commons by T. Gibson Bowles, to whom the British nation should be forever grateful, the House of Lords rejected the legislation necessary to enforce the Declaration of London. And, in 1914 and 1915, with unperturbed gravity, Grey wrote many neatly phrased notes to our State Department explaining the impossibility of England's abiding by an international agreement he had eloquently defended in Parliament.

GERMANY'S POSITION

Germany was impaled on the other prong of the international-law fork; she had openly opposed the restrictions on the belligerent's use of sea power during the London conference, and had not ratified the declaration. In 1914 it was plainly to German interests as the weaker

sea power to have the ameliorating provisions of the Declaration of London observed. She announced her willingness to abide by them, provided Great Britain would, but Grey was not to be imposed upon twice, so, in face of much urging for some obscure reason by our State Department, he resolutely refused to abide by the declaration, and thus enabled the British navy to operate offensively against enemy commerce.

The sagacity of Admiral Mahan has never been more clearly exhibited than in his exposure of the evil effects of the London Conference upon the application of sea power, where, as our naval delegate in 1908-09, he opposed its adoption. His world-wide fame as an authority on sea power gained him a respectful hearing from the delegates. But he was overruled by his own civilian colleagues, and the United States is recorded in favor of the provisions of this conference which affect our naval policy more adversely than they do that of Great Britain. For his opposition to this pact, Mahan was criticized by our Eastern press as a naval "militarist," but he was vindicated by the events of the World War.

CHAPTER XV

THE GRAND FLEET VS. HIGH SEAS FLEET IN 1915

The Grand Fleet vs. High Seas Fleet in 1915—Submarine Operations
in 1915

IN January, 1915, Admiral von Pohl succeeded von Ingenohl in command of the High Seas Fleet. He believed thoroughly in husbanding the German fleet until the Grand Fleet could be reduced by attrition, and throughout 1915 he pursued a very prudent course. But the British Grand Fleet was growing slowly and steadily and, in reply to the German hit-and-run attacks, Beatty's Battle Cruiser Fleet based on Rosyth was strengthened. It was this disposition that enabled them to sink the armored cruiser *Blücher* in a running fight with the German cruisers early in 1915.

The German fleet next laid several plans to entice Beatty's fleet of cruisers over submarines and into a pocket where they could be enveloped by the High Seas Fleet. The Grand Fleet continued to make periodic sweeps into the North Sea, hoping to intercept the High Seas Fleet or part of it in the northern or western part of the North Sea. The motives of both fleets were the same and if there was any purely naval strategy in the North Sea it was never more profound than the ancient effort to attack an inferior force with a superior force. Both sides employed submarines as scouts; the German navy were given the Zeppelins, which had proved unserviceable with the army, and they were used as naval scouts.

In spite of their scouts the misty weather generally prevailing in the North Sea frequently left both fleets without information of the enemy. Both admirals kept their fleets well in hand and neither leader was able to cut off a detachment of the opposing fleet.

SUBMARINE OPERATIONS IN 1915

On February 4, 1915, the first German submarine war on merchant vessels was ordered. The procedure prescribed for the submarine captains was a compromise between the naval recommendations that all merchant ships be sunk and the Foreign Office recommendations that neutral ships be spared. It was announced formally that on account of the misuse of neutral flags by British vessels, neutral vessels might be attacked. Confidential orders were given to submarines *not* to attack neutral ships, while at the same time submarines were ordered not to emerge for the purpose of examination. These two orders were in conflict, for the submarine could not ascertain the nationality of steamers without emerging.

When a Dutch steamer was sunk, the German Government immediately disavowed the act and offered an indemnity. The sinking of the *Lusitania* and *Arabic* brought stern notes from President Wilson, and in deference to his protests late in 1915 the attacks without warning were definitely limited to armed enemy merchantmen. An additional and powerful factor in Germany's decision to abandon submarine warfare was the comparatively small number of submarines, about twenty-four, in commission ready for duty. No large results could be expected from the submarines then available, and von Falkenhayn did not believe the gains to be expected would compensate Germany for the ill-will of neutral states.

After Weddingen's successes von Tirpitz was a persistent advocate of unrestricted warfare regardless of neutrals; so was Admiral von Scheer. General von Falkenhayn advised postponing the decision in the summer of 1915 until Bulgaria had joined the Central Powers, for he feared she would not join if the United States broke off relations with Germany. After Bulgaria was secured and the number of submarines had been increased, he was a consistent advocate of the unrestricted use of the submarine.

The limited submarine campaign was extended to the Mediterranean in the spring of 1915. It commenced with Hersing's successful attacks on the battleships off Gallipoli, which had much to do with the defeat of the Allies at the Dardanelles. Next, two new submarines, *U-33* and *U-35*, were sent from Germany and based on Pola. Most of the merchant tonnage navigating the Mediterranean Sea was British, French or Italian. Their naval commanders had made no comprehensive plans for protecting their shipping, consequently the Mediterranean Sea proved a profitable operating area for the German submarines.

The following table summarizes the record of German submarines:

MONTHS	NORTH SEA AND ATLANTIC
1915:	GROSS TONS SUNK
February to August.....	120,000
September	136,000
October	108,000
November	158,000
December	121,000
July to December, 1915:	MEDITERRANEAN
<i>Monthly average</i>	125,000

CHAPTER XVI

JOFFRE AND VON FALKENHAYN IN DECEMBER 1914

Joffre and von Falkenhayn in December 1914—Von Falkenhayn's Plan for 1915—Joffre's Plan for 1915—Joffre Attacks—The German Offensive in Poland—Von Mackensen Ruptures the Russian Line—Joffre Hurls Foch and the British Army at the Germans—Foch Fails to Rupture German Line

FROM September to December, Joffre and von Falkenhayn had raced and fought for the Channel ports. Their armies were almost exhausted and both commanders realized the war could not be decided quickly. Joffre took much satisfaction from the fact that he had frustrated the German effort to destroy the French army in a short, decisive campaign, but he was under no illusions of an easy victory over Germany, as he contemplated the "heart-breaking problem" of driving the Germans from northern France and Belgium and the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine.

Von Falkenhayn appreciated that the failure of the original German plan would expose Germany to a war of exhaustion, with Britain in control of the sea, for the German naval staff after the battle of Heligoland Bight refused to consider an attack on the British fleet. He clung to the original German plan "to force the decision on the Western Front" because he knew that France and Britain were Germany's most powerful and resolute enemies and that until the French army was defeated successes over Russia, no matter how enormous, would not bring victory to Germany.

As Minister of War, before being called to command the armies, von Falkenhayn had already organized the German zone of the interior to increase the supply of munitions and to provide a flow of replacements to the existing army divisions and to create four new army corps approximating thirteen new divisions.

When von Falkenhayn took over the duties of chief of staff he retained the office of Minister of War, leaving in Berlin in immediate charge his former assistant. He thereby forestalled any friction between the zone of the armies and the zone of the interior. By this consolidation of authority and the prompt manner in which German industry was diverted to the production of munitions, the German armies managed to hold their initial superiority in war material throughout 1915 and the spring of 1916. Von Falkenhayn established a better balance between industry supporting the war and recruits necessary for the fighting formations than either the French or British authorities were able to do.

VON FALKENHAYN'S PLAN FOR 1915

Von Falkenhayn knew he would be unable to resume the offensive on the Western Front until his new formations of recruits, due in February, 1915, were ready; and he resisted all pleas to put them into battle before they were properly trained. He was convinced that it was necessary to keep the eastern frontiers intact, in order to insure for the Central Powers the industrial and agricultural products of that area. He believed that if Hungary was invaded, Austria-Hungary would collapse and eventual victory of the Central Powers be made impossible. He decided to consolidate his position on the Western Front with a view to making it unbreakable and to maintain the minimum number of troops on the Eastern Front

to protect the frontiers of Germany and Austria-Hungary.

In January, 1915, despite urging by the Austrian general staff to undertake a new offensive on the Eastern Front, von Falkenhayn tentatively allotted the newly created German formations amounting to four army corps to the Western Front, which he considered of the first importance. The Russians maintained their pressure against the Austrian front in the Carpathians, and compelled the Austrian high command to recall the forces facing Serbia on the Danube in order to despatch them to the assistance of their comrades on the Galician frontier.

In spite of these reinforcements, the Russians encircled Przemyśl, and pushing by that strong point threatened to overrun Hungary. The possible collapse of the Austrian front compelled von Falkenhayn to reconsider his first decision and "with a heavy heart" he despatched three of the four new army corps to von Hindenburg, who attempted to take the Russian pressure off the Austrians by an offensive from East Prussia. In spite of von Hindenburg's successes in the forests of Augustow, the Russians continued their successful advance against the Austrians in Galicia and captured Przemyśl on 22 March. The Germans and Austrians on the Eastern Front were forced on the defensive.

JOFFRE'S PLAN FOR 1915

After the battle for Flanders closed in November, Joffre decided it was essential to renew the Franco-British offensive against the Germans before they could consolidate their positions in France, which, at its nearest point, was only "5 marches from Paris." The British army had been increased to nine infantry divisions, and three

cavalry divisions plus two Indian infantry and two Indian cavalry divisions, and had taken over thirty miles of front. Joffre, with the British assistance, was still engaging four out of five German soldiers.

In 1914 Joffre had found it necessary to introduce a new higher echelon of command, "The Group of Armies," and entrust the command of it to General Foch; likewise the German staff had found it necessary to make von Hindenburg commander-in-chief of the eastern armies to provide a proper co-ordination of the very large formations operating in that area. In January, 1915, Joffre combined the 1st and 3d Armies into the "Eastern Group" and assigned General Dubail to command. The remainder of the French divisions were continued under the army commanders or held as a reserve, subject to Joffre's own orders. This new echelon of command proved its usefulness and was soon generally accepted in all armies.

JOFFRE ATTACKS

Carrying out his plan of an offensive against the Germans, Joffre attacked in December and early January, 1915, in Alsace, in the Woevre and in Champagne; all these attacks failed to gain much territory but they held the great bulk of the German troops in France and kept them from reinforcing the Eastern Front, where von Hindenburg wished to undertake a new offensive.

Again in February, Joffre renewed the attacks in Champagne, but the Germans easily repulsed these attacks, and von Falkenhayn considered a German offensive in the west, for he believed that the German army was better on the offensive than the defensive and he was convinced that final success in war could only be obtained by taking the vigorous offensive. But the Austrian crisis developed and required the despatch of all

available German reserves to the Eastern Front. Even so, in accordance with the von Falkenhayn doctrine that trenches lost must be regained, the Germans on the Western Front instituted local attacks in various places, employing divisions drawn from their own reserves.

The failure of the French and English offensives in March encouraged von Falkenhayn to believe that the German Western Front was, for the time being, secure. Conditions on the Eastern Front by the middle of April were not promising; the German front was stable, but their armies were not in a position to advance, while the Austrian front in Galicia was rapidly crumbling.

THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE IN POLAND

Von Falkenhayn, who had failed to restore the conditions in the east by extending limited but direct assistance to the Austrian front, or by the relief attacks of von Hindenburg's armies from East Prussia and in Poland, now organized a new force, the German 11th Army of eight German and two Austro-Hungarian divisions, and the Austro-Hungarian 4th Army of five Austro-Hungarian divisions and one German infantry division. He appointed General von Mackensen to command; and directed this force to make a "break through" the Russian lines from Gorlice to Gromnik. Even with these reinforcements the Germans on the Eastern Front were still somewhat less than 650,000 men, while von Falkenhayn retained in France 1,900,000 men to insure the stability of the Western Front.

These figures indicate clearly that von Falkenhayn realized the French army was the one to be "watched" and the one he would eventually have to conquer before Germany could win the war. No greater compliment has ever been paid the French army than by its able antago-

nist, von Falkenhayn, for he retained almost 2,000,000 soldiers in France to resist the French attacks while he dispatched a third of that number to take the offensive against Russia. In amplification of his general plan, von Falkenhayn cautioned von Hindenburg and von Mackensen that neither did he contemplate, nor seek, the destruction of the Russian army; he only wished to render it powerless to threaten the eastern frontiers of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Von Falkenhayn appreciated that the numerical superiority of the Russians and the almost limitless space available for manœuvres in retreat prevented the envelopment and quick destruction of the Russian armies. He was familiar with Napoleon's Moscow campaign.

VON MACKENSEN RUPTURES THE RUSSIAN LINE

On the Western Front, in April, the Germans made lively demonstrations to cloak the preparatory movements of von Mackensen's army. One of these, in the neighborhood of Ypres on 26 April, was the famous poison-gas attack.

The von Mackensen offensive began on 2 May; two days later the desired rupture of the Russian line was complete, and to keep up the pressure on the retiring Russians another German division was taken from the Western Front, although indications of the approaching French offensive were not lacking.

JOFFRE HURLS FOCH AND THE BRITISH ARMY AT THE GERMANS

Joffre had been preparing Foch's 10th Army to attack in the region of Arras. The British army would co-operate and prolong the attack to the north, with Loos as their local objective. The object of Joffre's attack was to drive

the Germans from the whole of their prepared position and to defeat them before they could take up a new position.

Foch's army had been reinforced with three additional army corps, seventy-two heavy guns, and supplied with material and ammunition for a ten-day battle. May 1 was the day set for the attack, but arrangements could not be completed until May 7; bad weather caused another delay, and it was May 9 when the attack began.

Joffre, who entertained high hopes of this battle to be carried out by his favorite subordinate commander, the already famous Ferdinand Foch, with a completely equipped army plentifully supplied with ammunition, established his command post at Doullens, adjacent to the general headquarters' reserves, which he prepared to throw into the action. He warned all the cavalry divisions on 8 May to be ready to exploit the expected break-through.

FOCH FAILS TO RUPTURE GERMAN LINE

On 9 May five French army corps attacked on a front of about ten miles; the attack succeeded in the centre, where it advanced two and a half miles, but was fought to a standstill at each end of the line. The French reserves, although available, could not be brought up rapidly enough to exploit the initial success before the German reserves were able to intervene. The breach was repaired by the German command, and Joffre was not given an opportunity to employ his cavalry.

The British attack on the 9th in the Loos area only penetrated the first line of German trenches, and a counter-attack ejected them. The Germans were forced to employ their scanty army reserves to resist these attacks. The crisis passed on the 9th and 10th, after it had caused

the local German headquarters to consider a retreat. Again von Falkenhayn had barely left enough divisions to hold the Western Front, but his calculations proved correct and encouraged him to rely still more on the skill and resolution of the German commanders and the dogged determination of the German soldiers on the Western Front to withstand heavy and skillful attacks by superior numbers.

Joffre felt obliged to continue these attacks until the middle of June in an effort to take the German pressure off the Russians and to encourage the Italians, who were on the verge of joining the Allies, but after 10 May all hope of a French break-through vanished. In the meanwhile the Germans were exploiting to the full their break-through at Gorlice; first in the Galician region to relieve the Austro-Hungarians and next in the Vilna area. All through the summer they drove the Russians before them, inflicting upon the demoralized Muscovites increasing losses.

The Germans at Gorlice and the French at Arras both had the same tactical conception of rupturing the enemy line by employing an overwhelming artillery fire to search out the back areas, the ammunition depots, the forwarding points of the reserves, and finally, just before launching the infantry, to shatter the enemy front-line trenches. So continuous was the artillery preparations in these offensives that the apt term "drum-fire" was first applied to them.

The French did not effect the complete rupture, consequently they did not inflict the tremendous losses on the Germans that the Germans inflicted upon the Russians. The reasons for the German success and the French failure were, that opposed to the Germans in Poland were the comparatively poorly trained, badly equipped Russians already weary from their exertions on the offensive,

whose high command was entirely unequal to reacting against the savage and skillfully directed attacks organized by von Mackensen, while opposed to the French were alert, well-organized and equipped Germans, whose morale was high and whose officers could react against the French attacks.

Even so, the Germans barely managed to resist Foch's attacks, and on May 10 their situation was extremely critical. A break-through at that time, with Joffre in readiness to exploit it, would have had far-reaching consequences and might have forced the Germans to abandon their hardly won French territory.

This indicates very clearly the grave risks necessarily taken in France by von Falkenhayn in his effort to restore the eastern situation. It also shows that the French and English, to almost the full extent of their ability, were taking the offensive in the winter of 1914 and spring of 1915, primarily to rid France of the Germans, secondarily to relieve the German pressure on Russia.

These two battles illustrate the important fact that a successful offensive eventually inflicts much more loss than it entails, while an unsuccessful offensive usually has to accept greater losses than it inflicts. There is one important modification to this statement: to resist successfully an attack, a counter-attack is usually necessary, and in long-sustained battles this factor tends to equalize the losses on both sides.

CHAPTER XVII

DISPERSION OF MILITARY EFFORT

Dispersion of Military Effort—The Overthrow of the British Government in May, 1915—The War on the Eastern Front—Joffre Undertakes Relief Attack—Allied Delays—Joffre Barely Fails to Rupture German Line

ONE large dispersion of Allied military effort was taking place while this close decision on the Western Front was being made. During the first half of May, when the British and French armies were seeking a decision in Champagne, General Hamilton with a British-French army simultaneously was seeking a decision over the Turks at Gallipoli. Under his command were the 29th Regular Division, the 42d Territorial Division, the 29th Indian Brigade, the Australian-New Zealand Corps, and two French colonial divisions. If the Allies had been content to accept a defensive rôle in the Near East, the 29th Division, the Anzac Corps and the two French divisions could have taken part in the Champagne attack.

Almost as far-reaching in detrimental effect on the operations of the Western Front was the diversion of munitions from France to Gallipoli, a minor theatre. Field Marshal French was sadly in need of ammunition during the Champagne campaign and in the midst of it he received orders to transfer immediately some of his scanty store via Marseilles to Gallipoli. Hamilton's army also lacked ammunition, but the French corps at Gallipoli was equipped with batteries of the famous "75s" and supplied with ammunition that would have done more for the Allied cause in France than at Gallipoli. This campaign,

by influencing Admiral Fisher to resign, brought about the downfall of the Liberal government in England. The leading features of the failure at the Dardanelles are described hereafter; only its effect on the general situation, particularly on the government in London, is considered here.

THE OVERTHROW OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN MAY, 1915

During 1914 various proposals had been made in England to effect a coalition Cabinet as France already had done, but Bonar Law, leader of the Conservatives, at first thought better to remain in silent, patriotic opposition.

In January and February, 1915, Winston Churchill, aided by Lloyd George, influenced the Liberal Cabinet and the War Council in favor of the Dardanelles expedition. This campaign was never submitted to a joint army-navy staff for study and recommendation; its beginning was opposed by the few military officers who were consulted. After being inaugurated in a halting, piece-meal manner it quickly became such a drain on the military resources that practically all the army and navy officers opposed it.

The leaders of the Conservative party soon learned that Churchill did not hesitate to disregard the advice of Admiral Fisher, and having more confidence in Fisher than in Churchill, they became uneasy about the naval situation, with the civilian First Lord presuming to dictate to the First Sea Lord on technical matters. On May 14, 1915, Churchill ordered a naval reinforcement to the Dardanelles against Fisher's advice. Fisher resigned. Asquith vainly urged Fisher to withdraw his resignation; leaders of the Conservative party informed Asquith that they viewed Fisher's resignation "with dismay" and un-

less there was a proper explanation by the Prime Minister, they would force a debate in Parliament.

On the same day the Liberal Cabinet met and faced bad news from France, Poland and Gallipoli. The shortage of ammunition in the British army was published in *The London Times*. Asquith knew Churchill's repeated disregard of Fisher's advice could not be defended in Parliament. Lloyd George, with his keen political insight, realized that the government must placate the opposition. Accordingly, he arranged an immediate meeting between Bonar Law and Asquith. A coalition Cabinet was agreed upon and among the changes demanded by Bonar Law was the removal of Churchill from the Admiralty. Asquith and Lloyd George, although both of them had supported Churchill against Fisher, agreed that Churchill must go.

Although himself an advocate of minor theatres, Lloyd George remained in the Cabinet. As will be seen, the government took no steps to improve the system of conducting the war. It admitted some members of the opposition party into the Cabinet in order to silence their criticism. Admiral Fisher had petulantly left his office during the political crisis before his resignation had been accepted by the government. This conduct was indefensible, so he could not be recalled to the Admiralty, to the disappointment of many of his Conservative friends.

Asquith remained at the head of the government and was able, with the aid of the Conservatives, to give more support to the chiefs of the army and navy. But Lloyd George also continued in the Cabinet in a position to support operations in all minor theatres; and Churchill was able through his many personal contacts to support Lloyd George and all other advocates of adventures in minor theatres. For a period of about six weeks, while the new Cabinet was taking charge, the War Council made no

decisions between the French and Dardanelles front. During this period the British Government gave no coherent direction to the British armed forces; as far as its war-making functions were concerned, it might as well not have existed.

When the reorganized War Council, renamed the "Dardanelles Committee," finally commenced working, its first important decision, made early in July, was to reinforce Hamilton at Gallipoli to insure a rupture of the Turkish position on Gallipoli. Kitchener was mainly responsible for this decision, because he feared a serious loss of British prestige among the Mohammedan races if the Gallipoli venture did not succeed.

Unfortunately for the Allied cause, both Hamilton and Kitchener underrated the Turkish powers of resistance, and while Kitchener furnished all the infantrymen demanded by Hamilton, they were not properly trained nor led, and they lacked almost completely their quota of artillery. These men could have been used as replacements to fill the ranks of seasoned divisions, but, as new formations, they were, with the exception of a few battalions, entirely unready for the battle line.

THE WAR ON THE EASTERN FRONT

On 24 May Italy declared war on Austria, but not on Germany. In spite of being only recently relieved from the Russian invasion, Austria proposed an immediate offensive against Italy, which was peremptorily vetoed by Germany, who insisted upon Austria continuing the offensive against Russia. The Italians mobilized slowly. They were at a great disadvantage due to the almost impregnable Austrian frontier, and their first offensive against Austria made little progress. It contained a certain number of Austrian divisions. The addition of the

Italian navy increased the existing Allied naval superiority in the Mediterranean.

In June two and a half German divisions were brought from the Western Front, two from the German army in front of Warsaw, and two from the German forces on the Danube facing Serbia, to reinforce the troops operating against the Russians in Galicia. With these reinforcements the Russian Galician front was broken.

On June 22 Lemberg was recaptured by the Germans and Austrians. This success relieved Austria-Hungary from any fear of Russian invasion, and Turkey from any fear of a landing on the Bosphorus by Russia's Odessa detachment, which was drawn into the defense of Poland.

In July, von Gallwitz's army continued the German eastern offensive by breaking through the Russian line at Prassnycz. The von Mackensen group of armies turned northward after capturing Lemberg, and in spite of serious opposition and many Russian counter-attacks, made such progress that on 4 August the Russians evacuated Warsaw and Ivangarood.

To accomplish these huge successes against Russia it was necessary to detach two more German divisions from the French front.

JOFFRE UNDERTAKES RELIEF ATTACK

In June, Joffre learned that large German forces had been transferred to Russia and endeavored to take advantage of this situation to resume the offensive in France. Various reasons delayed the attack, first until August, then until September. Meanwhile the rôles of Russia and France were reversed; Russia was begging that France relieve her from the German pressure by attacking the German line in France.

By the middle of June, 1915, Joffre had formed the

French army into three groups. The first group, the Northern Group, had been formed in the fall of 1914 and assigned to Foch; the second group, the Eastern Group, composed of the 1st and 3d Armies, had been formed in January, 1915, and General Dubail assigned to command; the remaining, Central Group, was formed 13 June, 1915, and command assigned to General de Castelnau.

Joffre's strategical conception at this time was that simultaneous operations carried out by the groups of armies would prevent the enemy making full use of his reserves and "force him to accept battle with limited means wherever we elected."

The British army in France was steadily increasing. By the end of June there were twenty-seven British divisions in France, ten Regular Infantry, six Territorial Infantry, three New Army (Kitchener's) Infantry, two Indian Army Infantry, 1st Canadian Division, three British Cavalry Divisions, and two Indian Cavalry Divisions. Many of these units were composed of unseasoned and partly trained troops, and they could only be employed in the quiet sectors, or in rear areas to release trained and seasoned troops.

Joffre's plan was "to attempt a break-through . . . in Champagne, while pinning the enemy to his ground in the Arras region by a secondary attack, . . . carried out in conjunction with a British offensive."

The main attack was to be carried out by General de Castelnau with the Centre Group, including the 2d, 4th and 3d Armies. His forces included twenty-nine infantry divisions, two cavalry corps, and 800 heavy guns.

The secondary attack was assigned to General Foch with the Northern Group, to break through the enemy front in the Artois area. He was given twelve infantry divisions and a cavalry corps, and 300 heavy guns.

Joffre requested Field Marshal French to attack with the British army with the Loos-Hulluch area as the objective. Although Sir John considered a British attack in the Ypres region would be more effective, he loyally yielded to Joffre's wishes. In passing, this operation affords a good example of the way Joffre secured unity of action between the two Allied armies without unity of command. Both he and his leading subordinate, Foch, obtained loyal co-operation of the British commanders. Other French commanders did not inspire the same British confidence, and, naturally, did not obtain the same British support.

ALLIED DELAYS

These arrangements were agreed upon by 12 July, but the offensive could not be undertaken until some time in September, largely because the army commanders lacked the necessary men and munitions. The British army received five additional divisions in July, two in August, five in September. Meanwhile the Russian retreat continued. On 14 August a very moving appeal came from the French Ambassador at Petrograd, Monsieur Paleologue, stating that the Russian army had nearly reached the limit of its endurance and the Russian people impatiently awaited the French offensive. On 19 August, Joffre set 8 September as the date the offensive should begin. But it required still another month to complete the arrangements, and it was 22 September before the artillery preparations began; on the 24th the German rail-centres and troop quarters were bombarded.

JOFFRE BARELY FAILS TO RUPTURE GERMAN LINE

The infantry attack on the Champagne front was launched on 25 September. Unfortunately heavy rain

began on the 24th and continued through the 29th. The French had expended much of their ammunition when the rain began. If they delayed the infantry attack the Germans could quickly repair the damage done by the artillery. It was a difficult situation, because rain would interfere more with the French offensive operations than with the German defensive arrangements. Joffre decided to adhere to the original schedule. The French infantry made good progress until the 27th, by which date they had advanced beyond the effective range of their artillery. The infantry, unsupported, attempted to carry the German positions that had escaped the French artillery and were repulsed with heavy loss.

Again the French had nearly ruptured the German line. On September 25 they had driven back "the remnants of two German divisions, on a front of fifteen miles" into their rear positions, which had already been destroyed by artillery. The staff of the German 3d Army which held this front were about to order a retirement which would have forced a general retreat of the neighboring armies, when the chief of staff of the adjacent 5th Army persuaded them to delay decision until von Falkenhayn, who was on his way from Pless on the Eastern Front to the Western Front, could make the decision. Immediately after his arrival von Falkenhayn replaced the chief of staff who had advised retirement with a staff officer from his own headquarters.

Von Falkenhayn knew that he had placed an almost unendurable burden on the German army in France; he was informed of the impending French-English attack; he had reversed the flow of German troops, who were now headed west, and on 25 September accompanied by the German general headquarters he arrived on the Western Front and took charge. Two army corps that had just detrained in Belgium from the Eastern Front, and one

division from the German army in Alsace, were rapidly thrown into the battle and they sufficed to check the French attack. This was a closer call for von Falkenhayn than in May, for had this attack crashed through, his reserves to restore the situation were still scantier than in the spring.

In the secondary attack, carried out by Foch's 10th Army and the British army, Foch's attack failed completely; the British, using poison gas on the first day, captured the foremost German positions at Loos on the 25th, but were ejected by bitter German counter-attacks. The fighting continued in Artois and Champagne until almost the end of October before it died down, for the same reason that it had in October, 1914—complete exhaustion of all armies.

The Anglo-French offensives in September and October had been carried out by fifty-four French and thirteen British divisions, supported by 1,300 French and 300 British heavy guns. While Britain was contributing eleven divisions to the Gallipoli campaign it was only furnishing thirteen to the principal offensive in the main theatre in France. Another comparison will show the bad effect of the operation in Gallipoli on the Western Front: from February to July, while Britain sent eleven divisions to Gallipoli, only fifteen divisions were sent to France.

In addition, had the troops that were sent to Gallipoli been sent to France, they would have arrived there in time to permit launching Joffre's offensive in August, as originally planned. As it happened, in July five British divisions went to France, in August two divisions, and in September, five. In June, July and the first week of August, six divisions were sent to Gallipoli.

During May, Field Marshal French in Artois and General Hamilton at Gallipoli both had their offensives arrested for lack of reserves; if the divisions in Gallipoli

had been employed in France, the attack could have continued and given Joffre's offensive in Champagne a better opportunity to succeed. The divisions in France could not have been sent to Gallipoli without jeopardizing the whole Western Front, for von Falkenhayn never had less than 1,700,000 men there. Again, during the last week of September, when von Falkenhayn was throwing in his reinforcements hurried from Russia barely in time to prevent a rupture of the German line, the British divisions in France, having lost two-thirds of their effectives, had to stop their offensive; just a month before, Hamilton at Gallipoli on 20 August fought his last fight for Gallipoli, and stopped his offensive for lack of troops. Had Hamilton's troops been added to French's army, Joffre's two offensives in May and September could have been started earlier and continued longer.

The German line barely held under the strain it actually suffered; in all probability the line could not have held against the additional impact of Hamilton's army, and it is certain that von Falkenhayn would have been obliged to call a halt to von Hindenburg's advance much sooner if the British Cabinet had placed all the new divisions in France. That is to say, the best way to relieve the pressure against Russia in 1915 was to push the attack in France. This procedure had the further advantage of wearing down the German army that had to be defeated before the Allied Powers could win the war.

CHAPTER XVIII

WAR IN THE EAST—THE CLASH BETWEEN VON FALKENHAYN AND VON HINDENBURG

War in the East—The Clash Between von Falkenhayn and von Hindenburg—The Beleaguered Position of the Central Powers

THE long series of von Hindenburg's successes against Russia had aroused the enthusiasm of the whole German nation, but it had also raised among many Germans the phantom hope that "the war can be won in the east." Advocates of this plan strove to have the eastern armies reinforced at the expense of the troops on the French front.

During the Vilna offensive, early in September, von Falkenhayn warned von Hindenburg that the approaching French-English offensive in the Western Front would require the withdrawal of certain German formations from the Eastern Front, including two divisions of the 10th Army Corps. Von Hindenburg encountered more Russian resistance than he anticipated, and on 11 September he requested authority to retain these divisions for his offensive. Von Falkenhayn felt obliged to refuse this request.

On 19 September, von Falkenhayn ordered portions of the 12th and 8th Armies removed to the Western Front, amounting to seven divisions; one, the 26th Division, in rear of the line, he ordered to be despatched immediately; the remaining six divisions were ordered to proceed with all speed. Von Hindenburg protested his need of these

troops. He was told by von Falkenhayn to return the divisions as directed, for it made little difference to the eventual success of the war whether the German line in Russia rested on the Dwina or further back on the Niemen.

Von Hindenburg replied that he would send the divisions as soon as possible and would inform general headquarters when they could be transferred. Von Falkenhayn permitted this ambiguous reply because of the battle then being waged near Smorgon, which was expected to remove a salient in the German line and reduce the number of troops necessary to stabilize the front.

By 3 October it was apparent the expected success would not materialize, and von Falkenhayn demanded that von Hindenburg furnish a statement of the position of the army corps, so that detachments might be made to the other theatres.

On October 6 von Hindenburg reported that it was impossible for him to detach any divisions. Von Falkenhayn, in reply, again reminded von Hindenburg that the exact position of the German line in Russia was of little consequence, but "The loss of our [German] position in the West [France] can mean an unfavorable conclusion of the war," and demanded the entrainment of divisions for the west as soon as possible.

In the full tide of his victorious career, von Hindenburg, the idol of the German people, sincerely convinced that he had given thorough consideration to the other theatres of war, bluntly refused to comply with von Falkenhayn's order, and requested that his views of the relative importance of the fronts and the need for troops be laid before the Supreme War Lord, his Majesty, the Emperor.

Von Hindenburg's letter also contained implied and explicit criticism of general headquarters; in a sharp re-

ply, von Falkenhayn asserted that several of von Hindenburg's statements did "not concern authenticated consideration of past events," being the German military parlance for the British parliamentary term "a factual inexactitude." In plain American, von Falkenhayn charged that von Hindenburg's statements were in error. He also pointed to several instances where von Hindenburg's previous plans had miscarried, and asserted that von Hindenburg's favorite tactical idea of enveloping both ends of an enemy line was inapplicable on an extended front against a numerically superior army, like the Russian.

Von Falkenhayn concluded by informing von Hindenburg that all important previous decisions of general headquarters had been approved by the Emperor before being issued as directives, and that he would bring von Hindenburg's protest to the attention of his Majesty. The Emperor decided in favor of von Falkenhayn and the divisions were detached from von Hindenburg and placed at the disposition of the chief of staff, von Falkenhayn.

In this dispute between two great soldiers, both sincerely devoted to their country's interest, we see the difficulties inseparable from any war and particularly a "war on two fronts." Von Falkenhayn was responsible for the war on all fronts, he could not satisfy von Hindenburg at the expense of the Western Front without risking the loss of the war. Von Hindenburg, immersed in the gigantic battles on the Eastern Front, strive as he loyally did to consider the whole situation, could not visualize the entire picture of Germany at war that was so continuously present in the mind of von Falkenhayn.

Later on during 1916 we shall see Pétain making the same excessive demands on Joffre for reinforcements. During May, June and July, 1918, in the last campaign

of the war, Haig and Pétain made the same excessive demands on the allied commander-in-chief, Foch. This natural tendency for local commanders to demand more than their share of troops is practically universal. An able French military writer, Cordonier, praises the Duke of Berwick, natural son of James II by Arabella Churchill, as being one conspicuous exception to this rule, for he returned troops to the commander-in-chief as being unnecessary in his theatre of operations. During the World War, General Hamilton at Gallipoli loyally refrained from unduly pressing the claims of his army on Kitchener.

This dramatic dispute between von Falkenhayn and von Hindenburg also proves that Emperor William was not the mere figurehead he has been so often represented. The final decision was made by the Emperor, as Supreme War Lord, in accordance with the German Constitution.

Von Falkenhayn was convinced that the monarchical system, by concentrating all the powers of the German state, civil and military, in a single person, the sovereign, gave the German Government a great advantage in waging war. Consequently, as long as he directed the German armies, he was careful to conserve the authority of the Emperor.

THE BELEAGUERED POSITION OF THE CENTRAL POWERS

Much has been written of the superior position the Central Powers possessed due to their central location and their ability to strike first on one and again on the other front. There was another side to this shield; Germany and Austria were encompassed by enemies. At no time could either state devote its entire energies to one enemy, for that would expose it to crushing attacks from the

others. They were always under a compelling necessity to maintain a delicate balance of their forces.

At all times the German general headquarters had to be ready to transfer army corps as emergencies arose from one front to another. Twenty days were required to shift one army corps, between forty and fifty thousand men, from one front to the other. This requirement prevented any very sudden transfers. In addition, divisions fighting on one front and then almost immediately transferred to another, suffered a very heavy wastage of men due to the almost continuous fighting that was taking place either in France or Poland. Divisions were worn out rapidly by these frequent shifts that deprived them of time to recuperate and to properly assimilate their recruit replacements.

Also, the small number of German divisions available for use on the Eastern Front in 1915 reduced their usual rest periods and increased the normal wastage. For example, the three fresh army corps that von Falkenhayn gave to von Hindenburg in February for the campaign in East Prussia suffered so severely from the weather and fighting that they were out of the reckoning as combat formations for the rest of the year.

CHAPTER XIX

THE MINOR THEATRES—THE CENTRAL POWERS PREPARE TO CRUSH SERBIA

The Minor Theatres—The Central Powers Prepare to Crush Serbia
—Ineffective Assistance of the Allied Powers—Serbia Crushed—
The Genesis of the Salonika Expedition—The German Line
in France

VON FALKENHAYN had two motives for insisting that von Hindenburg return the divisions from the Eastern Front: first, to prevent the French-English offensive from breaking through in Champagne; and, second, to crush Serbia. The crushing of Serbia would remove a threat to Austria-Hungary, secure the adherence of Bulgaria to the Central Powers and open a direct road to Turkey.

Under the leadership of Enver Bey, Turkey had proved herself a loyal and valuable ally to the Central Powers; her usefulness would be increased if direct communication with Germany could be established. Turkey and Bulgaria had concluded a secret alliance at the end of the Second Balkan War in 1913. The Bulgarian King and his military advisers were greatly impressed by the German victories on land and were convinced of the eventual success of the Germans, so the path was open for Bulgaria to join the Central Powers.

In July negotiations were begun between Berlin and Sofia that rapidly developed into a secret alliance between Bulgaria and the Central Powers. On 6 September the military terms were agreed upon whereby Germany and Austria-Hungary would place six divisions

on Serbia's northern frontier by 6 October; by 21 September Bulgaria would commence to mobilize and by 11 October was expected to place four (4) Bulgarian divisions on Serbia's eastern frontier. Turkey facilitated the agreement between Bulgaria and the Central Powers by voluntarily ceding to Bulgaria a much coveted portion of Macedonia near the mouth of the Maritza River.

Beginning in the spring the German general staff had reconnoitred all the areas leading to the Serbian frontiers, the battery positions and bridging points on the Danube were located, bridging material and accessories were provided. Even the villages for billeting the troops were selected and arrangements completed for feeding the soldiers. Von Falkenhayn states that when the movement across the Danube into Serbia was finally ordered, "The troops had virtually nothing to do but to march up and instantly proceed with the crossing." As the campaign developed, the Bulgarian mobilization was slow and it was 15 October before the Bulgarians could move. The Austro-Hungarians could not supply four of their promised divisions, but so important did von Falkenhayn regard this campaign that he added four German divisions from his fast-diminishing reserves to take their places.

Compared with these painstaking arrangements of the Central Powers, the measures taken by the Allied Powers to assist Serbia were halting and futile.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF THE ALLIED POWERS

Serbia, after defeating the Austrians in December, 1914, and freeing her soil of invaders, suffered a terrible typhus epidemic that appeared to have paralyzed the energies of her government. During the spring and summer of 1915 her armies were inactive and contented

themselves with watching the movements of the Bulgarian army.

Britain, and to a lesser degree France, were already involved at the Dardanelles. Joffre realized the necessity of extending some assistance to Serbia, but he knew that his resources were insufficient for a major operation in the Balkans. Still Joffre considered it necessary to prevent Germany establishing a Middle Europe by securing Bulgaria and overrunning Serbia, and he proposed to block Germany's move by seizing Salonika and a large bridgehead into Macedonia up the Vardar Valley to Uskub with a French-English force, possibly assisted by the Greek army. If the Serbians would fall back upon this Allied contingent its retreat would always be secured and the combined force would be a perpetual threat to the communications between the Central Powers and Turkey.

British military opinion agreed that some assistance must be given to Serbia, but disagreed concerning the methods. Kitchener urged, according to Joffre, that an Allied force of 400,000 men be employed in the Balkans in an offensive against Austria. Joffre pointed out that neither roads nor food for such a force could be found in that area. Four hundred thousand men could be obtained only by drawing very heavily on the British force in France; Joffre refused to consider this large withdrawal unless Kitchener would replace these troops with an equal number of his new divisions. Kitchener did not believe his new formations were sufficiently trained to fight on the Western Front, so refused, and the two leaders were at an impasse.

Public opinion in both France and England demanded that some assistance be rendered to their small ally that was appealing for aid; and the two Cabinets were urging their military leaders to come to a decision. Joffre and

Kitchener had already failed to reach an understanding about a possible French reinforcement to assist Hamilton at the Dardanelles. Any plan of relief to Serbia involved either active participation, benevolent neutrality, or the neutralization of the Greek army. King Constantine and Prime Minister Venizelos were in complete disagreement, and Greece was alternately hostile and friendly to the Allies.

Under these conditions it was impossible to reach any sound decision, and it was the Bulgarian mobilization on September 22 that eventually forced the Allies to take hasty and ill-considered measures to meet the rapidly developing offensive of the Central Powers. In the painful and precise words of Joffre: "Once again the Entente had been forestalled by the Central Powers."

General Sarrail, a political favorite of the French Cabinet, although he had been relieved by Joffre of his command in France for incompetency, was selected by the French Government to command the French reinforcements destined, at one time, for the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles. He was transferred to command the French army suddenly diverted to Salonika, and one French division from the Dardanelles was sent to Salonika, where it arrived on 5 October. On 12 October, General Sarrail with the 57th French Division from France arrived at Salonika, one more infantry division and two cavalry divisions, aggregating about 64,000 men, were allotted by the French Government to Salonika. The British sent the 10th Division from the Dardanelles about the same time, and the feebly prepared, ill-fated Salonika expedition was finally started in this piecemeal fashion.

Kitchener and Joffre continued to disagree about the composition of the force, Kitchener still insisting upon a force of 400,000 men to operate against Austria through Serbia; Joffre determined that the Western

Front must be safeguarded at all costs. Meanwhile the French-English offensive in France was dying out and the campaign in Gallipoli was at a standstill for lack of men and munitions. At last, on 19 October, the British authorities agreed to send four more divisions to Salonika to reinforce the Allied forces already there. This movement, when completed, would create a force of ten divisions, five from each country. Two of the French divisions were cavalry, and the entire force totalled about 150,000 men.

These last four British divisions had to be taken from the troops in France; Joffre agreed that they should go, but Sir John French was reluctant to part with them. Kitchener still wanted a major operation or nothing in the Balkans, and had not decided to evacuate the Dardanelles. So while the French force advanced from Salonika towards Uskub, the promised British reinforcement remained in France. On October 28, Joffre was sent by the French Government to London to persuade the British Government to order the despatch of these four British divisions from the French front to Salonika. On 29 October, by threatening to resign as commander-in-chief of the French armies unless his request was acceded to, Joffre obtained the order from the British Government to despatch these four divisions.

SERBIA CRUSHED

By the time this agreement was reached the German and Austro-Hungarian armies had crossed the northern Serbian frontier, joined the Bulgarians invading the eastern part of Serbia, and both armies were rapidly converging on Nish, which fell into their hands a week later, November 5. After failing to make a junction with the French coming from Salonika, the Serbians fell back

across the plateau of Kossovo towards the Adriatic. By November 20 the Serbian retreat became a rout, their army abandoned its artillery and wagons and made its way across the mountainous country of Albania, whose hostile population added the culminating horror to the retreat. Only the starved, fever-stricken remnants of King Peter's army, that had twice valiantly withstood the Austrians in 1914, reached St. Jean de Medua and Durazzo on the Adriatic.

When they reached the sea, their Allies could assist them, and these worn and haggard Serbian soldiers were soon embarked on Allied transports and despatched to Corfu for rest and recuperation.

THE GENESIS OF THE SALONIKA EXPEDITION

The French force fell back to Salonika, and after a sharp ultimatum to Greece forced that country to acquiesce in their occupation of the Salonika bridgehead. The question then arose whether to retain the Allied force in this area now that Serbia was crushed. Joffre was in favor of the retention, Kitchener against it. Again the British yielded and an Allied force of eight divisions, five British and three French, large enough to be appreciable even on the Western Front, was permanently locked in a useless position for the duration of the war.

It is difficult to reconcile Joffre's defense of this disposition of forces with his oft-repeated statement that the Western Front was his main concern. It is more than probable that Joffre allowed his friendship for Briand to influence his judgment in this Salonika adventure. The Salonika army provided a berth for General Sarraill, who was in high favor with important French politicians, including Malvy and Caillaux. Briand's ministry needed the support of the deputies these gentlemen could control.

By providing for Sarrail, Briand thought he would placate the parliamentary attackers of the Cabinet. Briand had supported Joffre as commander-in-chief, and Joffre probably yielded against his better judgment.

There was no such mistake made by von Falkenhayn, for, having opened the corridor to Turkey, he as quickly as possible turned the new Salonika front over to the Bulgarians with a small stiffening of German troops and depended upon the extraordinary defensive strength of the position to assist this force in containing a stronger enemy force. The evacuation of Gallipoli peninsula by the British in December and January completed the objectives von Falkenhayn had set for the Serbian campaign and he did not propose to waste an unnecessary German soldier in that "inhospitable region." Therefore, von Mackensen was ordered to give up any idea of an offensive against Salonika and to entrench the line already strongly held.

THE GERMAN LINE IN FRANCE

The world at large acclaimed the wonderful successes of von Hindenburg in Russia and the prompt crushing of Serbia by von Mackensen, who was the leader selected to make the big rupture in the enemy's line on both occasions. These leaders and their troops deserve great praise, but it is probably true that a higher leadership was demanded from the officers, and a greater endurance from the men, of those German armies in France who throughout the year 1915 were called upon to withstand the repeated attacks of the French and British armies. Those devoted German soldiers who clung to their positions in Champagne, Artois and Flanders, were the mainstay of the German army during 1915. If they held, all was well with the Teutons; if they gave way, all the victories in the east were useless and sterile.

CHAPTER XX

THE MINOR THEATRES—THE DARDANELLES EXPEDITION

The Minor Theatres—The Dardanelles Expedition—The Naval Attacks—The First Landing in April—The Second Landing in August—The Evacuation—Allies Persist in Their Dispersal of Force

THE campaign in Gallipoli originated in the following manner. By the end of 1914 the French fleet in the Mediterranean, reinforced by some British predreadnought battleships and two battle cruisers, held that sea as securely as the Grand Fleet held the North Sea. In January, 1915, Grand Duke Nicholas appealed to Kitchener to relieve the Turkish pressure on the Russian forces in the Caucasus by an attack on Turkey.

THE NAVAL ATTACKS

Kitchener could not furnish the troops, so he requested Winston Churchill to make a naval demonstration at the Dardanelles. Churchill had already joined Lloyd George in advocating a major offensive in the Near East. A large number of predreadnought battleships were available for the demonstration, so he gladly consented, and subsequently developed the demonstration requested by Kitchener into a serious naval attack on the defenses at the Dardanelles, with a view to the capture of Constantinople.

The destruction of the obsolete Turkish forts at the entrance, during the last half of February, was so exten-

sively advertised, that all the Allied Powers and many neutral states were led to believe that Constantinople was about to fall. When the Allied fleets grappled with the Turkish intermediate defenses inside the Straits and their main defenses at the Narrows, the ships were continuously repulsed, with minor losses, for about a month.

On March 19 an attack in force by the Allied fleet in an effort to break through into the Sea of Marmora was decisively defeated. Three capital ships were lost and three others were badly damaged. This was the first attempt during the war to employ ships against forts, and, except for the sinking of the *Cressy*, *Aboukir* and *Hogue* by Weddigen, and the loss of Cradock's squadron, it was the first real reverse the Allied navies had received.

The loss of these ships was not serious, and if the propagandists had not overrated the initial successes against the four Turkish forts at the entrance to the Straits the Allies could have accepted these losses, advertised the attack as a reconnaissance in force, and withdrawn. But so much had been published about the approaching capture of Constantinople that Kitchener decided a joint operation must be undertaken and Constantinople taken at all costs.

THE FIRST LANDING IN APRIL

Kitchener agreed to find the necessary soldiers, but he grossly underestimated the power of the Turkish army. He despatched General Ian Hamilton with a force of about 60,000 men to defeat a Turkish army of 72,000 in and around Gallipoli, with over 100,000 reinforcements in easy forwarding distance from a mobile army of about 500,000 in Turkey proper.

In April and early May Hamilton's first attack was defeated by the Turkish 5th Army commanded by General Liman von Sanders. In the middle of May the dif-

ferences of opinion between Churchill and Admiral Fisher, concerning the naval features of the Dardanelles expedition, caused Fisher to resign. As previously related, the Conservative members believed in Fisher and forced the elimination of Churchill; whereupon Asquith formed a coalition Cabinet to carry on the war. The coalition Cabinet resolved to persevere in the Gallipoli campaign to capture Constantinople.

Meanwhile Italy had joined the Allies, but her forces were sent against Austria, and her intervention did not help at the Dardanelles. Hamilton was promised a reinforcement of two army corps, and made plans for a second attack in August.

THE SECOND LANDING IN AUGUST

On 7 August he launched his second major attack, with 100,000 men, against the Turks 110,000. On 8 August he established the remnants of two splendid battalions on Chunuk Bair, the lowest crest of Sari Bair, the key to the peninsula. On 9 August these determined men withstood continuous Turkish counter-attacks; during the night of the 9th it was necessary to relieve these wornout troops.

On 10 August, Mustapha Kemal, Turkey's greatest soldier, counter-attacked and drove off the two fresh British battalions that had been sent in to relieve the exhausted conquerors of Chunuk Bair. This battle for the crest of Chunuk Bair really ended the struggle for Gallipoli.

Meanwhile, as already related, during 1915 the German armies had been on the defensive in France and on a very successful offensive in Russia which took them deep into the heart of Poland, relieved the Austrians from Russian attack and enabled them successfully to with-

stand the first Italian offensive. The Central Powers assisted by Bulgaria overran Serbia in October and November.

THE EVACUATION

On 15 October, General Hamilton was relieved by General Monro, who believed in concentrating the Allied effort on the Western Front. He recommended the evacuation of Gallipoli. Kitchener was still opposed to giving up the attempt on Constantinople, but after visiting Gallipoli in November, by which time the Central Powers had opened the "corridor" from Germany to Turkey, he realized Gallipoli could not be held and declared for evacuation.

In December and early January evacuation of Anzac and Helles was brilliantly carried out. This unsuccessful campaign in Gallipoli cost the British the use of 400,000 men. Their losses totalled 120,000, namely 32,000 killed, 79,000 wounded, 9,700 missing (mostly killed). The French maintained about 35,000 men at Gallipoli for about eight months, of whom they lost 27,000 during the campaign. The Turks report they employed 400,000 men and lost 218,000, but these figures must be accepted with caution, for the Turkish records were not accurately kept. The Turkish military establishment probably never exceeded 600,000 men, and while they were fighting at Gallipoli they were maintaining armies on four other fronts—Caucasus, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Adrianople.

ALLIES PERSIST IN THEIR DISPERSAL OF FORCE

The Allies learned little by their experience at the Dardanelles, for they had no sooner evacuated Gallipoli than, at the instigation of the French Cabinet led by

Briand, they commenced to establish another battle-front at Salonika in a minor theatre, while the British Government, not to be outdone by the French, and in an effort to conceal their failure at Gallipoli, urged Generals Nixon and Townshend to undertake a farther advance in Mesopotamia. This unwise urging led to Townshend's surrender at Kut.

The advantages to the Allies of the Gallipoli campaign were limited to containing a large part of the Turkish army and to hastening the entrance of Italy into the war. Italy had an ancient score to settle with Austria, and was bound to join as soon as the prospects of Allied success seemed fairly certain. The Turkish army on the defensive was much more effective than on the offensive; it could have been neutralized with less effort by accepting attacks in Palestine, along the lower delta of the Shatt-el-Arab, in Mesopotamia and in the Caucasus Mountains, than in fighting at Gallipoli, where it could be reinforced within forty-eight to seventy-two hours from Constantinople and Anatolia.

In spite of the tactical failure of the British and French fleets in their contests with the defenses of the Dardanelles, the Allied navies continued their dominion over the seas except for the German submarine attacks, which were beginning to be more threatening. But the Central Powers were as definitely dominant on the Continent at the end of 1915 as the Allied Powers were on the sea. The situation resembled the Napoleonic war after Trafalgar and Austerlitz, and suggested the jocular comparison, once popular in Europe, of the combat of a whale with an elephant.

CHAPTER XXI

THE MINOR THEATRES—THE TURKISH REACTION IN MESOPOTAMIA IN THE SPRING OF 1915

The Minor Theatres—The Turkish Reaction in Mesopotamia in the Spring of 1915—Regaining Arabistan—Situation in June, 1915—Situation in August, 1915

THE rapid success of the British force in Mesopotamia during the autumn of 1914 brought home to Enver Bey his mistake in stripping that front of troops. He selected Suleiman Askeri Pasha to command in Mesopotamia and offered him a division from the Caucasus, but Suleiman, extremely brave and a fanatical Pan-Islamite with too much faith in the Moslem Arabs, undertook to expel the invaders and then invade Persia with no outside assistance. In addition to the Arab contingent to be raised locally, he was given the debris of the 38th Division, previously routed by the British in the delta of the Shatt, the 35th Division then being reconstituted, two excellent Turkish battalions that came from Constantinople and a German mission intended for Persia.

In the decisive battle of Shaiba, that occurred on April 15, 1915, the British completely broke up the most serious attack by the Turks in their first counter-offensive. The total Turks engaged were 7,000, assisted by 18,000 Arabs, a total of 25,000. The Turks fought excellently and lost 3,000 of their men, the Arabs did practically no fighting. Suleiman gallantly paid with his life for his rashness. The British had 733 cavalry and 4,000 infantry engaged; the cavalry losses were negligible, totalling

about 3 per cent; the infantry lost 20 per cent before they were able to beat off the determined attacks of the Turks.

REGAINING ARABISTAN

The next two months General Nixon devoted to regaining Arabistan with its valuable oil wells, and by June 11 General Gorringe, in immediate command of the force, had driven out the Turks and rebuilt the pipe lines. He left a reinforced brigade much depleted by sickness to hold Ah Waz and returned with his force to Basra.

General Nixon had to decide whether to continue the advance or consolidate his position. His force was organized into the 2d Indian Army Corps, consisting of the 6th (Poona) Division, 12th Indian Division, 6th Cavalry Brigade with corps and division troops.

SITUATION IN JUNE, 1915

The British, after the defeat of the Turkish counter-attack at Shaiba, and the recapture of the Arabistan, were in the most favorable position to attain, with a minimum force, their three objectives in Mesopotamia, namely:

- (1) Securing the head of the Persian Gulf;
- (2) Securing the vilayet of Qurna, and the adherence of the delta Arabs, and,
- (3) Consistent with the first two, securing the pipe lines to the oil wells.

SITUATION IN AUGUST, 1915

The British were not content with this strong position, and by August, General Nixon, the new commander in Mesopotamia, advanced to Nasiriyah, Amara, and Ah Waz. While this was a wider front and required a longer

line of communications than the Shaiba-Kurnah-Ah Waz position, he might have been able to consolidate this position and organize his lengthening line of communications.

But by August 15 it was definitely known in London that the second offensive in Gallipoli had failed, and the British Cabinet and Indian Government wanted some quick victory as a set-off to the Dardanelles failure. This was sufficient encouragement for General Nixon, who also desired Kut-el-Amara for local strategic reasons, it being at the junction of the river Hai and the Tigris. And in September he authorized General Townshend to commence the brilliant advance with the reinforced 6th Division that climaxed at Ctesiphon and burst at Kut-el-Amara.

The main reason for Townshend's failure was the despatch of two Turkish army corps to Bagdad under Field Marshal von der Goltz and Noureiddin Bey. This was the first real military opposition that the British had encountered, and as they met it at the extreme end of their badly strained line of communications the effect was disastrous, and fatally involved both army and navy. A hasty British retreat was unable to shake off the hot Turkish pursuit. It was necessary to halt, to rest the exhausted troops, at Kut-el-Amara; before Townshend could get them underway the Turks had cut off his further retreat. He entrenched at Kut-el-Amara, where British courage and endurance denied the Turks their triumph until April 29, 1916, when the surrender took place. Three separate attempts to relieve Townshend, in January, March and April, all failed. Townshend surrendered 12,000 British and Indian troops. The total British loss in Mesopotamia up to this time was roundly 40,000 men.

CHAPTER XXII

CONTROL OF THE SEA IN 1915

Control of the Sea in 1915—Comment on British and German Fleets
During 1915—Germany Increases Submarine Force—Joffre's
Summary of 1915—Changes Among the Allied Commanders

DURING 1915 the assistance of Japan enabled the Allies to control the Pacific and Indian Oceans; the British and French fleets held the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean; Germany held the Baltic Sea; and Russia controlled the Black Sea.

COMMENT ON BRITISH AND GERMAN FLEETS DURING 1915

Centuries ago, exasperated General "A" sent a message to his opponent, General "B," who had entrenched his army in an impregnable position and refused to fight, "If you are proper, General, you will come down to fight"; General "B" replied, "If you are a proper general, you will compel me to fight." This ancient piece of military repartee roughly represented the attitudes of two great European fleets, the Grand Fleet of Great Britain and the High Seas Fleet of Germany, during 1914 and 1915.

These fleets had been built, trained and concentrated on the hypothesis that they would battle in the North Sea. For nine years Britain and Germany had scanned the other's building programs with a jealous eye, and every modern naval development was rapidly embodied in their new construction. Before the war industrious and intelligent officers of both services had brought these two rival armadas to a high state of efficiency in gunnery and

tactics, and in the pre-war decade there had been little doubt in the minds of the British and German naval personnel that they would settle their differences among the mists, fogs and storms of the North Sea.

Seventeen months of war had toughened and seasoned the crews of both fleets. Yet, while the armies of Europe had been struggling in one mighty battle after another until exhaustion of personnel or ammunition forced temporary lulls, the British and German fleets had contented themselves with glaring at each other across the North Sea. Their diplomats had desired peace, but only upon their own terms; the two rival commanders-in-chief desired a naval battle, but only under their own conditions.

The newspapers of both countries shouted their defiance. Winston Churchill in one of his bad moments had threatened to dig the German "rats" out of their holes. The reasons for the inactivity of the fleets had been explained often by the two Admiralties, and the reasons given seemed good to their respective nationals. The spokesmen for Great Britain emphasized that without a battle they had complete control of the sea, and that they really had little to gain by defeating the German fleet.

The German authorities replied that their fleet, by remaining in being, protected the German coasts from Memel to the Ems, thereby releasing at least two army corps; that it commanded the Baltic Sea, thus insuring imports of iron ores and foodstuffs, essential to the prosecution of the war; that it made the blockade of the North Sea by the British ineffective; that it protected the sea (northern) flanks of both its armies, the left flank of the eastern army and the right flank of the western army, and, finally, that it furnished a naval corps to fight ashore with the army in Belgium.

The Germans also pointed to the great numerical

superiority of the British Fleet, in all types of vessels, as a sufficient reason for declining battle, but still insisted they were willing to fight in their own waters where the mines and torpedoes would compensate for their inferiority in capital ships. These statements and rejoinders differ little from the ancient repartee between General "A" and General "B." Jellicoe would not risk the Grand Fleet in the southeastern part of the North Sea and von Pohl would not risk his fleet outside of that area. Jellicoe made wide sweeps into the northern part of that sea; von Pohl and his predecessor contented themselves with smaller sweeps into the southeastern part. Both fleets proceeded with scouting forces of cruisers forty to seventy miles in advance of the battleships to warn them of advancing enemy forces, and, in addition, the German Zeppelins formed an excellent scouting force. Each endeavored to draw the other over mine fields and submarines and into an unfavorable tactical situation.

Meanwhile, month after month both Britain and Germany continued their mine-laying activities. The mine laying was frequently done by night and by vessels operating under pressure and uncertain of their position; the reported locations of the mine fields were very inaccurate, so it became hazardous to navigate the southern part of the North Sea except within the regularly swept channels. There were repeated clashes of light cruisers, destroyers and submarines, but the main bodies held aloof.

In August, 1914, the armies of Europe rushed toward one another in an almost frantic desire to reach an immediate decision by battle; while the two great fleets, of which so much had been expected, either remained in their bases or made cautious sweeps in their own areas of the North Sea.

There were two controlling reasons for this great difference in the reaction of Europe's fleets and armies. A weaker fleet like Germany's could retire into its own roadsteads and harbors, and protected by forts and mine fields could defy its more powerful antagonist. In doing so it did not necessarily abandon its home land to the enemy or with Germany's superior army even expose its country to invasion. A weaker army either had to stand and fight or permit the enemy army to overrun its territory. In western Europe territory is very precious. No government or general staff could afford to cede much land to an invader; and it was only the necessity of preserving the French army from the first fierce rush of the Germans that justified Joffre in yielding northern France to the invaders. At the time Joffre did not realize the great strength of the German army, and looked forward to resuming the offensive and driving the Germans back into their own territory.

It is true the government that permitted an inferior fleet to withdraw into port conceded command of the sea, permitted its merchant ships to be driven from the ocean, and exposed its sea-borne commerce to capture and its coasts to be blockaded. But various international conventions had, in theory at least, lessened the risk to sea-borne commerce, while the submarine, destroyers and aircraft made an effective commercial blockade impracticable. And finally, by a strictly legal interpretation of the London Conference of 1908, contiguous neutral states like Holland and Denmark could reroute raw materials and foods to beleaguered Germany, so that her people could expect to escape many of the evils that formerly accompanied the loss of sea power.

So the German naval authorities easily persuaded themselves that the retirement to port of the High Seas Fleet was only temporary, that long before the pressure

of enemy sea power would seriously affect Germany, the light forces would reduce the British fleet by guerilla warfare to the strength where a naval action could be risked reasonably and control of the sea restored. The German navy and the French army demonstrated that it is easier to abandon than to regain sea power or territory. In fact, their actions could only be justified by the necessity they were both under of preserving for the moment their inferior forces from destruction. The difference was that Joffre had to manœuvre very skillfully to avoid decisive action in August, 1914, while the German fleet simply retired to its protected anchorage.

The British fleet meanwhile having secured without a battle all the advantages that accompany control of the sea, the British naval authorities imperceptibly found more and more reasons for declining battle except under the most favorable conditions. These reasons actually were very cogent in the case of an island empire like the United Kingdom, whose industrial population had long outgrown its own farm products and which could be starved into submission quickly if its fleet should be defeated. Late in 1915, however, some naval authorities in England became impatient with the prudent procedure of Jellicoe. And about the same time some German naval officers, including Admiral von Scheer, began to have some misgivings about the eventual effect of the continued defensive rôle on the morale of the High Seas Fleet.

GERMANY INCREASES SUBMARINE FORCE

During 1915 Germany carried out an intensive building program for her submarines; she drew heavily from her fleet for the personnel, and in the fall of 1915 the admirals of the fleet again proposed unrestricted subma-

rine warfare. Their plan was based on carefully gathered data, and they predicted that they could sink 632,000 tons of enemy merchantmen per month.

The naval advocates of unrestricted submarine warfare had gained a powerful supporter in von Falkenhayn, who recommended it as part of his plan for the Verdun offensive in 1916, submitted to the Emperor in December, 1915. He wrote: "It is all the more necessary that we should ruthlessly employ every weapon—for striking at England. Such a weapon is the submarine."

Von Falkenhayn added the significant comment, "We have to assume that the naval authorities are not making a mistake. We have no large store of experience to draw on in this matter. Such as we have are not altogether reassuring." Here is seen the careful army leader, obliged to make an important decision, seeking to determine the accuracy of a technical naval estimate. This incident illustrates, once again, the continuous interdependence of sea and land operations.

In spite of his doubts, after Bulgaria joined the Central Powers, von Falkenhayn endorsed the plan and it was agreed that it should begin in February, 1916. Von Bernstorff again informed Bethmann-Hollweg that President Wilson would break off relations with Germany if ships were sunk without warning; and under this menace Bethmann-Hollweg prevailed upon the Emperor to delay the inauguration of the campaign to give von Bernstorff another chance to placate President Wilson.

JOFFRE'S SUMMARY OF 1915

Joffre's graphic summary of the Allied position ashore as the year 1915 ended gives an accurate panoramic view of the war on land: "In France, the hard campaigns of

the summer and autumn had left the French and British armies in imperative need of rest. . . . The Russians, after their long and costly retreat, were in no state to recommence offensive operations until they had effected a complete reorganization. The Italians were preparing to go into winter quarters."

The minor theatres were no better, and Joffre states, "The Serbian army was in the midst of its painful retreat towards the Adriatic, having been obliged to abandon its artillery and train"; the army of the east (the Salonika Expedition) was falling back in good order upon Salonika; "the situation . . . at the Dardanelles . . . forced us to withdraw our forces from that hornet's nest; the British expedition to Mesopotamia . . . beaten at Ctesiphon and thrown back to Kut-el-Amara; in Egypt . . . the British forces had established themselves behind the Suez Canal to protect it. . . ." And Joffre ends with the grim but exact statement: "Our armies had everywhere been either checked or beaten, and they needed to be reorganized before any new effort could be demanded of them."

Von Falkenhayn was only less gloomy than Joffre at the end of 1915. He stated: "We had been compelled to abandon our intention of conducting the operations in such a way that the English and French would lose all hope of changing the situation in their favor before France bled to death." He attributes the failure of this part of his program to the necessity of going to the assistance of Austria.

Von Falkenhayn continued, "In the east we had not reached the goals we had set before us. . . . We had kept within the limits of the possible, in confining ourselves to paralyzing the offensive powers of the colossus (Russia) so effectively that recovery could hardly be possible. Distant clouds . . . already announced the

approach of the revolutionary storm which was to burst over the realm of the Czar."

Of the Near East, von Falkenhayn observed, "The alliance with Bulgaria and the destruction of the Serbian army had opened the road to the southeast. . . . The position of Austria-Hungary had been relieved. . . . The Serbian danger was a thing of the past, the Rumanian [danger] had been reduced to a minimum. The tactics [defensive] adopted against Italy had been justified and there was no ground for doubting that they would continue to prove successful in the future."

CHANGES AMONG THE ALLIED COMMANDERS

These statements of the two opposing leaders show that both were dissatisfied with the results of the fighting during 1915. Both realized that the final decision could be won only on the Western Front. Both sought to concentrate their efforts in that area and both were forced to acquiesce in detachments of the available forces to minor theatres.

Joffre saw the collapse of the Russian armies, upon whose reputed strength the French had placed great reliance; he saw the removal of the Grand Duke Nicholas, whom he regarded as Russia's greatest leader, and the assumption of command of Russia's armies by the Czar himself in a desperate effort to restore the eastern situation. More disheartening still, Joffre had seen two of his carefully planned offensives in France broken up by the German defense. To all outward appearance the German army was irresistible on the offensive and immovable on the defense.

Most of the civilian leaders in France and England grew discouraged and began to lose faith in their military leaders. Publicly they continued to express confidence

in their army commanders; privately they began to question their decisions. The prestige of Joffre and Foch in the higher circles in France was distinctly lowered.

Field Marshal Sir John French, the British commander-in-chief in France, was removed and replaced by General Sir Douglas Haig, who had come over with the original Expeditionary Force as one of the two corps commanders, and had risen steadily until he was second only to French. Haig was a strictly professional soldier in the highest sense of the term. When selected to become commander-in-chief, he had passed every test that can be applied to officers during a long career; he was familiar with modern staff methods, a life-long student of war, and yet had served long enough in India and Africa to understand the character of the British army which is formed on the frontiers of the empire.

One of the main reasons that actuated the British Cabinet in selecting Haig was their belief that he was a solid conservative soldier who perhaps lacked brilliance but would not act hastily or involve the whole British army in some desperate encounter. Haig was extremely taciturn and in conferences was so inarticulate that he did not always succeed in giving supporting oral reasons for his proposed actions.

This characteristic became a serious handicap in his dealing with members of the British Cabinet and War Council, all of whom were lively debaters and instinctively doubted the capacity of any one unskilled in dialectics. When Lloyd George became Prime Minister, Haig's difficulties increased, because he was unwilling to agree with, and not sufficiently eloquent to oppose, the many specious proposals that the quick-witted Welshman was frequently offering to him.

The solid abilities of Haig, his supreme loyalty to his King, his country and his Allies, and his indomitable

faith in the British army, more than compensated for the less showy qualities which undeniably he lacked.

It is easy for bright young critics with a smattering of military terminology to ransack complicated casualty returns, turn them to prove almost any thesis, and thereby demonstrate the unfitness of such leaders as Haig. It is a necessity for certain civilian Cabinet officers, who during the World War repeatedly interfered with the British military leaders in their control of the British army, to attack the record of Haig, whose technical advice they would not heed; otherwise they cannot wash from their dripping hands the blood of thousands of their countrymen.

But it is a safe prediction that despite these attacks, as time goes on, the great qualities of Haig will become increasingly appreciated by his countrymen. Our own Grant was dubbed a "butcher" after the battle of Cold Harbor, but today it is recognized that he adopted and steadily pursued the one best method to defeat Lee. In time, the soundness of Haig's decisions and the persistent courage with which he pursued them, will appeal to his countrymen. Oblivion will overtake the unfair attacks of young writers seeking to qualify as military experts and the venomous abuse of interested participants who have succeeded in temporarily clouding the fame of Field Marshal Earl Haig, the great leader of the British army.

The success which had attended the German armies in the field made von Falkenhayn's position as chief of staff impregnable despite his differences with von Hindenburg. He made various shifts among the minor commanders, but the German High Command survived the bitter fighting of 1915.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE APPROACHING SHADOW OF 1916

The Approaching Shadow of 1916—The German Plan for the Western Front in 1916—The German Naval Plan—The Plan of the Allied Powers in 1916—The Allied Naval Plan of 1916—The Condition of the Allied Armies—Defense of England in 1916

THE year 1916 promised great events, for the German navy had made large increases in its submarines with a view to attacking Allied trade and to breaking the strangle-hold of the Allied navies. Kitchener's new army would be ready in the summer of 1916 to reinforce the Allies on land; no decision had been reached concerning their employment. Various proposals were being considered; professional army opinion and a substantial segment of informed civilian opinion agreed that the bulk of these new armies should be employed in France. Advocates of adventures in the Near East continued their efforts in France and England, and were able to divert Allied troops from the main theatre in France to the Near East.

THE GERMAN PLAN FOR THE WESTERN FRONT IN 1916

On Christmas Day, 1915, General von Falkenhayn submitted his plans for the year 1916 to Emperor William, who subsequently approved them. Von Falkenhayn considered that France "had been weakened almost

to the limit of her endurance," militarily and economically, that "the offensive power of the Russian army has been so shattered that she could never revive, that the Serbian army had been destroyed, and that Austria-Hungary, relieved of the danger from Serbia, could resist any offensive from Italy and maintain her Galician front against Russia. But von Falkenhayn feared Britain.

He believed the proposal in Parliament to adopt conscription indicated that Britain had been shaken by the losses she had endured, but that she was still willing to make extreme sacrifices before conceding defeat. Nor did he think there was any chance of a negotiated peace with those hated islanders, and he feared any overtures for peace made by Germany would be regarded as a confession of weakness and would be the signal for redoubled English effort.

He was convinced Germany could not remain on the defensive because her enemies were increasing their war resources faster than Germany, and Britain plainly was depending upon her command of the sea to exhaust Germany. Time was on the side of his enemies.

He did not believe further victories over Russia, the defeat of the Italian army, or victories in the Near East would have any effect on the resistance of England. His attitude towards all minor theatres was that not a single German soldier more than was necessary should be employed on any front except the Anglo-French front in France.

Von Falkenhayn would have preferred to attack the British line in northern France and Flanders, but the weather and terrain would not permit action there until late in the spring; he sought to strike before the Allies were ready, and fearing they might anticipate him, he selected Verdun as an objective because his offensive in that region could commence in February and its capture

would expose the heart of France to a German advance so the French would have to employ their whole army in defense of that important position. During an offensive in this area, the German High Command could accelerate or moderate the pace of the attack as it seemed best. And as long as Germany threatened Verdun the French offensive power would be paralyzed, for a possible German break-through at Verdun could not be permitted by France.

As von Falkenhayn could not strike directly at the British army in France, he proposed to destroy the French army, which he considered the sword that England was pressing to the German breast. He was convinced that England would not endure the extra burden necessary to continue the war, if the French army was reduced to impotence. Simultaneously with these attacks on the French army he recommended that the German navy unloose their submarines on British and neutral shipping that was supplying England with foodstuffs and the Allied armies with munitions.

Some tactical factors influenced his decision. He could launch an attack at Verdun on a narrow front of about forty miles which would require a minimum of force, and retain at his disposal sufficient reserve divisions to resist the expected relief attacks in other sectors. He would force the French to fight in a salient position which was difficult to supply. He anticipated that the French and English would launch relief attacks which would assist his plan to destroy the French army.

Thus the dominant ideas of the Verdun offensive were to bring about the fighting at the time and place desired; to retain the ability to accelerate or slow down the intensity of the battle with the primary purpose of bleeding the French army white, before Britain's army could intervene. The ultimate object was to force England to

terms by striking down the French army before the British army was ready to intervene. Territorial gains were only sought for tactical purposes. Finally, von Falkenhayn looked forward to making counter-attacks in these other regions in France against the French and British armies which he anticipated would attack in order to relieve the pressure on Verdun.

THE GERMAN NAVAL PLAN

In February, 1916, Admiral von Scheer succeeded Admiral von Pohl in command of the High Seas Fleet. Von Scheer had served in the fleet since 1914; he had seen the futility of the war of attrition against the British fleet which more than restored its losses by the continuous accession of new ships. And he realized the bad effect on the morale of the naval personnel of the long-continued defensive rôle. He believed the German fleet should operate more boldly and that unrestricted submarine warfare should be undertaken.

Emperor William approved the plan for a more vigorous employment of the surface fleet, but, on the advice of the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, he directed that a restricted form of submarine warfare be employed until 1 April to give Ambassador von Bernstorff an opportunity to placate the United States. Thus Germany, in the opening of 1916, determined to take the initiative on land, and, as far as the inferiority of the fleet permitted, to commence a limited offensive on the sea. The only German weapon not to be fully employed against the enemy was the submarine, and it was hoped that diplomatic measures undertaken in Washington would soon permit the employment of this weapon in all its strength. Again it was Emperor William who, in ac-

cordance with the German Constitution, made the final decision.

THE PLAN OF THE ALLIED POWERS IN 1916

In December, 1915, at the invitation of the French Government, representatives of Britain, France, Italy and Russia met at Chantilly and agreed that they should concentrate their efforts on the three main fronts—the Russian in the east, the Anglo-French in the west, and the Italian in the south. The only exception to this plan of concentration was made in favor of the Salonika expedition, and the British representatives, with the Dardanelles failure in mind, objected to even this one diversion of effort.

The dates the offensives on the various fronts should begin were selected, and also the measures to be taken for mutual support in case the Germans took the field first.

The British War Committee of the Cabinet reluctantly agreed, in January, 1916, that the main British effort should be an offensive in France in co-operation with the French against the Germans, and then only because of the support Prime Minister Asquith and Foreign Secretary Grey gave to the recommendations of their military advisers.

Joffre believed that the operations in France during the autumn of 1915 had shown clearly that no decision could be reached on the Western Front until the German reserves were exhausted. The 1916 plan was based upon Joffre's suggestion, accepted by all the Allies, "To seek to obtain the decision by simultaneous offensives on the Russian, Italian and Franco-British fronts." The French army had been worn down by the 1915 campaign so that

it was necessary for the British to accept the burden of the attack on the Western Front.

Joffre calculated that the Germans could transfer one army corps from the Eastern to the Western Front or the reverse, within twenty days. Apparently for this reason it was determined that any Russian attack would be followed within at least fifteen days by an Allied attack on the Western Front to prevent the transfer of German troops from west to east.

Joffre estimated that on the Western Front the Germans had twenty-five divisions disposable as a reserve that must be consumed before the main Allied attack would have a chance to effect an irreparable rupture in the German line. This estimate of German reserves was remarkably accurate, for von Falkenhayn disposed of a reserve of twenty-six divisions when the attack on Verdun began. Joffre desired the British to undertake preventive offensives that would exhaust these twenty-five German divisions prior to the main Franco-British attack.

Unfortunately for Joffre's plan, the British could not undertake these attacks until late spring or early summer, and von Falkenhayn was already planning to anticipate their attacks. The initial wearing-down process, conceived by Joffre, took place in due time, but it was the German and French armies that wore each other down at Verdun. As we shall see, Joffre, by clinging to his idea, was able to carry out in part his plan by interchanging the rôles of the French and British armies. But von Falkenhayn, by commencing the attack at Verdun in February, practically succeeded in engaging the French and British armies in succession.

On 14 February the French and British leaders agreed upon the general outline of their offensives in France; it would be a contiguous attack on both sides of the

Somme, commencing towards the end of June, in an endeavor to break through the German line by a general offensive. General Foch would command the French army of forty-two divisions and was allotted 1,400 heavy guns.

General Robertson had become chief of the imperial general staff, and Kitchener, having agreed to recognize him as the official military adviser of the Cabinet, supported him loyally. Robertson had been commandant of the Staff College at Camberley, was well versed in the theory of war, and had served successfully in France as quartermaster general and chief of staff of the Expeditionary Force. He was an unspectacular, vigorous soldier, a close reasoner and sound in his judgments. He was on cordial personal terms with Haig, was a product of the regular British army like Haig, and shared his conviction that Germany must be defeated to obtain peace, and that she could be overthrown only on the Western Front by the Franco-British armies. There was better co-ordination between the War Office and the British army in France during the Robertson-Haig tenure than either before or after.

Following a careful study of the employment of the British troops, the British general staff and General Haig in France both agreed that France and Flanders should be the main theatre for the British effort, and the British army should undertake the offensive in close co-operation with the French army in the greatest possible strength.

In the minor theatres, Egypt would be allotted eight British divisions for defense, and the force in Mesopotamia, after providing for the relief of General Townshend's army, would assume the defensive. The British force in East Africa would be restricted to the defensive.

THE ALLIED NAVAL PLAN OF 1916

The Allied navies were in such complete control of the sea that no discussion seems to have taken place about the navies' rôle. The Allied authorities took the continued command of the sea as an assured fact upon which they could depend.

THE CONDITION OF THE ALLIED ARMIES

In 1914 France entered the war with 97 active infantry divisions and the equivalent of 37 territorial divisions; Russia provided 128 divisions, England 11 regular divisions and 14 territorial divisions. By the end of 1915 the limit of the French army replacements was in sight; it had borne the brunt of the fighting on the Western Front up to that time. Italy had 36 divisions in line, with ample reserve of man power but was deficient in artillery. And Russia, after her heavy losses of men and material, needed 1,000,000 rifles to equip her 128 divisions.

The only new divisions available to the Allies in 1916 were the British, for Kitchener's new armies and some territorials would become available in increasing numbers throughout that year. But these new British divisions would not be sufficiently trained for battle until the middle of the summer.

The British army, including Dominion troops in Europe and Egypt, totalled 59 first-line divisions and 13 divisions of second-line Territorials. It was considered that 13 divisions of the new army would be needed in England, 28 divisions were necessary to maintain a defensive front in France, 8 divisions were required in the defense of Egypt, and 5 divisions had been despatched to Salonika, over the protest of the British general staff, to please the French Government.

This left a surplus of 18 divisions, which, if employed in France, would give a British striking force of between 42 and 59 divisions, because an offensive against the German front would release divisions held in England for defense against a possible German invasion and thus enable extra divisions to be sent from England. Whereas if an offensive were undertaken in Salonika a striking force of only 15 to 29 divisions could be used.

Unfortunately the War Committee of the British Cabinet still was reluctant to undertake an offensive in France against the German front, and it was late in March before General Haig was given the necessary authority to co-operate with Joffre in an offensive against the German lines in France. Shortly thereafter Haig was asked to consider a transfer of some of his force to the Near East.

DEFENSE OF ENGLAND IN 1916

In January, 1916, another examination was made by the British Government of the problem of the invasion of England. The startling conclusion was reached by the British military and naval authorities that 10 German divisions totalling 160,000 men could be secretly embarked for the east coast of England, and the British fleet could neither guarantee to intercept this force at sea nor to interrupt its movements within twenty-four hours of its landing.

To meet this possible force of invaders, Field Marshal French, commander-in-chief in England, recently relieved as commander of the Expeditionary Force by General Haig, demanded 9 Territorial divisions, 17 mounted brigades, and 10 independent brigades, a field force of 230,000 men. In addition garrisons for defended posts and vulnerable points in England absorbed

220,000 men. The Irish revolt in Dublin on Easter morning added to the number of defenders until the soldiers in the United Kingdom and Ireland amounted to 500,000 men during the spring of 1916.

It is plain that the British authorities did not take full advantage of the lessons of Gallipoli or fully appreciate von Sanders' plan of an elastic system of defense. If they had made full use of their roads and railways to increase the mobility of their troops, their machine guns and well organized intelligence system would have enabled them to release more troops for service in France. The results of the Gallipoli campaign were known in England in January, yet it was the fall of 1916 before the number of soldiers retained in England was decreased.

The results of the battle of Jutland in June, 1916, did not change the numbers of soldiers retained for the defense of England. But during the last phase of Verdun and Somme, reasoning that the Germans were fully occupied in France, the British Government at last reduced its estimate of the number of Germans that could be landed in England.

However, the largest unnecessary diversion of forces from the Western Front in 1916 was the quarter to a half-million men detained at Salonika, and for this Briand and the French Government were primarily, and indeed solely, responsible. It seems incredible, but it is true, that in the spring of 1916 when the German attack on Verdun was at its height, Prime Minister Briand could ask the British Government to transfer forces in Egypt destined for France to the Salonika front.

CHAPTER XXIV

1916—VERDUN AND SOMME

IN the middle of December, 1915, the Minister of War, General Roques, called Joffre's attention to alleged deficiencies in the defenses of Toul and Verdun. Joffre took exception to this report and replied that the minister's apprehensions were not justified.

Joffre did not expect an attack in that region, the labor and material for increasing the defenses in France were limited and Joffre employed most of these available resources in northern France, which he thought more vulnerable and valuable than Verdun. He was surprised by the report, early in January, 1916, from a reliable secret agent in Copenhagen, that a German offensive in the Verdun region was being contemplated. This information was quickly confirmed by reports from Switzerland, indicating that 400,000 German troops were concentrating northeast of Verdun.

Joffre could see no strategic justification for an attack on Verdun, nor were the strategic factors uppermost with von Falkenhayn, who was simply seeking a convenient battlefield where he could bring the French army to action, and force it to conform to his motions in order to bleed it to death.

Statements obtained from German prisoners and movements of railway trains offered further evidence that Verdun would be the German objective. Joffre sent his chief of staff, General de Castelnau, to study the defenses. Two additional divisions were given General

Herr, the commander of the fortress area, and work on the defenses was redoubled.

The Verdun area was transferred to the control of the central group of armies. On 6 and 7 February German deserters reported important concentrations of troops on the left bank of the Meuse, and on 14 February a copy of the Crown Prince's order was obtained by Joffre. During February 18-19 Joffre visited the area and interviewed the leading French generals.

When the German attack began the entire French line in France was held by fifty French divisions. Twenty divisions were in reserve at the disposition of the commanders of groups of armies. Joffre held under his own direction twenty-six divisions which he echeloned along the entire front, for some information indicated that the Germans might attack at other points.

General Langle de Cary, commanding the Central Group, was reinforced with aircraft and heavy artillery. The commander of the Eastern Group was directed to hold his reserve divisions in Lorraine ready for entraining. General Herr, in immediate command of the Verdun fortress area, had twelve divisions at his disposal.

The main railway that traverses the Meuse valley was cut at St. Mihiel early in the war; later the line from Verdun westward through St. Menehould was neutralized by German artillery; the only remaining railway connecting Verdun with France was the narrow-gauge line from Bar-le-Duc. This proved to be entirely inadequate, and only through a hastily improvised motor transport service was Verdun supplied.

An eighteen-foot road paralleled the one-metre railway line from Bar-le-Duc. This was widened to about twenty-two feet to permit two-way traffic. Over this road and the narrow railway passed the light artillery and all the men, munitions and food for Verdun. The

railway carried a daily average of 1,300 tons of food, and 1,000 tons of ammunition, while the motor road averaged 1,500 tons of ammunition, 250 tons of road material and 10,000 troops daily.

During the peak of the operations 6,000 trucks per day passed over the motor road that five thousand (5,000) engineer troops kept repaired. This transport service became so efficient that after 25 February, a reserve supply of rations and ammunitions was gradually built up in Verdun. These roads came under frequent and prolonged artillery fire; long stretches of them were repeatedly destroyed and as often rebuilt. The bones of many brave Frenchmen were ground in with the crushed stone that restored the surface of the motor road, and it truly became The Sacred Road to all France.

In January and February, von Falkenhayn concentrated in France a reserve of twenty-five divisions completely filled and well rested; he ordered Crown Prince William to attack the French position north of Verdun on the right (east) bank of the Meuse. The group of armies of Prince William had been rearranged to facilitate the operation by detaching the 3d Army in Champagne and attaching the German detachments in Lorraine and Upper Alsace. He was given a specially prepared reinforcement of nine divisions, up to establishment and well rested, he was assigned one-sixth of the German artillery on the Western Front and special arrangements were made to provide a full flow of ammunition for these guns. The tactical conception was to blast the French out of their positions with artillery and occupy their positions with German infantry who were told they would simply have to walk into Verdun. The German air arm was reinforced, so that at all times it was superior to the French, whose air operations were, for this reason, mostly carried out at night.

Provision had been made for forwarding German replacements, so that divisions could be taken out of the fight, rested, reconstituted and rapidly returned to the struggle. In addition, a large number of divisions were held in readiness to relieve the attacking divisions. Three picked divisions were conveniently placed to attack on the left (west) bank of the Meuse, to develop and secure the initial German success expected on the right bank. While these preparations were being made operations were conducted on other parts of the Anglo-French front in an effort to deceive Joffre.

These ancient antagonists, the French and German armies, representatives of Europe's most warlike races, trained by years of peaceful manœuvres, hardened and proved by eighteen months of war, were about to join battle in another effort to settle their age-long differences. Von Falkenhayn had chosen for the battleground Verdun, a favorite rendezvous of Europe's warriors since the time of Cæsar. Much depended upon the outcome of the struggle, and the opposing leaders, officers and men, direct descendants of the many generations of warriors whose spirits hover over this historic arena, knew the hopes of their own peoples were with them, and that the eyes of the world were upon them.

With their men rested by three months of comparative quiet in winter quarters, the French leaders calmly awaited the attack they knew could not long be delayed. With arrangements complete for an attack on the 14th, the Germans patiently waited a week for suitable weather. On 21 February, after an overwhelming artillery bombardment, eight divisions, the vanguard of seventeen divisions of assault troops, broke with such fury over the French lines that within five days they had advanced as many miles on a front of eight miles and had captured Fort Douaumont.

This advance had been made against the French army in position and expecting attack, but by advancing on a comparatively narrow front, the Germans encountered only three divisions of French Territorials on the first day and met little resistance; but as they pushed farther forward they came under fire of the French artillery securely posted on the Marre Ridge, on the west bank of the river. To stop the German advance it became necessary to reinforce the original twelve divisions of defenders, rather widely and thinly spread, first with two French divisions; then on the 23d, the 1st Corps and 13th Corps were thrown in. On the 23d and 24th, the 2d Army of ten divisions, under General Pétain, was sent to the west bank of the Meuse and he was given entire command of the threatened front. Meanwhile, General Haig had commenced to relieve the French 10th Army and that too, as it became available, was sent to Verdun.

On the 27th four French armies were fully engaged, and the command was again rearranged. The 2d and 3d Armies, under General Pétain, held the west bank, the 4th and 5th Armies, under General Langle de Cary, held the east bank, both commanders reporting directly to General Joffre.

Thanks to the prompt reinforcements, General de Castelnau, sent by Joffre to witness the contest, was able to report on February 29th that for the moment Verdun was safe. Von Falkenhayn admitted as much, attributing the arrest of his powerful attack to the vigorous French infantry counter-attacks and the well-served French batteries rapidly brought into position behind the Marre ridge on the west bank. Nevertheless, this initial German advance had penetrated into the third line of defense at Douaumont, and its partial success had a very depressing effect on the French Government, shook their

faith in Joffre, and in neutral countries added to the already high prestige of Germany's armies.

The possibility of French artillery being used on the west bank of the Meuse had been anticipated by von Falkenhayn, and three picked German divisions, already in position to relieve this menace, began the attack in that area on 6 March, and thereafter the battle alternately raged on either side of the Meuse.

The extension of the offensive to the west bank caused von Falkenhayn to rearrange the German command, so that while ultimate control of the attack still rested with the Crown Prince, General von Mudra commanded on the east bank, while General von Gallwitz commanded on the west bank. The French and German system of command was now identical except that while the two German commanders reported to von Falkenhayn through the Crown Prince, the two French commanders reported directly to Joffre. The battle was now a struggle between von Falkenhayn and Joffre, two past-masters of the art of war, who had been pitted one against the other since the fall of 1914.

In March the Russians attempted an attack in Courland and Lithuania to relieve the German pressure on Verdun. This attack collapsed with heavy loss. The British were obliged to take over more and more of the French front, and by 14 March had released the entire 10th French Army. By this time the Germans had thirty divisions engaged at Verdun. In May the Austrians opened their attack from the Trentino upon Italy. This attack was not approved by von Falkenhayn; it succeeded at first but was rapidly slowed down. The Germans continued to press their attack at Verdun.

Early in the summer the French and German peoples commenced to enter into the Verdun battle and disrupt the plans of both von Falkenhayn and Joffre. A pre-

mature announcement of the capture of one of the "key" positions led the German people to expect an early capture of Verdun and the end of the war by the complete elimination of France. The resolute defense of Pétain, the watchword "They shall not pass" of those bearded Frankish soldiers, communicated itself to the French nation. The patriotic populations of both countries demanded a decision.

Verdun became a symbol, the two struggling armies were as two knights representing in their persons their millions of countrymen, and as their champions rose or fell so vibrated the hopes of these nations. In a moment all the chivalry of the Middle Ages was restored to modern mechanized war. The spirit of the sublime Joan was everywhere with the French, inspiring their defense. Nor was the soul of the attacking German army any less noble. German soldiers relieve the tedium of marches with songs, but they go to battle solemnly. Nor do they require personal exhortation by their leaders to raise their combat spirit. Only once did Frederick the Great find it necessary to harangue his troops. The Brandenburg regiment that captured Douaumont would have pleased grim Frederick himself.

Thus it was that the German people assumed command of the German army and demanded that von Falkenhayn take Verdun, while the French people, with equal determination, insisted that the Germans "shall not pass." Von Falkenhayn cared nothing for a few more desolated acres of France, and Joffre was quite willing to exchange an acre or more to gain a tactical advantage. Both leaders aimed at consuming the reserves of the enemy. The objective of both leaders was the enemy army. But public opinion forced them both to continue the battle for Verdun through the early summer of 1917.

The Verdun struggle, militarily, was still a problem of reserves and the main decisions continued to be made by von Falkenhayn and Joffre. From March 6 to March 22 Joffre met all Pétain's requests for reinforcements, and by the end of March he had only *one* fresh army corps, the 9th, left. Thirty-nine French divisions had been successively engaged. Joffre believed that Pétain's 2d Army at the end of March was superior to the German, and suggested that Pétain counter-attack, and on 3 April, General Nivelle with the 3d Corps began a series of counter-attacks near Fort Douaumont.

The relations between Joffre and Pétain became strained during April, for Joffre, in his determination to carry out his original plan for a Somme offensive, was seeking to husband French reserves, while Pétain continued to demand reinforcements for Verdun and delayed the return of divisions whose reliefs Joffre had supplied. Early in May, Joffre removed Pétain to command the Centre Group, with headquarters at Bar-le-Duc, thinking a greater distance from the battlefield would broaden Pétain's outlook.

Throughout May the French and Germans continued the struggle for Douaumont on the east bank and Mort Homme on the west bank, not only for their tactical value, but because they had become, in the eyes of both armies, the symbols of success. The consumption of French divisions rose from one division every two days to two divisions every three days. In spite of these determined French attacks with heavy losses, Douaumont and Mort Homme remained in German hands at the end of May, when, due to the fierceness of the struggle, a lull in the fighting again became necessary. But the German losses were increasing and their army could spare men less than the Allies.

By 22 May, Joffre had been forced to employ at

Verdun sixteen of the forty-two divisions first assigned to Foch for the Somme offensive. This would limit the French participation to twenty-six divisions and make it distinctly secondary to the British, who had reserved thirty-seven divisions for this offensive, and Foch's rôle was gradually reduced to assisting the British advance.

As the Verdun battle continued Joffre had great difficulty in reserving even sixteen divisions for Foch, so insistent were the calls of Pétain at Verdun for reinforcements, but, with the same tenacity that marked his decisions leading up to the first battle of the Marne, Joffre clung to the conviction that Verdun could be relieved more easily by an offensive on the Somme than by a defense or counter-attack at Verdun itself. Events proved he was correct, for after the Somme fight developed the German pressure on Verdun sensibly relaxed, because the army of the Crown Prince could no longer be reinforced.

CHAPTER XXV

THE BRITISH AND GERMAN FLEETS IN 1916

The British and German Fleets in 1916—The Battle of Jutland—Beatty vs. von Hipper—Jellicoe and Nelson—Jellicoe vs. von Scheer—Jellicoe's Last Opportunity—The Night Actions—The German Sortie in August—Fleet Actions and Land Battles—The Reason for Jellicoe's Caution

IN February, 1916, Admiral von Scheer succeeded to command of the German fleet. He had been in the fleet since 1914, he had seen the Grand Fleet continue to increase in strength despite the German war of attrition; he also realized the bad effect on the morale of the naval personnel of being constantly on the defensive; accordingly he determined to initiate more active measures against the British Grand Fleet and he gained the Emperor's approval of his plan.

In April, 1916, as the result of President Wilson's protest about the sinking of the *Sussex*, the submarines were diverted from their war on commerce, and one-half of them given to von Scheer; he then attempted on several occasions to make up his deficiency in capital ships by using his submarines and Zeppelins with the fleet. He did not think it practicable to use his submarines in the same formation with his surface fleet, so he arranged to station them off the exits from Scapa Flow, Cromarty and Rosyth, the bases of the Grand Fleet, two or three days before he would sortie from Heligoland Bight. With his submarines on station, he could make a sweep into the eastern part of the North Sea with his surface fleet, employ the Zeppelins to cruise

ahead of the fleet and have others in readiness to join him on the battlefield. As the British naval aviation at that time was not capable of operating with the fleet, the Zeppelins might become an important factor.

To deploy his submarines required two or three days; to sortie with his fleet twenty-four hours; to bring his Zeppelins to the battlefield another twenty-four hours. He needed high visibility to co-ordinate his attack; the variable and unfavorable weather repeatedly balked his efforts to combine his forces against the enemy.

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND

In the latter part of May, 1916, von Scheer, having until then failed to entice British vessels into any of his traps, decided upon another enterprise in the North Sea, still employing his submarines, his Zeppelins and his surface fleet. He stationed two submarines off Scapa Flow, two off Cromarty, six off Rosyth, two off Sunderland, while the Flanders flotilla watched Harwich and the Channel. Five Zeppelins were ordered to scout a wide quadrant of the North Sea extending from Holland to Jutland. Behind the Zeppelins the High Seas Fleet would proceed to show itself in the North Sea in order to get the Grand Fleet, which was known to be based on three ports, Scapa, Cromarty and Rosyth, to sortie into the North Sea.

During the sortie of the three portions of the British fleet from their bases, von Scheer hoped to attack them with submarines; other submarines would also lay mine fields. The *U-75*, one of these mine layers, planted the field west of Scapa that subsequently sank the light cruiser *Hampshire* bound for Russia with Kitchener aboard.


In this proposed deployment of the German fleet, von

Scheer, with the main body of his fleet concentrated and covered by his Zeppelins scouting ahead of him, would be in readiness to retire in safety at any time to his mine-protected roadsteads if his scouts sighted the entire British fleet. But if the three portions of the British fleet failed to concentrate promptly after leaving port, von Scheer might be able to fall upon part of it with the entire High Seas Fleet. There was nothing more abstruse in any of von Scheer's plans than the ancient effort to fall upon a weaker force. Both commanders-in-chief had been seeking such an opportunity for twenty-two months.

To this venerable idea was added the additional submarine menace during the sortie of the British detachments from their bases. British submarines operated regularly in the Heligoland Bight, so the German fleet was similarly exposed during its sortie. It should be noted that the British fleet used its submarines and mine layers fully as energetically as the Germans; in fact, the British submarines were operating continuously against the German fleet, whereas the German submarines frequently shifted their attacks from men-of-war to merchant ships with some inevitable loss of effectiveness.

About the only risk von Scheer accepted under this plan was from British submarines operating in Heligoland Bight or that of running into recently laid British mines. Unfortunately for his plan, bad weather that prevented the Zeppelins' taking their full part caused him first to delay and finally to undertake the operations with the rôles of the Zeppelins considerably modified.

Von Scheer then restricted his sweep with the main body to the extreme eastern part of the North Sea, passing in sight of the Jutland coast so that his movement would be reported and draw the British fleet out over his submarines.



The parade of the German fleet along Jutland was not necessary to bring out the Grand Fleet, for the numerous radio messages which were always used to get the German fleet underway had been intercepted by the British directional radio stations, and by noon, 30 May, the British Admiralty warned Admiral Jellicoe that sixteen German submarines were already at sea, an unusually high number, and that the High Seas Fleet might make a sweep into the North Sea the next day.

Six hours later, the Admiralty having intercepted additional German messages indicating an important fleet movement, telegraphed Jellicoe: "You should concentrate to the eastward of the Long Forties (about sixty miles east of Aberdeen) ready for eventualities." Jellicoe with the squadrons of the Battle Fleet from Scapa and Cromarty, and Beatty with the Battle Cruiser Fleet from Rosyth, were underway within a few hours. The squadrons from Scapa and Cromarty converged rapidly and concentrated under Jellicoe's immediate command. The Admiralty recalled the Belgian Coast Patrol and East Coast Minesweepers, and ordered the Harwich force, a squadron of eight predreadnought battleships with cruisers and destroyers attached, to be ready at daylight on May 31. The operating division of the Admiralty was functioning perfectly, detecting the early movements of the German fleet (although it failed to identify positively the departure of the main body), and initiating the moves of the Grand Fleet and the Harwich force, which operated independently of Jellicoe.

BEATTY VERSUS VON HIPPER

The course of the German fleet was almost north, the two parts of the British fleet steamed almost east. These courses, prolonged, intersected. And, shortly after 2

P.M., on 31 May, the light cruisers, the outposts of the two opposing scouting forces, made contact about sixty miles southwest of the Skagerrack. The German battle cruisers stood towards their light cruisers to support them. Beatty, whose previous efforts to bring German cruisers to action had been foiled by their rapid retreats, immediately stood southeastward with his battle cruisers towards Horn's Reef light-vessel, to intervene between the Germans and their base, to ensure bringing them to action.

So anxious was Beatty to cut off the German retreat that he failed to close up his battleship supports, the four superdreadnoughts (*Barhams*) that accompanied him. This failure proved to have serious consequences, but it is quite understandable if the previous experience of Beatty is kept in mind, for he was unaware of the proximity of the German battleships and naturally expected the German cruisers to dash away for Heligoland, as they had always done before. In that event Beatty's battleships would have soon dropped behind, as they were only capable of making twenty-five knots against twenty-seven and more for the German cruisers. Jellicoe's first reaction to the information that German light cruisers were in sight was much the same as Beatty's: he expected they would at once endeavor to escape, so he ordered Admiral Hood with the 3d Battle Cruiser Division to prevent the German cruisers escaping via the Skagerrack.

The first contact was made between the opposing light cruisers about 2:20 P.M. on 31 May; further contacts were rapidly developed, and within twenty minutes both commanders knew that enemy battle cruisers were in the vicinity. Within an hour the light forces had concentrated upon their own battle cruisers. By 3:50 the battle cruisers on both sides were engaged on a south-

easterly course, with von Hipper leading the unsuspecting Beatty towards the approaching German battle fleet at the rate of over fifty miles an hour. However, Beatty had a screen of light cruisers proceeding about eight miles ahead of him so he would not be surprised. During the first half hour of this battle-cruiser action, the Germans sank the *Indefatigable* and the *Queen Mary*, and badly damaged the *Lion*. Each of the German battle cruisers, except the *Moltke*, was hit at least once, while the *von der Tann* and *Seydlitz* were hit several times but not sunk.

During the first half hour the Germans made almost two hits for each one by the British. As their projectiles were more effective, and as the British battle cruisers had from three to five inches less armor, the reasons for Beatty's heavier losses are obvious. In addition to sinking two battle cruisers, the Germans had rendered unserviceable five of the sixteen turrets on Beatty's four remaining battle cruisers; while the British had permanently disabled only five of the twenty-two turrets on the five German battle cruisers.

As the four British battleships were also engaging the German cruisers at extreme range, the damage inflicted on the German ships cannot all be credited to the British cruisers. The light favored the Germans, but not enough to account for the great superiority of the German gunnery, which in the first fifteen minutes enabled them to make approximately four hits to one for the British. As Beatty had been in command of the Battle Cruiser Fleet for almost three years he must accept responsibility for its inferior gunnery.

The British destroyers attacked German battle cruisers about 4:30; the attack was parried by German destroyers and cruisers and, in the ensuing mêlée, both sides had destroyers sunk or totally disabled. The *Seydlitz* was hit

by a torpedo but was still able to keep her place in the line, a monument to German naval construction.

While the destroyer action was taking place, Commodore Goodenough, in the *Southampton*, about 8,000 yards in advance of Beatty, reported sighting enemy battleships. At that time Beatty was about fifteen miles away and had ample opportunity to turn about. Goodenough boldly approached within six miles of the German battle line, made detailed report of its battle fleet and fired one torpedo before turning away.

When von Scheer, about 3:50, first heard that von Hipper had made contact with and was leading Beatty's battle cruisers towards him, he did not know that Evan-Thomas was present with four superdreadnoughts or that Jellicoe with the Grand Fleet was only seventy miles from Beatty. It appeared that his plan to cut off part of the Grand Fleet would succeed. His primary concern then was to prevent the escape of Beatty, just as Beatty's first effort had been to prevent the escape of von Hipper, so he altered course to the westward to bring Beatty's force between his battleships and von Hipper's battle cruisers that had already turned to the southward. A half hour later von Scheer learned that four or five battleships had joined Beatty's force. He had not heard of the sinking of the *Indefatigable*, became alarmed for von Hipper's cruisers, and changed course to head directly for his own battle cruisers.

His battleships were in a long single column, probably for fear of mines; the predreadnoughts, his slowest vessels, were in the rear. Consequently he could only proceed at fifteen knots with his leading division, until his rear division closed up. Von Scheer had been hoping for the exact situation that had arisen, but his tactical formation did not permit his prompt improvement of it and his subsequent fears for von Hipper's battle cruisers

caused him to abandon the only manœuvre that would have surely drawn Beatty into his net.

About 4:50 the German battleships entered the fight. Beatty had turned about but delayed the signal orders to Admiral Evan-Thomas to reverse his course. Evan-Thomas continued to steam full speed with his four battleships towards the greatly superior German battle line. Beatty, with his battle cruisers, and Goodenough with his light cruisers, turned about and got away unscathed, but the *Barham* and *Malaya*, two of Evan-Thomas' battleships, suffered severely. Beatty's delay in signalling Evan-Thomas might have had much worse consequences, for he exposed the four battleships to the fire of the German fleet, and if the machinery of one of these battleships had been disabled, it soon would have been overwhelmed. Luckily for Beatty, these battleships were able to keep going and escaped.

The German command was very disappointed at its failure to cripple at least one of these battleships.

Beatty's defenders assert he extended an unusual amount of initiative to his subordinates and expected them to take necessary action without orders. Evan-Thomas had served with Beatty for only a short time, apparently was unaware of Beatty's methods, and stood well past the cruisers and continued towards the entire German fleet until the signal for him to turn was hauled down by Beatty.

From the armchair it would seem that both commanders erred. Certainly Beatty should not have delayed the order of Evan-Thomas to turn, but it was well within the prerogative of Evan-Thomas to change course on his own initiative, when it was obvious that to continue towards the German fleet exposed his force to greatly superior numbers with no compensating advantages. Had Beatty been really Nelsonic he would have

indoctrinated his junior commander with his ideas before the battle; had Evan-Thomas been Nelsonic, he would not have hesitated to turn his ships on his own responsibility.

Beatty with four battle cruisers and four battleships was now pursued by von Scheer much after the fashion he had pursued von Hipper, over practically the same route and for about the same length of time, one hour. Beatty was leading the German fleet to Jellicoe, just as von Hipper led Beatty to von Scheer. About 5:50 P.M. Beatty passed the 3:30 P.M. position where he had sighted von Hipper's cruisers, but the situation at 5:50 P.M. was vastly different. At this later time he was within seven or eight miles of Jellicoe with the Grand Fleet and leading von Scheer directly into the clutches of the greatly superior British fleet. He was rapidly creating a situation that would make it impossible for the German fleet to escape a decisive battle.

Meanwhile Jellicoe had been steaming towards the scene of action at his highest fleet speed, somewhat more than eighteen knots. When it appeared that the German battle cruisers were not seeking to retire via the Skagerrack, he despatched Admiral Hood with three battle cruisers ahead to assist Beatty. Hood's division was rapidly converging upon the German fleet from the eastward. Jellicoe, anxious for information, made various signals to Beatty, but the radio on the *Lion* had been shot away, and Beatty was too engrossed in fighting von Hipper to gather much information or to forward via any other ship all the information he did have.

Fortunately for Jellicoe, Commodore Goodenough in the *Southampton*, with the 2d Light Cruiser Division, kept his station ahead of the German battle fleet, and made reports of its position, disposition and course. Commencing about 4:30 he sent in five reports, the last

at 5:40, only fifteen minutes before sight contact was made. These reports were incomplete, but taken together with those from Beatty, gave a rough outline of the rapidly changing situation. It has long been a commonplace of war that information is always incomplete and usually unreliable, and for this lack of information Jellicoe should have been prepared. It is probably true that Beatty furnished Jellicoe more information than von Hipper forwarded to von Scheer.

Jellicoe did know that the whole German fleet was out, that the day had finally arrived for which this Grand Fleet he commanded had been created. And although a very modest gentleman, Jellicoe could not have been unaware that of all the British naval officers he had been selected and trained for this very occasion, nor could he have been unconscious of the fact that his selection for commander-in-chief met the general approval of almost the entire British naval personnel. Such thoughts must have passed through his mind as he proceeded to his destined rendezvous with von Scheer.

As Jellicoe stood towards von Scheer in six lines of divisions, with four superdreadnought battleships in each division, eagerly seeking information from Beatty, the situation was developing so closely to what he and his staff had anticipated from peace-time manœuvres on the chart and on the sea, that his chief of staff, Rear Admiral Madden, remarked, "This is all going according to expectation." There was one enormous difference: this was the actuality, these two fleets hurrying towards each other through the mists were not cardboard ships manœuvring on an ocean painted on the deck of the *Iron Duke*, nor friendly ships engaged in manœuvres, firing blank charges. These ships that after twenty-two months of shadow fighting were approaching each other were steel ships, the finest that either country

could produce. Both fleets were manned with such officers and sailormen that Nelson, Monck, Jervis or von Reuter might well have envied Jellicoe and von Scheer. On the outcome of their encounter the fate of Europe hung.


JELlicoe AND NELSON

It is refined cruelty to compare a naval commander to Nelson, yet any British commander-in-chief who commands in a fleet action must expect his conduct to be contrasted with England's great naval genius. Nelson, in Jellicoe's place, would have stood towards von Scheer with exultant elation, happy in the thought that the drudgery of the war, the weary waiting, the long surveillance over the enemy ports, the training of his fleet, the painstaking indoctrination of his flag officers and captains was behind him. Only the fighting remained. In the prospect of battle, Nelson would have taken a fierce joy.

Nelson would have realized as keenly as Jellicoe that on the British fleet floated the British Empire, but Nelson would have known that in the summer of 1916 England again "badly needed a victory" that would remove the menace of the German fleet once and for all. After his years of war experience Nelson knew from personal observation that in a naval battle "Something must be left to chance." Some risks must be taken, and having reduced these risks as much as he could, Nelson would have boldly taken those remaining, in the serene faith that before the enemy could defeat him, he would deal so roughly with that enemy fleet that it could do England no further harm.

It would have been well for Jellicoe, the British navy and the Allied countries, had some of Nelson's reflections on war flashed into Jellicoe's mind as he pieced together the meagre, fragmentary, sometimes contradic-

JELlicoe




HIPPER

SCHEER

SITUATION
ABOUT 6:00 p.m.

SCHEER STEAMS INTO
BRITISH NAVAL NET



tory, information that came to him, and discussed the situation with Admiral Madden, his brother-in-law and trusted chief of staff. But Jellicoe was convinced of "the necessity for not leaving anything to chance in a fleet action, because our fleet was the one and only factor that was vital to the existence of the (British) empire, as, indeed, to the Allied cause." If we seek the basic reason for the indecisive nature of the battle off Jutland it is to be found in Jellicoe's vain endeavor to remove all chance from battle, rather than in the haze of the North Sea, or his incomplete information of the enemy fleet.

Jellicoe was reared in an era of peace and great material progress, Nelson grew up in an atmosphere of war and during his entire eventful career there was practically no improvement in the material of fighting ships. Jellicoe could not visualize the nature of battle, while the material factors bulked large in his mind.

Nelson fought mainly against the French and Spanish, who fight better on the land than on the water, and during an era when their fleets were deteriorating. Jellicoe had to battle with Germans, a race at home on the water, that has bred good seamen as well as good soldiers from time immemorial. The Germans lacked a naval heritage, but their fleet was the pride of the German Empire. By careful planning and painstaking preparations their naval leaders had done their utmost to prepare themselves, their officers and their men for battle. Despite their long defensive rôle, their leaders had been able to preserve the fleet morale.

Jellicoe did not have as large a reserve fleet to fall back upon in 1916 as did Nelson, but, in addition to those at Jutland, Great Britain had eight modern dreadnoughts against five for Germany. Behind the dreadnoughts came a relatively more powerful fleet of English pre-dreadnoughts, while the fleets of France, Italy and Japan

formed a potential reserve that included several dreadnoughts. Had both fleets been destroyed, the Allies would have still possessed a great numerical superiority that would have insured control of the sea. So Jellicoe could have entered the battle, feeling not only that he was superior locally, but behind him was a superiority in reserves. To all these advantages, fortune was now about to add the advantage of tactical position. Surely, Jellicoe's good angel could have done no more, for in that high latitude there still remained two and a half hours of the summer daylight during which, at a not unbearable British loss, the German fleet could be completely destroyed.

JELlicoe VERSUS VON SCHEER

From 5:30 to 6:30 von Scheer had steamed directly into the enveloping British net. Almost due north was Jellicoe with twenty-four superdreadnought battleships, in a compact flexible formation, under complete control, with accompanying light cruisers and destroyers. Northeastward was Admiral Hood with three fresh battle cruisers, with accompanying light cruisers and destroyers. Northwestward was Beatty with four battle cruisers somewhat battered, and four 15-inch-gun superdreadnoughts. Into this naval net von Scheer was plunging his fleet at full sustained speed.

In the first clash of these mighty fleets, Admiral Hood's battle cruisers, assisted by Admiral Arbuthnot's armored cruisers, drove first the German light cruisers and then von Hipper's battle cruisers back upon von Scheer's battleships, and as the light cruisers fell back, they signalled von Hipper that they were being fired upon by British battleships. Whereupon von Scheer mis-



SITUATION
ABOUT 6:30 p.m.

SCHEER "T"ED BY JELlicOE
IS FORCED TO TURN ABOUT

takenly concluded that Hood's battle cruisers were Jellicoe's battleships.

Jellicoe could deploy his battleships on his left flank (northeast) division, his right flank (southeast) division, or by a slightly more complicated movement, on his own division in the left centre. Each deployment had some advantages, but Jellicoe was in such a favorable position, and in such superior force, that either of these three courses of action would have left him in an advantageous position over von Scheer.

Jellicoe was under one handicap: there was an error between the calculated positions of his fleet and Beatty's fleet of about twelve miles, so he expected to sight Beatty twelve miles to the eastward of the point of contact. This slightly disconcerted him, but still left him actually in a superior position. For this error, Jellicoe himself was to blame; he had not provided linking vessels to obtain or maintain visual contact between the two fleets. As commander-in-chief, linking up the fleets was his responsibility, he had vessels available for the purpose, and apparently did not consider visual contact necessary.


Jellicoe did not have all the information he wished. But he had more than enough to enable him to act intelligently, and quite as much as is usually afforded a commander-in-chief in war time. At 6:10 the 5th Battle Squadron reported the enemy battle fleet S.S.E. At 6:15 Jellicoe ordered the deployment on his northeast, or left flank, division, away from, but across, the head of the enemy fleet.

This was a lengthy operation requiring about twenty-two minutes; during some of this manœuvre many of his ships could not fire, during all of it a few of his ships could not fire. Beatty's battle cruisers were steaming across the front of the formation to take station in the van; Evan-Thomas with the battleships of the 5th

Squadron was taking station on the quarter; the opposing light forces were fighting between the lines; the *Inflexible*, Admiral Hood's flagship, after driving von Hipper back upon von Scheer, was quickly sunk. There was plenty of smoke and many separate actions. But chart manœuvres of modern naval actions had usually developed in this manner, and while there was much apparent confusion, the salient features were rapidly crystallizing and becoming plain to the trained nautical eye. As the situation cleared it developed more and more in favor of Jellicoe.

During the first clash, von Scheer was as much in the dark as Jellicoe. In hot pursuit of Beatty, much chagrined at the failure of his battleships to cripple at least one of Beatty's fleeing ships, he turned to the eastward about 6:00; shortly afterwards he sighted the 3d Battle Cruiser Division, forming ahead of Beatty's battle cruisers, and on account of an incorrect report from his light-force commander that he had been fired upon by enemy battleships, mistook them for Jellicoe's fleet, which actually was to his northward and fast commencing its deployment. By 6:30 Jellicoe had brought his battle line almost completely across the head of von Scheer's line, to form an almost perfect "Tee." Jellicoe was in the ideal position for destroying the German fleet. Jellicoe also obtained better visibility conditions by deploying on his northeast division, for the German fleet was now to the westward and silhouetted by the descending sun, while Jellicoe's ships were partly hidden by the misty background to the eastward.

Von Hipper's cruisers, in the van, suffered heavily, the *Lützow* was forced out of line, disabled. The leading German (Fifth) division of battleships, four of the *König* class, next felt the weight of Jellicoe's guns. The situation of these ships quickly became unbearable and



von Scheer was forced to turn 180 degrees away to break the British range. He ordered a flotilla of destroyers to attack, to cover his retirement and, protected by the heavy smoke-screen they made to cover their own retreat, he broke away from that deadly embrace of the Grand Fleet. But only by steaming due west, that is to say, directly towards Scotland and away from his own base. Jellicoe had placed his entire fleet between von Scheer's weaker fleet and its base.

After a brief fifteen minutes' thinking, von Scheer realized he could not continue a westerly course without exposing his fleet to more danger than he was avoiding, and, still under the mistaken impression that Hood's division was Jellicoe's main fleet, he turned about at 7:00 P.M. Had his original assumption of the position of Jellicoe's fleet been correct and Jellicoe continued to the southward, von Scheer's second turn should have headed him across the stern of Jellicoe's fleet, and given him the advantage of position.

But von Scheer's assumption was incorrect, and Jellicoe had turned towards him, seeking to regain lost contact. As a result, von Scheer again led his whole fleet straight into the British superdreadnoughts' line and this time Jellicoe's six divisions were deployed for battle. A second time the German fleet was delivered into Jellicoe's hands.

For a brief five or ten minutes the Grand Fleet concentrated on the head of the German dreadnoughts, the 5th Division and the already battered battle cruisers. Von Scheer's battleships, outnumbered, again Tee-d by the whole British battle line, could not endure the punishment. The German signal book contained an emergency signal prepared for just such a desperate occasion; the fleet had been trained to execute it; the tactical concept was simply to push home *at all costs* a

torpedo attack by cruisers and destroyers while the battleships broke off the engagement and withdrew. It was a manœuvre well known to all armies for breaking off contact with superior forces. It required the sacrifice of a part of the force to save the whole. Its employment at this time showed plainly that von Scheer regarded his situation as desperate. He had departed from the Jade in the high hopes of cutting off a detachment of Jellicoe's fleet; so hopeless had his position become, that to save his battleships, he was compelled to order his cruisers and destroyers, a large detachment of his fleet, to apparent destruction. The tables were turned completely.

At 7:13 von Scheer commanded all his cruisers and destroyers to attack with the utmost determination. They did, and the gallantry of his heavy cruisers, light cruisers and destroyers extricated him from his intolerable situation. Under cover of their attack he again swung his fleet 180 degrees away from the heavy fire of Jellicoe's superdreadnoughts. The German cruisers and destroyers responded in a truly noble manner to von Scheer's desperate cry for help, but it was Jellicoe's fears and not von Hipper's forces that permitted von Scheer to escape destruction.

This German torpedo attack was delivered in full force by all their cruisers and destroyers. The conditions were favorable for a torpedo attack, low visibility with twilight approaching. It was the identical situation that Jellicoe had often imagined might happen. He knew the Germans had trained for this form of attack, he had a genuine respect for the German torpedo, and bearing continuously and heavily on his mind was the consciousness that on his fleet depended the security of the British Empire. He had frequently contemplated such an attack, his tactical staff had figured to a nicety the number



SITUATION ABOUT 8:15

JELlicoe'S LAST OPPORTUNITY

BEATTY REGAINS CONTACT FORCES
SCHEER AND HIPPER TO TURN AWAY
THE THIRD TIME

of probable torpedo hits under three conditions: a turn-away from the enemy, a continuation of the same course and a turn towards the enemy. A turn away from the enemy practically neutralized a torpedo attack, for ships making almost twenty knots with a start of over 12,000 yards, could easily reach a safety zone beyond the maximum range of the thirty-knot torpedoes before they could be overtaken.

For this reason Jellicoe, after careful consideration of the problem, had determined to turn away. He notified the Admiralty of his decision in the autumn of 1914 and pointed out that such procedure might be construed as retiring from battle. When the often imagined and carefully considered situation arose, Jellicoe promptly turned away as he had decided to do, months before, in the quiet of his cabin. Unfortunately for the British cause, to escape the German torpedoes, Jellicoe allowed the German fleet to escape from their almost hopeless position. The two fleets rapidly separated, for von Scheer would no more face the British guns than Jellicoe would risk the German torpedoes.

By 8:00 von Scheer was out of range of Jellicoe's guns. As he escaped destruction the second time he found himself again in a very critical position. Darkness was coming on, and only a short six-hour summer night was given him to elude Jellicoe, who was between him and his base. With that quick decision which had marked all his tactical moves, he determined to proceed by the shortest route to the shelter of his mine fields. He ordered his less valuable predreadnought squadron to the head of his column, directed his dreadnoughts to take station astern of them, and stood for his home waters. He ordered his destroyers to attack enemy capital ships during the night.

JELlicOE'S LAST OPPORTUNITY

At 7:45 Beatty radioed Jellicoe: "Urgent period submit van of battleships follow battle cruisers period we can then cut off whole of enemy battle fleet." At 8:14 Jellicoe ordered the 2d Battle Squadron to follow Beatty.

At 8:00 Beatty ordered his light cruisers to regain contact, while Jellicoe, having evaded the German torpedo attack, was standing to the westward almost directly for von Scheer, who was steaming a little east of south. At 8:20 Beatty was again battling with von Hipper. But Jellicoe's battleships were not near enough to support the attack. Even so, this time von Hipper suffered more than Beatty and was forced to turn away. Von Scheer followed his motions and the whole German fleet was again forced to the westward, further from its base.

Had the nearest British battleships supported Beatty promptly, it was still possible in the remaining twilight to have done the German fleet considerable damage and insured a battle the following morning. For von Scheer was shifting the fleet formation to place the predreadnought battleships at the head of the column and his three roughly parallel columns masked each other's fire. So disarranged was the German formation that Beatty's unsupported attack with his battered cruisers was sufficient to turn the whole German fleet to the westward for the third time.

THE NIGHT ACTIONS

With persistent determination, as soon as he had broken off the engagement with Beatty, von Scheer resumed his plan to form his capital ships in single column and take the shortest route to his home waters. By 9:00

he had formed his column on a course to the east-of-south, with the predreadnoughts leading; then came the dreadnoughts, while in the rear were placed the remnants of the battle cruisers, which had been fighting since 2:00 P.M. Over ten miles astern, the crippled *Lützow*, escorted by destroyers, was limping home, with her devoted crew laboring to keep her afloat.

At 9:00 Jellicoe ordered the fleet to steer south, so from that time on the German fleet to the westward was converging on the British. The light forces were ordered to take station astern of the British fleet to protect it from the German torpedo attacks. From 10:00 P.M. to 3:00 A.M. there were numerous encounters between the opposing light cruisers and destroyers. The German light forces operated more coherently than the British, but neither side inflicted any important losses. The German predreadnought battleship *Pommern* was sunk with all hands, and the British armored cruiser *Black Prince* suffered a like fate; these were the largest losses. During the night the *Lützow* was abandoned and torpedoed to prevent capture and most of her crew was taken off by German destroyers. It is scarcely necessary to add that the night attacks by destroyers and light cruisers were carried out with the utmost courage and devotion by both British and German vessels, exactly as any one at all acquainted with the personnel of the two navies would have anticipated.

From 9:00 P.M. to 12:00 P.M. the two fleets were steaming on slightly converging courses, with the British gaining distance to the southward. Between midnight and 1:00 A.M. the German fleet crossed the wake of the British fleet. The 4th British Flotilla of destroyers made three attacks; destroyers from the 4th, 9th, 10th and 13th Flotillas made one attack and the 12th Flotilla made one attack on the German fleet. The comparatively

meagre results of these attacks were due first to the afternoon fighting during which many of the destroyers had fired their torpedoes; to the disorganization that resulted from the day engagement and very probably due to lack of training for this particular form of attack. Last but very important, the Germans had developed a formidable defense against a destroyer attack. Simultaneously trained searchlights and guns, manned by skilled crews, enabled the battleships and cruisers to sink or drive off many of the attacking destroyers. Long after this night battle, the crews of those British destroyers could remember the blinding glare of the German searchlights that blotted out their vision as they stood in to the attack.

In the existing situation the British destroyers were favorably placed to defend the rear of their own formation and attack the van of the German formation. Even with this advantage the results of the night destroyer attacks were as small as the day torpedo attacks had been.

Unquestionably, one reason the day torpedo attacks on the British fleet failed was Jellicoe's turn-away, which made it almost impossible for a German torpedo to catch up with his battleships, but there is still reason to wonder why the British destroyers did so little damage during their night attacks.

Jellicoe had intended to stand towards Horn's Reef at daylight, and at 2:47 A.M., as day broke, turned his battleships about and endeavored to collect his fleet. By 3:30 A.M. he had assembled his battleships, except the 6th Division. His cruisers and destroyers were more widely scattered, and it was after 5:00 A.M. before the Battle Cruiser Fleet joined the battleships. Many of the destroyers did not rejoin until after 9:00 A.M., and the 6th Division of battleships did not join until the evening.

By the time Jellicoe had assembled his fleet it was ap-

parent, from intercepted messages, that the German fleet was again behind its mine fields. In fact, none of Jellicoe's dispositions for the night revealed any real determination to renew the action at daylight. The Grand Fleet did keep the sea after the High Seas Fleet had retired, and was unquestionably again ready to resume battle under its own conditions, and to that extent possessed the battlefield.

On the 2d of June the various parts of the Grand Fleet reached their home ports, effected minor repairs, refuelled, and by 10:00 P.M. on that day were placed on four hours' notice for sea. That is to say, the bulk of the Grand Fleet was ready for action. Various vessels, like the *Marlborough*, required extensive repairs, but the bulk of Jellicoe's fleet had not suffered materially, and was still greatly superior to the High Seas Fleet. But Jellicoe had not improved the favorable opportunity to destroy the German fleet, and he was never given another chance.

Although von Scheer had fewer ships sunk than Jellicoe, his remaining four battle cruisers required very extensive repairs. And it was August before he was ready for another sortie in the North Sea.

The German Government handled the news despatches concerning the battle very smartly, whereas the first British despatches bungled the description of the fighting. As a result, in neutral, and even Allied, countries the impression went abroad that the Germans had gained a great naval victory. This had an important, but temporary, effect on German morale.

THE GERMAN SORTIE IN AUGUST

The Germans inflicted greater damage on a stronger fleet, therefore they should be credited with a tactical

success. Von Scheer made one more sortie in the North Sea, in August, much as he had done in May. His submarines were again located by taking radio bearings as they reported their positions, and again Jellicoe went out with the Grand Fleet on August 18. The opening moves on both sides resembled those that preceded the battle of Jutland.

Von Scheer's submarine trap netted him two light cruisers, the *Southampton* and *Falmouth*, while a British submarine twice torpedoed, but could not sink, the battleship *Westfalen*. Both fleets retired towards their bases before contact between battleships was made. Both Jellicoe and von Scheer were now convinced that capital ships and cruisers must be continuously protected by destroyers from submarine attack. Von Scheer in June had reached an even more momentous conclusion, namely, that the High Seas Fleet was no match for the Grand Fleet.

FLEET ACTIONS AND LAND BATTLES

A defeated fleet differs radically from a defeated army in that it does not usually survive a decisive battle; thus, after Lepanto, the battle of the Armada, Trafalgar, the Sea of Japan, Manila Bay and Santiago, it was impossible to recreate the defeated fleets; these battles were not only decisive of the campaign, but in some cases decided the war and the destinies of the nations concerned for a hundred years. On the other hand, the Army of the Potomac survived defeat after defeat and emerged victorious. In only one land battle of the Civil War, Nashville, was an army actually destroyed as the result of one battle.

It is natural, therefore, that an admiral should approach the field of decisive battle a little more solemnly

than a general who realizes that behind him are a supply of reserves; that a shattered division can be drawn out of the line; its cadres filled and its newcomers quickly absorbed in its body. For example, with the enormous reserves available on both sides of the Western Front it was always possible for a defeated general to rehabilitate his armies and to re-establish a position in rear. But had Jellicoe risked receiving into the double bottoms of his battleships an uncertain number of German torpedoes for the privilege of landing a much greater number of 12-inch, 13.5-inch and 15-inch shells on the decks and sides of the German battleships, within a few hours only one fleet would have remained. And naval experts would not be in doubt about the victor at the battle of Jutland.

THE REASON FOR JELlicoe's CAUTION

A decisive naval battle in the North Sea in June, 1916, with heavy losses on one side without corresponding losses on the other, would have ended the war regardless of who won. A British victory would have enabled Great Britain to concentrate her naval energies on crushing the submarines, would have released troops held in England by fear of a German invasion, and would have permitted a more vigorous restriction of supplies to Germany. A German victory would have raised the so-called blockade of Germany, cut the communications of the British armies overseas, driven British commerce off the sea and starved the United Kingdom.

The tremendous consequences of a naval defeat on the destiny of Great Britain is unquestionably the reason for the extreme reserve displayed by Jellicoe in refusing to accept battle except on his own terms. It is a matter of

record that Jellicoe informed the Admiralty long before the battle of Jutland that he did not purpose to accept battle in the eastern part of the North Sea and that when battle was joined he would turn his battleships *away* from a torpedo threat, although this would involve opening the range. The Admiralty accepted this decision and consequently share with Jellicoe the responsibility for the indecisive nature of the result of the battle of Jutland.

CHAPTER XXVI

SOMME—VERDUN

Somme-Verdun—Haig's Plan—Joffre and Pétain—Roques Places Responsibility on Joffre—Joffre Regains the Initiative—The Battle of the Somme—The British Government and the High Command—The Results of Verdun and the Somme—Impossibility of Gaining a Decision in 1916—Rumania Destroyed—The Results of the Land Fighting in 1916—The Results of the Battle of Jutland

ON the 1st of June, the day after Jutland, the Germans renewed the attack at Verdun, and on 6 June captured Fort Vaux. Whereupon Pétain demanded four new divisions, and informed de Castelnau, during a short absence of Joffre in England, that Verdun could not be held for more than eight days.

Meanwhile, on 1 June, at the request of Italy to relieve some of the Austrian pressure on her armies, Brusiloff attacked with large Russian masses in Galicia and crushed the Austrian front—the front, be it noted, which had provided the additional Austrian troops required for the almost useless Austrian offensive against Italy. The German High Command was compelled to divert four to six German divisions to reconstitute the Austrian Eastern Front in order to prevent the invasion of Silesia or Hungary, but the Germans still managed to continue the pressure on the French at Verdun.

HAIG'S PLAN

The plan of the British-French offensive on the Western Front in the summer of 1916 was necessarily

extensively modified on account of the French reserve divisions drawn into Verdun, and the British army taking over more front. Haig would have preferred to wait until the middle of August before launching his attack, for his forces were continuously increasing. His officers, mainly volunteers, were improving steadily, and by the middle of August he would receive 200 additional heavy guns. But by 1 June the German attacks around Verdun had reduced the offensive power of the French army by one-half and, if the British failed to intervene or postponed their intervention too long, the Germans could continue their attacks with the full prospect of reducing the French army to impotence.

JOFFRE AND PÉTAİN

On 11 June, Pétain requested Joffre to urge Haig to open the battle of the Somme earlier than the date already agreed upon, 1 July.

On 12 June, Joffre wrote Pétain, "All arrangements have been made to launch the (Anglo-French) offensive on the Western Front (the Somme area) at as early a date as possible, consistent with the carefully calculated preparations, without which it is foredoomed to failure," and begged him "to resist to the bitter end." On the same day, Joffre, in an impassioned order-of-the-day, exhorted the ". . . Soldiers of Verdun . . . I make one more appeal to your courage, your ardor, your spirit of sacrifice, your love of country. Hold fast . . . to shatter the last desperate efforts of an enemy now at bay."

Joffre from his headquarters was in daily communication with Haig and Pétain; he intended that Pétain should carry the burden as long as possible, in order to give Haig time to prepare, and then he would insist that

the British commander-in-chief set his armies in motion.

It was necessary also to synchronize as nearly as possible the attacks in France with Brusiloff's offensive in Galicia, so July 1 was the latest day on which the British and French infantry attacks on the Somme could be launched. By that date Haig would have in France fifty-four divisions, eleven coming from the Dardanelles via Egypt. Of these, thirty-seven divisions were assigned to the Somme offensive instead of seventeen as originally contemplated.

Between June 8–20 no fresh German divisions were identified on the Verdun front. Yet on June 21 the Germans were able to renew the attack. After an intensive bombardment of three days the Germans launched nineteen infantry divisions, twelve in the front line, on a narrow front of three and one-half miles. General Nivelle, commanding the 2d Army, was able to maintain the situation without requesting additional troops, although Pétain, from Bar-le-Duc, considered it might be necessary to abandon the right bank of the Meuse, where one-third of the French artillery was placed.

ROQUES PLACES RESPONSIBILITY ON JOFFRE

On 24 June the Minister of War, General Roques, telephoned Joffre to make sure nothing delayed the British attack, and emphasized Joffre's responsibility in the event of disaster at Verdun. The French Government was alarmed by the reports from Verdun, and sent General Roques to Verdun to make a personal investigation.

On the 24th of June, General Nivelle partially restored the situation by a counter-attack. On the same day the artillery preparations for the long-awaited Somme attack began. Pétain had requested additional artillery from General Roques, although he knew that

Joffre had sent all the artillery he could mobilize to take part in the Somme offensive, which all the French commanders believed would disengage Verdun.

Pétain was one of the ablest French generals. Yet in spite of his high character and excellent tactical skill, under the stress of the German attack on Verdun and the weight of his own responsibility, he could not refrain from making unnecessary demands on Joffre, the already hard-pressed commander-in-chief. By 24 June, Joffre, who was seeking determinedly to regain the initiative, regarded the Verdun attack as secondary and the Somme offensive as the real struggle. He was seizing the initiative hitherto held by von Falkenhayn; he wished to select the place to fight and to control the intensity of the fighting.

On 30 June the German attack was finally arrested by the French within two and a half miles of Verdun.

JOFFRE REGAINS THE INITIATIVE

For over four months Joffre had danced to von Falkenhayn's tune; he proposed to reverse the rôles by shifting the scene to the Somme and the main burden to the British army. His persistence, the valor of the French soldiers, the skillful tactical dispositions of Pétain and Nivelle at Verdun, and the loyalty of Haig enabled him to do so.

Joffre during the first phase of Verdun was much the same as Joffre during August and September, 1914. He was not quick to divine the enemy's intention, and his initial plans and dispositions were not good; but once the battle was fully joined, his tactical instincts became more alert and his battle reactions were correct. He had the keen ability to gauge accurately the capacity in defense and offense of the French army, and he did not hesitate

any more than von Falkenhayn to expose his soldiers to the last-minute blow of the enemy before he turned to the counter-attack. During the climax of battle, when others wavered, he was imperturbable and intrepid.

At Verdun the French employed sixty-six divisions out of a total of ninety-five; the Germans used fifty out of a hundred and twenty-one on the Western Front. This comparison is not exact, for the French relieved their divisions oftener than the Germans. The losses on both sides were colossal; both sides claim to have inflicted greater relative casualties.

THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME

Joffre's confidence in Haig was abundantly justified, for he opened the British infantry attack on the Somme on July 1 and held his men to this task until the winter weather forced him to desist, on November 15. After July 1 Britain's army carried the burden. The Germans expected, and were prepared for, an attack along the British front. They did not believe France could undertake an offensive after the losses at Verdun, consequently, the British soldiers encountered more stubborn resistance than the French.

This shift of the load was only fair. During the first six months of 1916 the French bore the brunt at Verdun while the British held the quiet sector. During the last six months of 1916 the British spilled their blood freely. By August 9, in addition to the killed the British had evacuated 117,000 sick and wounded. To make good these losses, so the fight could be continued at full force, 192,000 reinforcements had been received. Even with these replacements, so fierce was the struggle that by the end of October the British army was 80,000 below strength. To appreciate these figures it is necessary to

recall that the original British Expeditionary Force of six infantry and one cavalry divisions approximated 120,000 men.

The great handicap of the British was the lack of officers prepared for high command and staff duties. It was much simpler to train battalions of British infantry than to accustom officers, to whom a division had been a large command, to direct the movements of an army of one and a half million men.

But this enormous army did not lack a proper leader, and Haig, training and educating his officers and men as he fought, kept such pressure on the German front that after the middle of July the German offensive at Verdun was slowed down.

Joffre, the commander-in-chief of the French army, was looked to by the commanders-in-chief of the other Allied armies to synchronize their attacks. Accordingly, in addition to directing the French army, during August he urged Haig to continue his attacks on the Somme front. He encouraged the Russians to keep up their attacks on the Eastern Front, and spurred on the Italians, who, in their counter-offensive on the Isonzo, captured Goritza.

During the month of August, 1916, the Allies conducted simultaneous attacks on the three fronts—France, Russia, Italy. But note that the French army was taking a very limited part; von Falkenhayn had fought it to a temporary standstill at Verdun and still was in position to withstand the British offensive. Foch, with his keen eye and well-trained staff, could make minor gains with small losses along a narrow front, but his part was distinctly secondary to the massive attacks made by Haig. Von Falkenhayn, by attacking at Verdun, had succeeded in his plan to fight the French and British armies separately.

From 1 July the British with their army of 1,400,000 men, in co-operation with the French, continued the battle of the Somme until November 15. Simultaneously, the Russians carried on a succession of attacks along the whole Eastern Front. The Russian attacks accomplished little, but their infantry suffered appalling losses, due to insufficient training, a shortage of artillery and the lack of proper logistic support. These heavy casualties had much to do with the subsequent demoralization of the Russian army. The Italians kept up their attacks on the Austrians but made little progress.

On August 28 von Falkenhayn was relieved as chief of staff by Field Marshal von Hindenburg, who took General von Ludendorff as his quartermaster general, and in September the Verdun offensive was definitely abandoned by the Germans.

The battle of the Somme gained little ground, but the British claim that four-fifths of the German divisions in France were called upon to stop this attack and some of these were returned to the line twice. Von Falkenhayn admits that the Somme attack sorely tried the defenders, but claims that the German reserves on the Western Front had not been exhausted when the bad weather and the British losses brought this offensive to a close about 15 November. Von Ludendorff said: "The [German] troops were getting exhausted," and estimated that they were losing their fighting power.

Haig kept such pressure on the German front that von Hindenburg was forced to devise far-reaching changes in the old rigid trench system which could be pounded to pieces with massed artillery. He supplemented this system and added depth to his defensive lines by the employment of great numbers of machine guns mounted in scattered shell holes and concealed emplacements. This addition gave him a more elastic and effective defense

and it was employed with great vigor and determination.

The new and more flexible system of defense introduced at this time contemplated the gradual but slow abandonment of ground, which was to be sold at a high price in French and English soldiers. Even with this new system of defense, the pounding of these shell-hole positions by the British artillery caused the Germans to resort to the famous strategic retirement to the von Hindenburg line in the early days of 1917.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE HIGH COMMAND

The British High Command carried out these strenuous attacks in the full knowledge that the British Government deplored their heavy losses and many Cabinet members were ready, at a moment's notice, to force a stop to the fighting. Fortunately, Asquith, Grey, and a few others in the British Government were strong enough to support the chief of the imperial general staff, General Robertson, and General Haig. During 1916 Prime Minister Asquith appeared at his best as a war leader. His sincerity and integrity had never been questioned. He had learned much about war during its continuance, he had confidence in the abilities of Kitchener, Robertson and Haig, and lent them his powerful assistance when Lloyd George and other advocates of minor theatres attacked Haig's plans. He was never able to overcome a certain hesitation in reaching decisions, a fault that resulted from years of Cabinet service in which he too faithfully acquired the habit of pooling his brains with others and yielding some of his convictions during the process.

The fight along the Somme continued until bad weather brought it to a close. As for the Verdun battle itself, the French made a counter-stroke in October that, at very little loss of life, recovered most of the territory previously lost to the Germans. In the middle of December, by a brilliant attack, the French completely restored the Verdun situation and captured 12,000 prisoners, including 300 officers.

THE RESULTS OF VERDUN AND THE SOMME

On June 1 the naval battle of Jutland was acclaimed a great victory by the Germans. Tactically it was, and under cover of the general elation it caused in Germany the disappointing tactical results of Verdun were overlooked and the German losses forgotten. Yet the battle of Verdun accomplished more for Germany than the battle of Jutland.

The results of the Verdun offensive can be properly judged only by considering what probably would have happened if the Germans had either attacked at some other point in France, or had waited for the French and British to complete their preparations and launch their joint attack on the Western Front simultaneously with a Russian attack and an attack on the Italian front.

The superiority in munitions and man-power that the British and French could command by 1 July would almost certainly have enabled them to inflict more loss on the Germans than the Germans suffered at Verdun and on the Somme. Given time, the British plans would have been developed in detail, and there are few attacks so difficult to resist as a deliberately prepared and methodically executed British offensive. By attacking at Verdun, von Falkenhayn first forced the British to take over

more of the French lines, disarranged their plans and finally compelled them to undertake their greatest offensive before they were entirely ready, and the British are not so skillful in improvising plans as they are resolute in carrying-on according to their own deliberate design.

Nevertheless, even as executed, the Somme battle of 1916 so impressed itself upon the German army that it became one of the leading reasons given by von Ludendorff for resorting to ruthless submarine warfare when he stated to Bethmann-Hollweg, "We must spare the troops a second Somme battle." It is significant that the Somme made more impression on the Germans than Verdun, yet it lacked much of the cold and persistent Scotch fury that Haig would have given to it had he been permitted to carry out his original plan.

IMPOSSIBILITY OF GAINING A DECISION IN 1916

No decision could be reached on the Western Front in 1916 for the good reason that the reserves available to both sides were still sufficient to furnish replacements to hold the line. The high command in all three armies was equal to restoring any breaches in the line that the enemy might make. There was neither sufficient fighting space in France nor fighting time in 1916 to consume the available reserves so that a break-through could be exploited by either side.

The will to carry-on the war still existed among the brave people of France, Germany and England. Attrition, and bloody attrition, was necessary before a "knock-out" blow could be delivered by either army.

Haig realized this, and fearing the Cabinet would expect too much of the Somme offensive, was careful to inform the government that the object of the attack on

the Somme was, first, to relieve the German pressure on Verdun; second, to inflict as much loss on the Germans as possible; and, third, to prevent the transfer of German troops to the Eastern Front. He sought to prepare their minds for the inevitable losses the British army must suffer, but without success, for when the British casualties mounted to some 300,000, the government began to suggest the suspension of the attack there, with a view to renewing an offensive in the Near East. The total British loss from 1 July to 15 November was roughly 500,000, which was about the same as the French loss for the year, including 348,000 at Verdun, 194,000 on the Somme; total, 542,000.

For the Somme offensive the British increased their field guns in France from 2,000 to 3,000, howitzers from 800 to 1,900, and their daily income of ammunition from 30,000 to 90,000 rounds. Munition plants in the United States furnished a large share of this ammunition and the hope of reducing the Allied supply of ammunition to the Western Front was one of the motives that led the German army chiefs to advocate unrestricted submarine warfare.

By 1 July the French formations were 92,000 below establishment; as they had enrolled 78,000 from their class of 1916, they were really 170,000 men behind, and their replacements were increasingly difficult to obtain.

Von Falkenhayn believed it was only the African troops of France that made it possible for France to sustain the Verdun attack and then take part in the Somme offensive. To make up the infantry deficiency the French had greatly increased their artillery. On the same date 2,300 batteries were in service. Their daily production of shell was: 75-mm. 155,000, heavy gun 65,000 and special shell 10,000.

RUMANIA DESTROYED

In July, 1916, the German High Command estimated that as soon as the time was opportune, Rumania would join the Allied Powers. To meet this expected enemy General von Mackensen was designated as commander-in-chief on the new front and told to make the preliminary plans and carry out the necessary reconnaissances. Von Falkenhayn was hard-pressed for the necessary divisions, so the German Foreign Office "dragged out" the negotiations with Rumania as long as possible. Early in August representatives of Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey determined upon the plan of campaign and set aside their required quotas of troops for this purpose.

The Central Powers correctly anticipated that Rumania would rush her forces eagerly towards the coveted Transylvania. When, on 28 August, Rumania declared war and began an advance on a broad front through the passes of the Carpathian Alps into the plains of Transylvania, the armies of the Central Powers were quickly set in motion.

General Mackensen, with a combined force of Bulgarians, Turks and Germans, overran Dobruja, the Black Sea province of Rumania. Von Falkenhayn, who had planned the campaign, had been relieved as chief of the German general staff by von Hindenburg. He was given command of the Austro-Hungarian-German force in Transylvania; with part of his force he first arrested the Rumanian advance through the Carpathian passes, and then pouring his men through the Vulcan pass he threatened to roll up the whole Rumanian front.

Meanwhile, von Mackensen continued his advance, crossed the Danube and joined hands with von Falkenhayn coming through the Carpathian Alps. Bucharest, threatened by both armies, was evacuated and, on De-

cember 5, von Mackensen entered that unfortunate capital. The remnants of the Rumanian army escaped to the northeastward.

There was a tragic monotony in the fate of the three small states, Serbia, Belgium and Rumania, that depended upon the Allied states for assistance. And surely it seemed the duty of the four Great Powers to defend a small state like Rumania that had been urged to join with them in the war against the Central Powers. But there was another side to the story. Rumania had been earnestly urged to join in June when Brusiloff's offensive was in full progress, and to operate with her prospective Allies in a common plan of action against the armies of the Central Powers. Instead of joining them in June she continued her bargaining for more territory until brusquely informed by Russia and France in August that unless she joined at once her future alliance would not be welcome. This was, in effect, an ultimatum calling upon Rumania for an immediate decision concerning her future course in the war.

Rumania had been coaxed and threatened alternately by both Alliances and she could procrastinate no longer. On 27 August she joined the Entente, three months too late. Having allowed this precious time to be wasted, after joining she pursued her own selfish territorial objectives, operated without regard to her Allies, and her over-grasping leaders invited the terrible catastrophe that soon overwhelmed her light-hearted people.

Under the best of conditions and with the aid of her Allies, the unseasoned Rumanian army would have been tried desperately by veteran divisions equipped with all the modern arms and led by such generals as von Mackensen and von Falkenhayn. But her own cupidity contributed more to her undoing than the genius and valor of her enemies; she fished successfully in troubled waters

after the First Balkan War, but her second attempt met with terrible retribution.

The crushing of Rumania was accomplished in spite of the heavy blows given the Germans on the Somme and at Verdun, where they had been forced to assume the defensive, and despite prolonged but fruitless attacks by the Russians along the whole Eastern Front, that at one time threatened to break through the Austrian front in Galicia. Meanwhile, in Macedonia, Bulgaria was able to take the offensive, the situation in Turkey was not yet menacing, and Enver was able to make generous contributions to the European theatres.

THE RESULTS OF THE LAND FIGHTING IN 1916

On account of the heavy German losses at Verdun, von Falkenhayn's reputation began to wane, while their successes in Russia enhanced the prestige of von Hindenburg and von Ludendorff. Towards the end of August Emperor William felt constrained to relieve von Falkenhayn and substitute the conquerors of the East for the defender of the West. Whether this substitution affected the final result of the war is doubtful, for on the decisive question of ordering ruthless submarine warfare, there was no difference of opinion among these three great leaders.

Von Falkenhayn was convinced that the war must be won on the Western Front, and, in 1915, had the courage to refuse reinforcements requested by von Hindenburg for the Eastern armies. When von Hindenburg became chief of staff, he at once became as solicitous for the safety of the Western Front as von Falkenhayn had been.

Von Falkenhayn claims that at Verdun he put out of action five French soldiers for every two German soldiers

lost. His claim is partly supported by an "Estimate of the Situation" made by the British general staff in June, 1916, which states in part that Germany "has already reduced the offensive power of the French army by one-half." And before the attack was abandoned about "ninety French divisions" had been put through the Verdun attack. As only sixty-six French divisions took part, about twenty-four divisions must have gone in twice.

It may seem curious that the French Government should remove Joffre, and the German Emperor remove von Falkenhayn, as the result of the same battle of Verdun. The explanation is simple. The forces were so evenly balanced, the struggle so obstinate, that the shock of this battle was felt all over France and Germany. Public opinion in both countries became very critical of the conduct of the war and demanded new leaders.

Joffre had exposed Verdun to attack by failing to improve the defenses and the communications with the rest of France. Only along the narrow limits of the "Sacred Road" could the determined defenders of Verdun be reinforced or supplied. So the victor of the Marne was himself open to criticism and he did not lack enemies in France to give it voice.

Von Falkenhayn had taken over from the feeble hands of the invalid von Moltke a precarious situation in October, 1914. For almost two years he had directed the armies of the Central Powers, and he turned over to his successors a greatly improved position.

The Western Front he had held against the powerful attacks of the French and English; with rare judgment he had allotted the Eastern Front just enough divisions to render the Russian army impotent; more than once he had restored the Austrian front in Galicia, and, in the fall of 1915, he delivered Austria permanently from the Serbian menace. His victories brought Bulgaria to the

side of Germany and enabled him to open the road to Turkey and join hands with that loyal ally, who sustained the attacks of almost as many Allied soldiers as did Germany itself.

As he accomplished these results without disrupting German industries or anticipating too drastically the annual levies upon the German youths, he delivered to his successors an established Middle Europe, unbroken fronts, and a replacement system that was still furnishing reserves to replace the heavy losses inevitable in these gigantic battles. Above all, he bequeathed to his successors the prestige of a long series of successful campaigns. It is hard to imagine how an army leader with the means at his disposal could have done better.

Von Falkenhayn was removed because of the heavy German losses at Verdun with the small territorial gains to show for them. Yet after Verdun the French army, although elated by the apparent victory over the Germans, was capable of but one more offensive, the unfortunate one launched by Nivelle in 1917. This attack quickly failed and mutinies arose in the French army. It is more than probable that the flower of the French army was consumed at Verdun, and, if so, von Falkenhayn accomplished his 1916 objective, which, as should be recalled, was to strike down the French army, which he considered the sword-arm of England.

Joffre obtained his revenge at the Somme when the British pounded the German lines from July to mid-November. Joffre and von Falkenhayn were as evenly matched as their armies, and it was fitting that they should be led to their corners simultaneously. Von Falkenhayn had the satisfaction of turning over to his successor an army firmly established on enemy territory on all fronts; Joffre could boast that he had out-stayed every other commander-in-chief. Both of these commanders

rendered valuable services to their countries after their demotion.

Joffre's favorite subordinate, Foch, had preceded his leader into a retirement that proved to be temporary. Foch's reputation had suffered on account of the failures of his attacks in 1915 and 1916. He was open to criticism on his own account, and as the friend of Joffre he automatically shared the resentment accorded to his chief by Joffre's numerous enemies.

Foch was nearing the age of retirement. He suffered severe injuries in an automobile accident in the latter part of 1916, and his foes succeeded in forcing Joffre to relieve him of his active command. After a short period of inaction he was brought to Paris as the French representative on the Inter-Allied Committee recently formed to co-ordinate the military effort of the Allied Powers. It was from this position that he was summoned in March, 1918, to direct the Allied armies in the last campaign of the war.

THE RESULTS OF THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND

There was great rejoicing in Germany over the battle of Jutland. Led by the Emperor, various dignitaries visited von Scheer and congratulated his crews. This was for foreign consumption and to bolster German morale. For von Scheer was under no delusion about the strength of the Grand Fleet.

In his report of the battle to Emperor William, von Scheer stated: "If, however, as an outcome of our present condition, we are not finally to be bled to death, full use must be made of the U-boats as means of war, so as to grip England's vital nerve." Von Scheer expressed this same sentiment to the Imperial Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, when he visited the fleet, and in reply was

told that new enemies would be created for Germany if the submarines were unleashed. Von Scheer then explained to the Chancellor the structural vulnerability of the U-boats that effectually prevented their carrying out a visit and search before seizing or attacking a merchantman.

The battle of Jutland convinced von Scheer that unrestricted submarine warfare was the only method that would enable Germany to break the British control of the sea and thus escape exhaustion. And, except for one sweep in the North Sea in August during which he sank two British light cruisers, after the battle of Jutland, von Scheer relapsed into the defensive attitude of his predecessors.

In 1914 and 1915 the High Seas Fleet unsuccessfully endeavored to reduce the Grand Fleet by mine fields and submarines; next, they endeavored to provoke the Grand Fleet to come into Heligoland Bight by bombarding the English coast, but this plan also failed. In 1916 they attempted to draw the Grand Fleet over their submarines, using their Zeppelins for scouts, and then attack with the High Seas Fleet. This led to the battle of Jutland, which was a tactical success, but did not reduce appreciably the superior strength of the British Battle Fleet.

Admiral von Scheer, who had been in the fleet since 1907, with the exception of one year, and was probably the ablest German admiral of his generation, was convinced by these failures that only ruthless submarine war against merchantmen carrying supplies for England would win. If the war had depended on naval factors alone probably he was correct.

The important naval lesson is that skillfully handled superior fleets usually are not reduced by guerrilla warfare. The circumstances that enable a state to begin war with a superior fleet will operate to accelerate the con-

struction of still more ships, so that the fleet initially superior is able normally to overcome its losses and actually adds to its superiority and grows stronger as the war progresses. This has been true of Great Britain in practically all of her naval wars. It would seem, therefore, that an inferior fleet should carefully consider the possibilities of an immediate battle rather than voluntarily undertake a form of naval warfare, such as that employed by the German navy in the World War, which has yet to succeed.

Naturally, it would be even wiser always to maintain a superior fleet in peace-time.

CHAPTER XXVII

MINOR THEATRES IN 1916—SALONIKA EXPEDITION

Minor Theatres in 1916—Salonika Expedition—The Attitude of King Constantine—The Turkish Theatre in 1916—Enver's Loyalty to Germany—General Maude's Advance in Mesopotamia

LLOYD GEORGE and Winston Churchill in England, and Briand in France, were the earliest advocates of an Allied offensive in the Near East. In January, 1915, Lloyd George had gone to the extreme of advocating the removal of practically all the British Expeditionary Force from France to the Near East. Winston Churchill had been the mainspring of the Dardanelles expedition. The main reason for their support of a Near East campaign was the belief that the German line in France could not be broken by the Allied forces without unbearable losses, and they all hoped brilliant and almost bloodless victories could be obtained in the Near East. On the stump, Winston Churchill and Lloyd George were the two fire-eaters of the British Government; nothing but the complete overthrow of the German Empire would satisfy these gentlemen. Their brave notes aroused their countrymen. In the Cabinet room they could not nerve themselves to permit the British army to fight this much-denounced German military system in France, and they sought continuously other ways of winning the war. Their eloquent tongues aroused more courage among the British people than in their own souls.

The leaders of the French Government had fled to

Bordeaux in September, 1914, when Paris was threatened by the German armies. When they returned in December, though somewhat sheepish, they were quite determined to assert their control of Joffre, who, during their flight, had directed the policies of the war by controlling the French armies. But Joffre, with his prestige as victor of the Marne, was able to neutralize Briand's opinion in France by pointing out the danger to the French line if the Germans returned to the offensive. And, reinforced by Joffre's views, the British military authorities were able to convince Asquith of the danger of shifting the offensive to the Near East. Thus the first proposal for changing the main British effort from France to the Near East was rejected.

In October, 1915, when the Gallipoli offensive had failed and Austria and Bulgaria were overrunning Serbia, the Salonika project was again revived. Public sentiment in both England and France was in favor of some intervention in behalf of Serbia. Joffre's prestige had been weakened by the recent failure of the French offensive in Champagne, and the French Government was in danger of being overthrown by the deputies because it had not assisted Serbia.

In addition, France had long-cherished ambitions of extending her influence in the Near East, and vague hopes of satisfying this ambition added strength to the advocates of a Near East adventure. Briand had supported Joffre in several differences with the French Cabinet, and Joffre was very grateful to Briand. For political reasons it was necessary for Briand to provide an army for General Sarrail, whom Joffre had relieved from his command. So the strange spectacle occurred of Joffre, the prime defender of France, urging that British divisions be transferred to Salonika from the Western Front and placed under command of General Sarrail,

whom he had relieved from command in France for incompetency. Joffre exerted himself to meet the wishes of the government, although he well knew the folly of a Balkan diversion.

The French Government used Joffre to convince the British authorities. Joffre first tried to persuade the British War Office, by pointing to the success of the Germans in bringing Bulgaria in on their side, that the Salonika project would bring in Greece and possibly Rumania, on the side of the Allies. Joffre proposed that Russia should assemble an army of 150,000 men in Bessarabia to force Rumania to join the Allies, while France and England would provide a force of 250,000 men at Salonika to put pressure on Greece.

Unhappily for this plan, Russia had no rifles with which to equip the projected Bessarabian army, and neither England nor France could really spare the force requested for Salonika. The British chief of the imperial staff, supported by representatives of the British Admiralty, would not agree to the plan. Prime Minister Viviani then sent Joffre to London to persuade the British Cabinet to overrule its own military agents. The British Government, with its experience at Gallipoli fresh in mind, was loath to undertake another Near Eastern adventure. Joffre threatened to resign as commander-in-chief of the French army unless his request was granted, although he had given the problem of secondary operations constant thought and realized that "the advantages they offered were almost wholly theoretical, while the dangers they presented were real and present." The British officials finally gave way for the sake of harmony.

Joffre was the unwilling spokesman for some French statesmen who were chasing their own long coat-tails. They were seeking to obtain the Rumanian and Greek armies to make up their own military deficiencies, but

these new armies could be had only on condition that the Allies would send contingents from their own armies to Rumania and Greece to help those two countries obtain their own local territorial objectives. In short, Rumania and Greece would overwhelm the Allies with assistance as soon as it was evident the Allies did not need help, but they were too wary to join a doubtful or losing side.

Nor would they pool their soldiers for a common military objective and take their chances of receiving their territorial rewards at a future peace conference. It must be said that the previous relations of the Balkan states with the Great Powers were not such as would encourage any self-denial on the part of Greece or Rumania.

It is questionable if the Greek army would have been of any actual assistance to the Allies. When Kitchener interviewed King Constantine on 20 November, 1915, he was told by Constantine that the Greeks could equip only 100,000 men, and her ammunition would only last the army fifteen days. The Bulgarian army was estimated at 500,000 men, with an Austro-German contingent of 80,000 near at hand. It is quite likely that if the Greeks had intervened, Bulgaria would have overrun Greece, unless von Falkenhayn could have restricted their operations. This would have given the German submarines operating in the Mediterranean numerous Greek harbors for bases.

THE ATTITUDE OF KING CONSTANTINE

King Constantine's sentiments inclined him to Germany, but he seems to have acted throughout the war for what he considered to be the best interests of Greece. The data of the Greek army he gave Kitchener in November, 1915, agree with the information obtained by the

British Admiral, Mark Kerr, who was commander-in-chief of the Greek navy in 1913-14. But even had the Greek army been better prepared and entered the war, in all likelihood it would have pursued its own aims, as did Rumania later on, and have been of little service to the Allied cause. Even if Rumania and Greece had proved useful, it was a humiliating situation when four great Powers were obliged to beg two small Balkan states to enter the war to do their fighting for them.

Nevertheless, in pursuit of these phantom armies, three French and five British divisions were sent to Salonika under command of General Sarrail, who enjoyed the special protection of prominent French politicians. In the fall of 1915 Sarrail was able to make a feeble attempt to save Serbia, but by 10 December the Serbian army was destroyed or driven out of its own country, and this Anglo-French force of about 150,000 was forced on the defensive covering Salonika, their base, 30 miles in their rear. Neither Greece nor Rumania moved.

One of the inducements that obtained the adherence of Bulgaria to the Central Powers was the loyal attitude of Turkey, for she voluntarily ceded Maritza Valley to Bulgaria to gain her assistance. When the Allies requested Serbia to make some concessions of territory in order to obtain the help of Greece, Serbia refused, and was supported in her selfish attitude by her patron, Russia.

In spite of the attempt to appease public criticism by the Salonika adventure, the Viviani government was overthrown in October, 1915. Briand became Prime Minister, and, with his powerful support, the Salonika expedition became a permanent and, as events developed, a useless drain on Allied resources.

By October, 1916, the Salonika expedition had risen to the total of 297,000 men, which included 180,000

French and English soldiers, that might have been employed on the Western Front in the Somme offensive to take the pressure off Verdun. The Balkan terrain entirely favored the Bulgarians, and when Joffre advocated an advance from Salonika as a relief measure for Rumania, General Milne, commanding the British contingent, reported that a reinforcement of seven divisions would be required for even a limited offensive in that inhospitable area.

The curt comment of the German chief of staff, General von Falkenhayn, will complete the evidence of the futility of the Salonika enterprise. He said: "From the point of view of the war as a whole, it remained more advantageous to know that between 200,000 and 300,000 men were chained to that distant region, than to drive them from the Balkan peninsula to the French theatre of war." Von Falkenhayn's remark suggests Napoleon's admonition to beware of forcing an opponent who is making a mistake into adopting the correct course.

The only military objective of any value in the Balkan peninsula was the Berlin-Nish-Constantinople railway, and it was securely protected by the Bulgarian army, stiffened with Germans, and by the strong natural defensive positions that lay between it and the Allied armies at Salonika.

THE TURKISH THEATRE IN 1916

In the beginning of 1916 the Turkish army reached its maximum strength of approximately 600,000 men. While the internal conditions in Turkey were not good, they were not beyond the endurance of the Turkish people who, inured to hardships, had been at war almost continuously since 1911. Their victory over the British

and French at Gallipoli in 1915 had renewed their courage and they faced the future in the confident belief that the coming triumph of the Central Powers would restore some of their lost provinces, such as Egypt and Georgia, previously wrested from them by England and Russia.

Enver Bey was still dominant; he had a consuming ambition that outran Turkish resources and caused him to dissipate the Turkish armies. He resented the frank criticism of General Liman von Sanders, and unduly interfered with the German mission. But he was wise enough to resort to von Sanders when the situation became dangerous. There was a small German officer-clique connected with the German embassy in Constantinople that, for their own purposes, agreed with Enver's visionary schemes. This small group of German officers did their country no service by intriguing against von Sanders.

In February, 1916, the Turkish forces were disposed as follows:

1st Army—Essad Pasha—near Constantinople.

2d Army—Wehit Pasha (Izzet Pasha)—Tschorlu.

5th Army—von Sanders—Lule Burgas.

3d Army—Mustapha Kemal—Caucasus.

4th Army—Djemal Pasha (von Kriess) Palestine.

6th Army—Izzet Pasha (von der Goltz)—Mesopotamia.

In the summer of 1916 the Turkish 19th and 20th Divisions were formed into the 15th Corps and sent to Count Bothmer's army in Galicia; the 46th and 50th Divisions were sent to the 2d Bulgarian army on the Struma and, after Rumania joined the Allies, the 15th, 25th and 26th Divisions, formed into the 6th Army Corps under Hilmi Pasha, joined von Mackensen's army.

Before sending these divisions to Europe all unfit of-

fficers and men were removed and replaced by good officers from the divisions left in Turkey. The divisions destined for Europe were brought to full strength, given an additional percentage for a reserve, and furnished with the best equipment remaining in Turkey. Thus, these three army corps of seven divisions were picked Turkish troops, and Enver ordered that only the best officers and men should be sent as replacements to these divisions serving in Europe. Thanks to the German officers in charge of recruit depots, the Turkish replacement system was still functioning, but it could not meet the demands put on it in 1916, when, in addition to fighting the Russians in the Caucasus, the British in Mesopotamia and Palestine, it voluntarily undertook this great contribution to its Allies.

ENVER'S LOYALTY TO GERMANY

Enver Bey showed himself a loyal ally of Germany, but von Sanders proved himself a truer friend to Turkey and more alert to the real interests of Germany when he protested this diversion of the finest Turkish troops to minor European areas when Turkish territory was invaded in three places. It is to von Falkenhayn's credit that he refused to accept the last army corps of two divisions, too generously promised him by Enver, although in the summer of 1916 von Falkenhayn needed troops very badly. In the opinion of von Sanders, Turkey should have contributed only to Mackensen's army, which kept open her communications with Germany, and reserved the remainder of her strength to protect her own fronts, which were threatened by Russia, France and England, and to make threats against the Suez Canal.

In January and February, 1916, the Russians under Grand Duke Nicholas destroyed the Turkish 3d Army

in the Caucasus; the Turkish 2d Army was sent from Syria to its relief and succeeded in halting the Russian advance in August-September, 1916, but at heavy cost and only after the Russians had seized Trebizond, Turkey's most important Black Sea port. The 3d Army was reformed into the 1st and 2d Caucasus Corps, but thereafter it was never able to resume the offensive.

In Mesopotamia the Turkish 6th Army beat off three attempts of the British to relieve Townshend, and on 29 April Townshend surrendered.

After Townshend's surrender, in April, 1916, the Turkish commander, Halil Pasha, unduly elated, despatched the 13th Army Corps to Persia in order to stir up its Moslem population, but the unwarlike Persian people made inferior soldiers and were of no service, though many of them joined the Turks. The movement in Persia did cause considerable uneasiness to the Indian Government.

In the autumn of 1916, when General Maude made his advance in Mesopotamia, the Turkish 13th Army Corps, containing between two and three divisions, was still in Persia at Kermanshah and Hamadan and only the Turkish 18th Army Corps, the 45th, 51st, and 52d Divisions at Felalieh and Kut, opposed the British advances. These Turks were good troops and had infantry effectives of 120 to 150 men per company, or a maximum of 7,500 rifles per division.

GENERAL MAUDE'S ADVANCE IN MESOPOTAMIA

After Townshend's surrender, on 29 April, the British War Committee agreed with the proposal of the general staff that the Anglo-Indian army in Mesopotamia should maintain a defensive attitude. From May to December, General Maude, who had been placed in com-

mand, was busily engaged in reorganizing his line of communication, assembling the necessary river transport and supplementing it with light railways where necessary. He paid particular attention to creating the essential terminal facilities to serve an army.

Nor did General Maude neglect to build up the morale of his men that had suffered from the climatic conditions and the defeat inflicted by the Turks, and he improved his tactical situation by minor enterprises during the summer.

In London, during the summer, the advocates in the British Cabinet of a new advance upon Bagdad clashed with Robertson, chief of the general staff, who wished Maude to retire to Amara, and who proposed to reduce the mission of the British Mesopotamian army to the original one of protecting the oil wells in Arabistan, occupying the Basrah region and controlling the Persian Gulf and southern Persia. The inevitable British compromise was reached and General Maude was authorized to advance on Naziriyia, a place of considerable political and local strategic importance. Both General Monro, the new commander-in-chief in India, and General Robertson thought General Maude could manage the advance to that point without requiring additional troops.

In December, General Maude began his advance; his opponent, Halil Pasha, could only oppose one army corps of three divisions, approximately 20,000 rifles, to this movement, for, as already stated, the army corps despatched to Persia could not be returned in time. Halil was driven from one strong river position to another by Maude's systematic advance, which was readily sustained by abundant British water transport. Maude was swift in pursuit and followed so furiously that the Turkish retreat was turned into a rout and the British forces entered Naziriyia on February 24, 1917.

CHAPTER XXVIII

SUBMARINE OPERATIONS IN 1916

Submarine Operations in 1916—Hindenburg's Big Mistake—The Actual Situation in Russia in December 1916—The Submarine Warfare in 1917—Summary of the Submarine Warfare—Germany's Fatal Decision—The Entry of the United States—The Last Two War Years, 1917-1918

THE proposal for unrestricted submarine warfare was reconsidered by the highest German authorities late in 1915. Again the controlling factor was political, namely, the attitude of the United States, and again there was a compromise. It was decided to inaugurate a restricted form of warfare to operate until April 1, to give the Foreign Minister another chance to placate the United States and other neutrals.

On March 24, 1916, the *Sussex* was sunk and one American was drowned. In face of the American threat to break off diplomatic relations unrestricted warfare was abandoned and on May 6 Germany informed the United States that submarine warfare would thereafter be conducted in accordance with international law. For a second time President Wilson had triumphed.

Admiral von Scheer did not believe submarines would be effective if they were required to examine every ship before seizing or destroying it, and he promptly recalled all the U-boats under his command, about one-half of the total. He then proceeded to use them against combatant ships alone and in conjunction with the fleet.

After the battle of Jutland, on June 1, 1916, von

Scheer took the opportunity, during the Emperor's visit to the fleet, to urge again that restrictions on submarine warfare be removed, and in his official report on the battle he asserted that it was necessary to undertake unrestricted submarine warfare unless Germany was willing to give up all hopes of defeating England.

When von Hindenburg relieved von Falkenhayn, late in August, the chief of the naval staff repeated the request to resume unrestricted warfare. On September 3, 1916, the question was again discussed at general headquarters at Pless, in the presence of the highest army and navy officials. It was then determined to postpone decision until the situation on land was more clearly defined and the German frontiers facing Holland and Denmark were secured. It was further decided that von Hindenburg should make the final recommendation to the Emperor.

Von Scheer, learning of this, sent his chief of staff to confer with von Ludendorff, and together they agreed upon the following:

- (1) There is no possibility of bringing the war to a satisfactory end without ruthless U-boat warfare.
- (2) On no account must a half-and-half campaign be started.
- (3) The campaign should begin as soon as possible. The navy is ready.
- (4) The commercial treaties with Scandinavian states must be cancelled, so there can be no interference with the submarine campaign.
- (5) In no circumstances must there be any yielding.

Commencing in October, 1916, von Scheer made a final effort to use submarines against merchant ships complying with the requirements of visit and search. For a short while they were successful, but the anti-subma-

rine measures adopted by England soon inflicted such losses on the submarines that cruiser warfare by submarines was abandoned as unprofitable.

It is a very significant fact, and one naval officers should remember, that German submarines, excellent and efficient as they undoubtedly were, could *not* operate effectively against merchant vessels and comply with the old legal requirements to visit and search merchantmen before seizing or destroying them.

Von Scheer personally recommended unrestricted submarine warfare to von Hindenburg on November 22. In December the Allies, still faithful to the terms of Grey's treaty, refused to consider the peace terms proposed by Germany.

On December 22, 1916, the chief of the naval staff, Admiral von Holtzendorff, who had opposed the proposal for unrestricted warfare in the spring of 1916, submitted a formal recommendation to the Emperor in which he asserted positively that within five months the submarine war, waged ruthlessly, would force England to sue for peace. He was equally certain that submarines could not wage effective war unless released from all requirements to visit and search before sinking, and he advocated that the unrestricted warfare begin on February 1, 1917.

HINDENBURG'S BIG MISTAKE

The final recommendation to the Emperor to embark on unrestricted submarine warfare was made by von Hindenburg in his capacity as chief of the general staff; he made this recommendation on the advice of the ablest German naval officers, yet the resulting decision was fatal.

THE ACTUAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA IN DECEMBER, 1916

Von Falkenhayn, at the close of 1915, realized that the Russian army was no longer a menace to Germany. In 1916 both the French and British ambassadors at Petrograd had reported to Paris and London the probability of a Russian revolution. But in the winter of 1916 no one in authority in Germany appeared to anticipate the impending collapse of Russia. Yet the following events had happened and were known in all the whispering galleries of Europe.

In October, 1916, a very effective general strike occurred in Petrograd; the strikers attacked the police; the first detachment of soldiers sent to support the police joined the strikers and fired upon the police; other loyal regiments restored the situation and 150 of the revolting soldiers were executed.

Towards the end of November public indignation finally forced the Czar to remove the reactionary Sturmer from the Foreign Office. This did not satisfy the Cadet party headed by Miliukof, which openly stated that the time had come to frighten the Czar into establishing free government and proposed to do this by demonstrations against Protopopov, the unpopular Minister of the Interior.

There was an open outbreak by the Duma on December 2 when the liberal pro-Ally Trepov, who had succeeded Sturmer, made his announcement that Russia proposed to stand by the Allies until Constantinople was won and Poland regained. The Russian people were so overwhelmed by their heavy losses that the prospect of obtaining Constantinople, the dream of Russians for generations, no longer inspired their enthusiasm. Conservative members of the Duma denounced Rasputin and threatened revolution if that profligate peasant-priest

were not removed from the councils of the Czar.

On December 6, the Austrians, Germans and Bulgarians entered Bucharest. Rumania was conquered and Russia thoroughly discouraged. On 12 December the German peace note was issued. By 18 December the Kerensky group in the Duma were flooding the barracks of the soldiers with pamphlets whose theme was: "The land belongs to the peasants—only by revolution can they obtain it."

On 23 December the Union of Zemstvos and the Union of Towns were forbidden by the police to hold their regular annual meeting in Petrograd. These unions were composed of loyal patriotic Russians of moderate views, who had nobly supported the Russian armies in the field. On 29 December these two unions met secretly and adopted the following resolution: "The government which has become the tool of occult forces is leading Russia to her ruin and shaking the imperial throne. We must create a government worthy of a great people at one of the gravest moments of its history." On the same day a well-informed friend of the French Ambassador reported that if the Czar appeared in Moscow, a more truly representative Russian city than Petrograd, he would be "booed," and if the Czarina appeared she would be torn to pieces.

Throughout December, Petrograd society was openly discussing the approach of the revolution, and with Slavic resignation they did nothing about it. On 30 December Rasputin was murdered and there was talk on the streets of a palace revolution.

Had the German High Command been well informed of conditions in the Allied countries, particularly in Russia, in all probability unrestricted submarine warfare would not have been undertaken.

There was a large group of intelligent pro-German

Russians and numerous secret German agents in Petrograd. It was comparatively easy to pass from Russia to Switzerland and forward information to Germany. Yet these obtainable facts were apparently not known and therefore not considered before declaring for unrestricted submarine warfare.

The united front presented in December, 1916, by the Allies in opposition to the Kaiser's terms led the German leaders to believe the enemy war-spirit to be higher than it actually was. Von Tirpitz, the leading advocate of unrestricted submarine war, says: "Had we been able to foresee the Russian revolution, we need not have resorted to the submarine," and in extenuation adds that, "In January, 1917, there was no visible sign of the revolution." The obvious reply to this feeble explanation is that the German authorities should have secured this information, for it was easily obtainable, and they had been equal to gaining intelligence of Russian affairs in 1914 and 1915.

THE SUBMARINE WARFARE IN 1917

The final decision to resort to unrestricted submarine warfare was made by the Emperor at Pless on 9 January, 1917, after hearing the views of Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, Field Marshal von Hindenburg and Chief of the Naval Staff von Holtzendorff. The Chancellor reported that the Allies had rejected the German peace offer; that he had no hope that President Wilson's effort at mediation would succeed; that there were no prospects of a separate peace with any of the belligerents nor any evidence of the collapse of any of the enemy states.

The chief of the naval staff expressed the opinion that the submarine campaign would have decisive results within five months. Von Hindenburg, more conservative,

thought it would have decisive results within a year and he thought that the army could hold out for that length of time on land, *provided* that the submarines could reduce substantially the flow of munitions to the Allies in France.

All members of the conference agreed that the United States would enter the war when unrestricted submarine warfare commenced; von Ludendorff estimated that within a year the United States could only land five or six divisions in France; he thought the output of munitions from the United States had already reached its maximum and had no apprehensions of an increased supply of munitions reaching the Western Front; but he did realize that if the war was not won within a year the intervention of the United States probably would be decisive.

This was one of the gravest decisions of the war and placed the fate of Germany squarely on the shoulders of her submarine commanders. The losses inflicted on merchant vessels at first exceeded German anticipation; in the summer of 1917 they reached their climax. The cumulative effect of the submarine campaign on Britain attained its maximum in the winter of 1917-18, when the food in the United Kingdom was reduced to less than six weeks' rations. But there was always enough food to keep the people from starving and Britain continued to bear her full share of the war.

England was saved by the reinforcement of American destroyers, submarines and patrol vessels which, added to her own more extensive protective system, was just sufficient to turn back Germany's submarine offensive. An auxiliary factor was the additional supplies of food from the United States that partly compensated for the cargoes sunk. Neutral and German shipping seized in United States ports made up in some degree for the Allied

tonnage that was sunk. The introduction of the convoy system recommended by Admiral Sims, and made practicable by our naval reinforcements, was the most important new feature of the naval defense against the submarines. By the end of 1917 the German naval offensive was definitely overcome.

The German High Command had estimated that Germany could win the decision at sea before the American army could be prepared for service in Europe, and had further predicted that even if an army was created their submarines could prevent the arrival of the Americans in France. Both these assumptions proved incorrect, and the American army intervened in time to break up the land offensive in 1918. Except on a few occasions, the German submarines did not attack transports carrying American soldiers to France, and concentrated their efforts on sinking cargo ships.

SUMMARY OF THE SUBMARINE WARFARE

The Germans began the war with 24 submarines. In the beginning of 1915 they were able to employ 24 submarines; their replacements up to this time just covered their losses. Five had been lost, and five commissioned.

With 24 submarines, the Germans could keep 3 to 4 submarines operating continuously in the approaches to the British Isles.

By June 1, 1916, the Germans had added to their submarine force, 38 large U-boats, 7 large mine-laying U-boats, and 34 small U-boats, a total of 79; 8 of various types were undergoing final trials, and 63 large and 93 small submarines were under construction.

On February 1, 1917, there were 57 large submarines operating in the North Sea; 38 small ones from bases in Flanders, and 31 large and small in the Mediterranean,

and 8 in the Baltic, a total of 134. This is probably the largest number that Germany ever had in active operation at one time.

The Germans report that altogether 363 U-boats were employed, of which 186 were sunk, a little over 50 per cent. After the armistice 158 were surrendered to the British and 21 interned in neutral states, a total of 179, which agrees reasonably closely with the German figures.

The reason given by von Scheer for the failure of the unrestricted submarine warfare is that it was undertaken half-heartedly, and stopped at President Wilson's orders. He believed that if it had been commenced in January, 1916, and prosecuted vigorously before England had built up her anti-submarine defenses, it would have succeeded. This argument is analogous to that given for the failure of the tanks to win the war on the land and is open to the same rebuttal.

GERMANY'S FATAL DECISION

In the light of after-events, Germany's decision to undertake unrestricted submarine warfare appears criminally stupid. By December, 1916, she had destroyed the Russian army, she had conquered Rumania, she had established her Middle Europe, and she held Belgium and northern France. Two-thirds of the French divisions had been through Verdun and were far from eager for more fighting. The Italian army was held up and unable to affect the decision in the main theatre. Russia was on the brink of revolution. But apparently Germany did not appreciate her advantageous situation.

Admiral von Scheer had consistently advocated unrestricted submarine warfare. He has recorded the reasons for his actions as follows: "If we did not succeed in overcoming England's will to destroy us, then the war

of exhaustion must be and is Germany's defeat. There was *no* prospect of avoiding an unsuccessful conclusion by the *war on land*. And on February 1, 1917, the strategic offensive passed definitely to the German navy. The fleet then became an auxiliary to the submarine and the fate of Germany lay on her underseas boats."

This was contrary to the views of von Falkenhayn given in the fall of 1915, when he said England could be brought to terms by defeating France decisively. During the Napoleonic wars England was practically helpless against a united Europe, but given a foothold on the Continent and even very weak allies, England at once became a formidable foe.

Almost immediately after the victory of Trafalgar, Napoleon had forced a disadvantageous peace upon England by striking down Austria and Russia during the Austerlitz campaign. If Germany could have struck down France and Russia, she might have been able to build up her fleet during an armed truce, to cope with Britain's. Then, with the supreme army and navy, the world was at her feet.

Clémenceau's reference to Waterloo and Trafalgar, in conversation with King Edward in 1909, was still applicable. But, thanks to Kitchener's foresight and British patriotism, Britain was no longer dependent on French armies.

In the summer of 1916 the Territorial Divisions and Kitchener's new armies were finally ready, and Britain was not only a sea power, but numerically she was second only to Germany as a land power. Britain's army from July, 1916, had become one of the decisive factors in Europe. Haig's rôle from 1916 to 1918 resembles that of Wellington's in the longer period from 1807 to 1815.

A little over two years of war caused the great land power Germany completely to reverse the original rôles

of her army and her fleet. No less paradoxical was the British situation, where a state that depended on a large navy and a small standing army had, after raising the largest volunteer army ever known, been forced to resort to conscription to fill the ranks of her enormous army. The willingness of the proud British and German peoples to bear such burdens before they would concede defeat shows how difficult it is to break down the will to win of a powerful state with a high-spirited citizenry.

It shows further that predicting the course of a future war is almost beyond human imagination, and the most priceless assets of a nation are war leaders with fortitude and flexibility of mind which will enable them to face each new situation with calm courage and bend their best efforts with open minds to reach sound decisions.

THE ENTRY OF THE UNITED STATES

After the entry of the United States into the war the Allied naval plan resolved itself into: (1) Preventing the German submarine from starving England; (2) transporting and maintaining the American army aboard.

The Germans failed to launch a submarine offensive in American waters at the commencement of the war when it might have led us to retain light forces at home that were needed to meet the German submarine offensive in European waters. When Germany eventually sent her submarines to American waters public opinion had been sufficiently educated so that their presence did not cause us to recall our patrol vessels from Europe.

Rather slowly, but in time, our naval reinforcements enabled Great Britain to overcome the submarine threat to starve the United Kingdom, and by the spring of 1918 the German offensive against merchant tonnage had been definitely met and overcome.

THE LAST TWO WAR YEARS, 1917-1918

Joffre had created many powerful political enemies by his drastic removal of general officers who failed to make good. He laid himself open to criticism by some serious errors, and after Verdun his enemies encompassed his downfall. He was pushed gently upstairs into an honorary but ineffective position, and Nivelle, the tactical hero of Verdun, took command.

Nivelle boldly launched his 1917 offensive in Champagne against a securely held German position, his attack collapsed with heavy loss and the devoted French army that had withstood the terrific German attacks of 1914, and still reacted at the Marne, finally refused to fight. It required the unbrilliant but rugged leadership of General Pétain, and several months of rest, to restore the French army. During this period in 1917, when the French army was recuperating and the Russian army disintegrating, Haig's army had to keep the German army in check. Haig's task was made more difficult by Lloyd George, who continually deflected British forces to Palestine and Mesopotamia.

The transfer of the French attack from the Somme area to the Champagne caused a delay in the time of launching the attack. This delay enabled von Hindenburg to execute the strategic retreat of 1917 to the so-called Hindenburg line. If the plan of Joffre and Haig made in the fall of 1916 for the year 1917 had been carried out, von Hindenburg's army would have been heavily attacked during its retreat and in a region where the severe bombardments of 1916 had pulverized all the German entrenchments. It would therefore have been difficult for the Germans to have held up the Allies long enough to have withdrawn without suffering heavy losses.

Von Hindenburg's 1917 retreat was accompanied by

the complete devastation of the French territory he felt compelled to abandon. While this extreme measure facilitated the escape of his army by making a rapid pursuit by the French and British armies very difficult, it had the important result of causing the German attack in the spring of 1918 to break down. It is another irony of the war that the completeness of the German devastation of France in 1917 contributed largely to the German failure to advance in the spring of 1918.

This decision to retreat, arrived at in the autumn and winter of 1916, would indicate that the new German High Command, von Hindenburg and von Ludendorff, did not realize the completeness of their own victories over the Russians in the East in 1915 and the prospect thereby opened for a new offensive against France in 1917 or 1918, for had they then contemplated renewing the offensive in northern France they would not have destroyed the means of moving and supplying their armies in that area.

Repulsed on the sea in 1917 the German High Command then cast their last throw on reaching a decision on land before the American army could be transported overseas. In spite of Lloyd George's dispersal of the British army in Mesopotamia and Palestine, and Briand's Salonika expedition, our navy, assisted by Great Britain's, placed the American army in France in time and Germany's last land attack was defeated. In the late summer and autumn of 1918 the Allies were able to take the final offensive ashore.

The establishment of the convoy system, largely at the instigation of Admiral Sims, and the enormous mine barrage that stretched from Scotland to Norway, were the only naval developments after our entry. The remainder of our naval contribution, though enormous in quantity, simply reinforced Allied naval measures already taken.

CHAPTER XXIX

SOME POLITICAL FACTORS

CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS

Some Political Factors—Parliamentary Government—The Modern European Press—Some Naval Factors—The Deterioration of the German Fleet—Limitations of Sea-Power—The Balance of Power—The Difficulty of Making Peace—Armchair Critics—The Seven Years' War and the World War—England in 1759 and 1914—Russia's Conduct—Prussia During the Seven Years' War—Germany During the World War—German Reflections on Two World Wars—The Effect on France—The Results of the War—The Lesson for America

WE believe that European statesmen did not desire a war, but were unable to find a peaceful solution to the conflicting ambitions, mainly commercial, of European states. It must be remembered that public opinion in all European states stoutly supported the national claims asserted by the leaders prior to the war. Also, European statesmen had the support of their nationals until the burdens of war and the diminishing prospect of victory caused first the Russians and then the people of the Central Powers to forgo their ambitions in order to obtain peace.

That is to say, the statesmen of Europe only voiced and did not create the conflicting European ambitions; these arose through the industrial development and energies of the European peoples that required more markets and more colonies. These requirements in turn forced the European governments, democratic and autocratic alike, to respond to the wishes of their people and to demand more commercial privileges and territory.

PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT

The fortunate people of the United States, in considering the form of their government, have only had to take heed of the rights and pleasures of the governed. Due to our geographical position and the nice balance of power that has existed in Europe since our independence, we have not had to consider the efficiency of our government as an instrument of war. In fact, our people have been so absorbed in pursuit of individual aims that they have taken very little constructive interest in national government or public affairs, external or internal.

Europeans face an entirely different situation. They might establish the most equitable and delightful form of government the wit of man has yet conceived, but unless it provided adequate protection against their neighbors it could not endure. The first concern of a European government must be security against its powerful neighbors. When this has been accomplished the government can consider the general internal welfare.

In western Europe parliamentarism reached its height in 1914. The privilege of suffrage had been widely extended, and liberal-minded forward-looking people everywhere saw in the indiscriminate extension of the ballot the solution of all the problems of modern civilization. This view was expressed crudely in such slogans as "the remedy for all failures of democracy is more democracy."

With this profound faith liberals all over the world shut their eyes to the many obstacles in the way of popular government and almost violently thrust the ballot into the hands of an unprepared electorate. Demagogues, the ancient curse of the Greek and Roman republics, arose in numbers in England and France, and posing as apostles of a new era greedily grabbed office and public place.

The ancient political order in England at first made a determined stand against this new development, but from the turn of the present century both of the old English parties, the Unionists (Conservatives) and Liberals, have given ground steadily to the newly enfranchised. In the decade preceding the war the Liberal party practically surrendered to the advanced or left wing of the party led by Lloyd George.

In France the political situation was even more complicated than in England. The parliamentary system was developed naturally by the English, but was only adopted by the Gallic people and superimposed on a centralized government modelled by the first Napoleon. It has always appeared incongruous and ill-suited to the sensitive, quick-witted, logical-minded French people. That the French people have made this form of democratic government work at all is a tribute to their national stability, their ability at adaptation and their genuine passion for liberty and equality.

Their honest and capable leaders have been unduly sensitive to parliamentary attacks, and their frequent resignations overturn cabinets so often that it is difficult to give any continuity to domestic or foreign policies. The well-developed individuality of the French people, their fondness for political disputations and their predisposition to explore a problem to its ultimate conclusion split them into many small political groups, whose political tenets shade from one to another so gradually that only an initiated Frenchman can define where one party stops and another begins.

These numerous groups have been useful instruments in the hands of some designing and unscrupulous politicians. These groups have been just as disastrous to the welfare of France, when headed by patriotic but oversensitive leaders who refused to sink small differences of

opinion in order to give France a strong and stable government. So poorly have these imported British institutions, parliament and cabinet, suited the peculiar political genius of the French people, that it is only short of miraculous that France was not destroyed by Germany during the era 1870-1906.

From the military standpoint one of the worst features of French parliamentarism was that politics spread into the army. Many politicians sincerely distrusted the fidelity to republican institutions of some French military leaders; others simply used the charge of "royalism" to help their own friends or depress army leaders they disliked. Thus Caillaux supported General Sarrail against Joffre, and even the patriotic Clémenceau complained against Joffre when he removed, for incompetency, a divisional general who chanced to enjoy Clémenceau's friendship.

Some French generals were not above attempting to placate members of Parliament and possible War Ministers even after the war began; and the only excuse they can urge for such an attitude, so fatal to military efficiency, is that their careers would be in jeopardy if they ignored or offended these actual or potential Cabinet ministers.

This attitude on the part of certain military leaders, and a desire among certain civilian leaders like Briand to interfere in the strategical dispositions of the army, caused the Salonika diversion.

In the United Kingdom the attempt to direct a war by a committee formed from the Cabinet, coupled with the vanity first of Winston Churchill and afterwards of Lloyd George, involved the English army in three disastrous diversions: the Dardanelles, the Mesopotamia and the Palestine campaigns.

When we compare the resources for war of the Central

Powers with those of their enemies and consider the military results obtained, it is plain that the Teutonic alliance employed their forces more wisely and economically. The basic reason for this superiority over the Allied Powers was the inability of the democracies of France and England to make war efficiently. The parliamentarians who formed the Cabinets attempted to direct the operations of war as they did the peace-time affairs of a nation, by debates in council that always caused delays and usually eventuated into fatal compromises.

The leaders of the two democracies, without reason, lacked faith in the courage and devotion of their own peoples, and dared not call upon them for the sacrifices the people were willing to make. These leaders were accustomed to ascertaining popular opinion by consulting the party whips and then determining the government's policy; when the patriotic people of France and England looked to them for leadership they were incapable of it and timidly returned to their constituents to inquire how much sacrifice they would make to be free. No one imagines that the liberty-loving Western nations are going to return to absolutism to avoid the inefficiency of parliamentarians. But, if Cabinet government is to endure, Cabinet ministers will have to give more thought to the adaptation of their governmental machinery to war-making.

No intelligent group of citizens can deny that it will frequently be necessary for a nation to fight for its rights. Nothing can be surer than that concessions made to a bullying rival in an attempt to avoid war lead first to further concessions and at last to war itself. In the past those states who for any reason have refused to arm to protect themselves have become the vassals of their more military neighbors, and in the end their citizens have been forcibly embodied in the armies of their conquerors.

Having been unwilling to fight for their own rights they or their children have been made to fight for the privilege of others; of history's many ironies, none surpasses that.

The peoples of France and England were, before and during the war, aware that their liberty and independence depended primarily on their willingness to defend them by accepting the hardships of war. But their leaders hesitated to demand the sacrifices the people were willing to undergo, and in the end their hesitancy and uncertain leading involved the British and French people in much greater losses than bolder courses would have entailed.

This lack of faith existed before the war, and the British Government dared not adopt conscription or the French enforce the three-year military service. These governments would not prepare to face the powerful German army, although many members of both governments knew war was very possible if not probable.

When the war broke upon them these parliamentarians were still so fearful of the courage and endurance of the people that they refused to seek the decision by overcoming Germany on the Western Front. In consequence they frittered away their forces on every imaginable pretext in minor theatres rather than employ them on the Western Front.

The subordination of the military to the civil had been carried to such an extreme that military and naval advisers became obsequious to the civil authorities. Even Joffre could be employed to divert forces from France to Salonika. Admiral Fisher silently acquiesced in measures he knew were wrong, while the sturdy Field Marshal Robertson, for venturing to oppose the strategical designs of Lloyd George, was contemptuously dismissed by that overconfident parliamentarian, who sought to defeat Germany by capturing Jerusalem.

THE MODERN EUROPEAN PRESS

Before the war numerous sensational journals had been established in England and France that pandered to the lesser-informed of both nations. As their circulation increased so did their political influence. Under a popular form of government the editors of these papers attained much influence and many of them were known to exercise extraordinary power over members of Parliament and of the Cabinets. In Paris there were several newspapers known to be subsidized indirectly by Russia, and on the Continent generally it was the practice for diplomats to maintain a friendly press by gifts amounting to bribery.

The English press was notably free from governmental or foreign control, but it was open to political manipulation, and certain London editors were high up in the political councils of the two leading parties. Other editors were political "sharpshooters," firing at will at members of either party; these independent snipers could only be resisted by the solidarity of a Cabinet or of the opposition party; they were strong enough to overbear an individual, and during the war it was quite possible for an editor to blackmail an English official.

In spite of the British and French censorship, the newspapers in both countries continued to increase their political power during the war. In France, Clémenceau's paper criticized the military operations so severely that Joffre refused to permit its sale in the army zone, but the government permitted Clémenceau, and others less sincere, to continue their criticisms, although such attacks lowered the morale of the army.

In England, towards the end of the war, Lord Northcliffe, with his syndicate of papers, repeatedly dictated to the British Government until Lloyd George finally broke with him after the armistice. There is no way of holding

a newspaper editor responsible for the courses of action he forces a government to adopt. This extraordinary power of the press led finally in the World War to the evolution from parliamentary institutions, in subjection to a popular press, of a sort of supergovernment by an irresponsible newspaper magnate who could claim the credit for any success his plans might attain and conveniently forget any that failed. This was the utmost in irresponsibility of government; and it occurred in the United Kingdom of Great Britain, which prides itself on the political sagacity and ability of its people.

After the armistice it was natural and proper for France to seek to destroy Germany utterly. However, it was no part of Britain's policy to make France the overwhelmingly dominant power on the Continent. But during his Khaki campaign of 1918 Lloyd George went before the English people and promised to make Germany pay for the war and to hang the Kaiser; he and his supporters among the press stirred up popular feeling in England that prevented any leniency to Germany at the peace conference.

After the victory of Waterloo, statesmen of the old era showed more moderation and judgment in reconstructing Europe than the statesmen of the parliamentary countries did in the Versailles Conference that framed the peace terms imposed upon Europe after the German collapse. It seems, therefore, to be proved beyond dispute that parliamentary institutions during the present century have shown themselves comparatively ineffective in keeping their countries out of war, in preparing their countries for war, in waging war and in making peace. And we think this is the major reason why autocratic Germany and her three despotic, but comparatively weak, allies could hold their own against the remainder of Europe for two and a half years. The framers of our Constitution

realized the necessity of an autocrat during war and endowed the Presidency with unlimited powers over the people and resources of the United States during a national emergency.

SOME NAVAL FACTORS

At the beginning of the war the naval plans of Germany, England and France were conventional but sound and in harmony with the plans of their armies. Germany's main effort was to be on the land; England's on the sea. France would bear the brunt of Germany's land attack and control the Mediterranean. Before the end of the war Germany resorted to a major effort on the sea, and Britain had created an army of over 5,000,000 men and was engaged in the largest land war in her history. The large lesson is that while some wars may be won at sea, and some on land, others require maximum efforts on land and sea and in the air.

Germany's best opportunity to overcome Britain's naval superiority was early in the war, because after hostilities began England was able to increase her fleet faster than Germany. After the battle of the Marne, when it became evident that the German army could not gain a quick decision, Germany should have employed her fleet more vigorously, for it was apparent even then that minor naval attacks could not damage the British fleet beyond the capacity of British shipyards to replace and augment.

The Allied control of the sea and their surplus ships led them to undertake joint operations in minor theatres that diverted from the main theatre at least one-third of Britain's land forces and a considerable French force. The surplus naval resources would have been employed to better advantages in antisubmarine measures, and the land forces in the main theatre.

The British antisubmarine measures cannot be consid-

ered entirely effective, yet they inflicted such losses on the German submarines which attempted to operate against merchant ships in accordance with the old law of "visit and search" that the German naval leaders decided they must resort to unrestricted submarine warfare or be defeated by England's sea power. This brought the United States into the war with disastrous results to Germany.

In spite of the submarine attacks, the control of the surface of the sea by the Allies was more complete than in any modern war. The economic and military pressure of Allied sea power for two and a half years caused Germany to resort to unrestricted submarine warfare, after the results of the battle of Jutland convinced Admiral von Scheer that the High Seas Fleet could not hope to break up the Allied blockade.

The big naval error of Britain was the failure to fight a decisive action at Jutland; this followed from Jellicoe's fear of the torpedo and his conviction that he should not expose his fleet to a torpedo attack; Jellicoe's apprehensions were shared by the Admiralty, which concurred in his plan.

While Jellicoe's excessive caution at Jutland eventually exposed his country to greater risks than a bolder course would have involved, it is to his credit that he created the Grand Fleet from a collection of ships and secured its northern bases after war was declared. He also trained its personnel so that he could operate the world's largest fleet under practically all conditions of wind and weather. He inspired the great majority of his officers and men with such confidence in his skill and judgment that it survived the indecisive contest off Jutland.

The next large naval error was the British failure to appreciate the submarine menace in its early stages and to take complete and comprehensive measures to overcome it. They took various disjointed measures in 1915

and 1916, but they attributed the lulls in the submarine warfare, that we know now were due to President Wilson's notes, to their antisubmarine devices, and concluded too complacently that all was well. The surplus naval strength that Winston Churchill employed at the Dardanelles and that Fisher wished to use in the Baltic should have been developed into an antisubmarine detachment.

Jellicoe was the first high authority to realize fully the danger from the German submarine and urge the Admiralty to create a systematic defense. That is to say, Jellicoe, having deliberately assumed a very cautious policy with the Grand Fleet, understood clearly that it must be accompanied by an extremely efficient defense against any counter-attack by enemy submarines.

In the summer and autumn of 1916 Jellicoe wrote various letters to the Admiralty inviting attention to the increased sinkings by submarines, their cumulative effect on the carrying capacity of the merchant marine, and to the small losses inflicted on the submarines. He expressed the opinion that the High Seas Fleet would not accept battle again until the submarines had been given their opportunity to win the war. In November, 1916, Jellicoe was called to the Admiralty to organize and co-ordinate antisubmarine measures. Jellicoe's estimate of Germany's intention was singularly shrewd. For there were few indications at that time to support his hypothesis. Jellicoe had taken a full and accurate measure of his able antagonist, von Scheer.

The strength of their fleets and the operations of Jellicoe gave Great Britain and her allies control of the sea except for submarine attacks and sporadic raiders. The danger lay in the fact that as long as the German High Seas Fleet still existed the Grand Fleet literally sustained the British Empire; if it suffered any serious loss without inflicting a comparable loss on the German fleet the con-

trol of the sea would be in dispute and most of these advantages disappear immediately. Only by accepting a risk with the Grand Fleet could Jellicoe defeat the German fleet and secure, beyond dispute, the control of the seas.

THE DETERIORATION OF THE GERMAN FLEET

In June, 1916, the German High Seas Fleet was the equal of any on earth in skill, endurance and courage; late in October, 1917, it was capable of executing a successful operation against the Russians on Oesel island; in the summer of 1918 it was carrying out naval operations against Russia's naval capital, Cronstadt; in November, 1918, it tamely surrendered without a blow.

Many reasons have been advanced to account for this complete reversal of morale. Among the most evident causes was the continuous recruiting of officers and men for the submarines from the personnel of the fleet; only the best were taken for the submarines. The residue in the fleet was bound to deteriorate, just as did the German army under the system of culling the best soldiers from all divisions to form a few "shock troop" divisions.

Next was the long-continued defensive rôle imposed on the German fleet, which gradually convinced the enlisted men that the British fleet, with the American fleet available as replacements, was unconquerable. Also, the compartmentation of the German ships decreased their habitability; the large war-time crews required more living space than the ships afforded. This situation was met by berthing a large number of men in barracks at the naval bases when the fleet was in port, as it habitually was. Thus the men were separated from the life of the fleet and left conveniently grouped for the propaganda of the civilian defeatists in the German navy yards.

These reasons are not sufficient to explain the sudden and entire collapse of a magnificent fleet. Some of the imponderables are needed to complete the explanation.

The German fleet, as such, had few naval traditions to hold its spirit up under the trials of war. It had no naval war cries to rally the spirit of its personnel, such as "I have just begun to fight," "England expects every man to do his duty," "Don't give up the ship," or "Damn the torpedoes, go ahead." The complete poverty of the German navy in this respect was revealed by their christening naval vessels for German army officers for lack of distinguished naval names.

And there was something in the reasoning processes of the educated German personnel which caused them to deduce and anticipate their inevitable defeat and refuse to give up their lives in a plainly hopeless cause, just as an expert chess-player frequently resigns many moves before a checkmate. This is the exact opposite of the old English soldiers and sailors, whom the French often accused of not having sense enough to know when they were beaten; and the same courageous inability to recognize defeat was characteristic of the higher British ranks.

Von Hindenburg and von Ludendorff signed a humiliating armistice, with an unbroken army still well advanced into enemy territory, because they realized the apparent inevitability of eventual defeat and wished to prevent further bloodshed and spare Germany from enemy invasion. Perhaps this is laudable, it may be necessary under certain circumstances, but it is quite a different spirit from that of a British lieutenant at Gallipoli, who, after three bloody repulses, gathered the remnants of his platoon and led them and himself to certain and apparently useless death in "just one more attack for the honor of the regiment." It would have been far better for the morale

of the future German navy and army if the High Seas Fleet had thrown itself upon the reinforced Grand Fleet, and if von Hindenburg had fought to the end in the spirit of Napoleon's Old Guard, which knew how to die but did not know how to surrender.

LIMITATIONS OF SEA POWER

Before Kitchener enlightened them, the British people were led to believe the war would be short, but they have never fought a successful short war. The reason is plain; their offensive weapon, the fleet, can only apply pressure gradually. And one of the limiting conditions that always confronts the British in waging war alone is that they must not exhaust their own resources before time permits their fleet to starve their enemies.

The first great limitation on sea power is that a superior fleet cannot prevent an inferior fleet retiring to a protected harbor and denying action indefinitely. The superior fleet's only recourse under this condition is to operate against an enemy's sea-borne commerce in an endeavor to force the inferior fleet to come out and battle in an effort to overcome the situation. This economic pressure is slow to take effect, and requires a complete investment by sea of an insular power, and by land and sea of a Continental power with land frontiers.

During the time required for pressure from sea power seriously to injure an enemy's trade it is open to him to take counter-measures on land, and European history illustrates fully the ability of a powerful Continental nation to win back on land what she has lost at sea. Thus France repeatedly forced England to restore oversea conquests, such as Louisburg, Havana, Cape of Good Hope and Guadalupe, in exchange for conquests by the French army on the Continent. In this manner the possession of

Hannover became a handicap to England, for it was exposed to capture by Prussia or France.

It is impossible entirely to invest by sea any Continental European state; so that it is necessary for a state dependent solely upon a navy to obtain allies possessed of armies in order to complete the investment of an enemy by land and sea. History has yet to record the naval investment of a great Continental state sufficiently complete to force it to sue for peace, whereas history furnishes example after example of great states succumbing to the combined action of armies and navies where the navy, establishing control of the sea, supported and transported a superior army which delivered the final blow. As late as 1870 Germany crushed France, although France possessed the superior navy. And finally during the World War it was necessary to defeat the German armies in France in 1918, after containing the German fleet for four years and defeating the submarines at sea in 1917, just as it was necessary to defeat Napoleon at Waterloo after defeating the French navy at Trafalgar.

Overseas commerce of a belligerent cannot be stopped without interrupting simultaneously the trade of his neutral customers. Therefore in endeavoring to put pressure on a belligerent by the application of sea power, the superior navy runs the risk of driving into the enemy camp neutrals whose interests are adversely affected by the vigorous exercise of sea power. This fact is responsible for the many inconsistencies of international law, which is principally concerned with the conflict between the right of a belligerent to operate against an enemy's commerce, and the right of a neutral to continue to carry on his peacetime trade with that enemy. In the abstract, both rights are indisputable; historically, the belligerent rights, once absolutely supreme, have given ground continuously in time of peace, but have rapidly recovered their supremacy

when powerful states have gone to war. In practice the vigorous exercise of these belligerent rights against neutrals has varied inversely as the military strength of the neutrals affected.

Grey, the British Foreign Minister, was reproached bitterly during the war by British navalists for his policy towards United States commerce. In Grey's memoirs, written after the war, he states frankly that he permitted the Admiralty to exercise as much pressure against our commerce as he thought our government would permit without resorting to retaliatory measures. Unquestionably Grey was wiser than his naval critics, who would have provoked an embargo on munitions or even more serious retaliation by the United States.

In short, the exercise of sea power alone against a Continental state is a difficult, long-drawn-out means of bringing an enemy to terms, and it is shadowed continually by the possibility of driving into the enemy's camp neutral nations that may be sufficiently powerful to decide the result of the war.

Sea power can be exercised with immediate effect only against an insular power. Great Britain has always been acutely aware of this danger and has striven to provide against it by her naval forces. England is favored by its geographical location; the United Kingdom, although close to Europe, can be advantageously approached only from France or Belgium. Holland and Germany, her next nearest neighbors, are disadvantageously placed to operate against Great Britain, even with an equal or superior navy. Owing to the absence of nearby bases, it would be almost impossible for any other state but France to operate against Great Britain in or near her own home waters. But against her scattered possessions any state with local or temporary command of the sea and a superior army can operate to advantage. Thus Japan could easily

occupy and hold Wei Hai Wei, and, with little more difficulty, Shanghai, and, with a certain risk, Hong Kong.

Sea power ultimately depends on the fighting ability of the fleet; in the past the strength of the fleet lay in the ships of the line. During the World War, the essential difference between the Grand Fleet and the High Seas Fleet was a few battleships. The British superiority in this type of ship gave Britain control of the surface of the seas. Pacifists and economists should recall this fact when they bewail the money spent on battleships. And if they wish to appraise the real value of a battleship, let them estimate the price Germany would have been willing to pay for a few more superdreadnoughts in 1914. In the future, control of the seas will probably be secured by ships, however called, with similar characteristics to battleships, namely, the ability to give and take blows.

While submarines and aircraft have modified the methods of utilizing battleships, there is small likelihood that this type of ship will become obsolete during the present generation. For, as against surface, subsurface and air attack, they offer the maximum resistance of any type of vessel. If any surface vessel survive, it will be the battleship. Submarines submerged are practically immune to any known form of attack, but their vulnerability on the surface places definite limits on their usefulness. Future developments in air craft and submarines will tend to neutralize each other. Should the air craft ever be able to drive the surface vessels from the seas, some form of submersible will continue to operate at sea, and sea power will continue to be one of the deciding factors in the world's life.

THE BALANCE OF POWER

England on the offensive has always had to cultivate allies in Europe with armies, and create her own armies,

in order to apply the final stroke and thus avoid the long delay necessary to win a war by the pressure of sea power alone.

It has been England's traditional policy to support the weaker Continental state or group. This involves certain burdens on the English people, for in addition to her navy England has frequently had to provide sufficient land forces to restore the balance on shore.

These burdens are borne because otherwise England would be reduced to a second-class power, such as Holland or Denmark, for if one power or group of powers could engross or consolidate the whole of Europe into a United Europe, a fleet could quickly be constructed that would overwhelm the British Isles and the British Empire.

Thus the policy of England almost automatically has thrown the European balance first in one direction, then in the opposite. Clémenceau was aware of this ancient policy of England, and on this ground demanded British help to oppose Germany in the decade before the war. And, in 1919, the Allies having overthrown Germany, he realized immediately that England would seek to curb France on the Continent, and cynically accused Lloyd George of rushing to the support of Germany as soon as England had taken over the German fleet.

Before condemning England for her long-enduring policy which has involved her people in many wars, consider what would have happened had she stood aside and let Philip II, Louis XIV, Napoleon I or William II dominate the Continent. Europe would have had the practical restoration of the Roman Empire. Granted a succession of able Emperors, Europeans would have exchanged the delightful variety of customs, manners and morals, the prevailing freedom and culture of modern Europe, purchased by periodic wars, for the disciplined

monotony of an enormous empire with eras of benevolent despotism like that of the Antonines, alternating, no doubt, with the monstrous tyrannies of a few modern Neros.

Many wise and conservative Englishmen, with this tradition of the balance of power bred in their bones, would have preferred a negotiated peace in 1916 or 1917 to the dictated peace of 1919. Among them were the Earl of Lansdowne and Sir Arthur Nicolson, both early advocates of the pre-war entente with France and Russia, but both desirous, after checking Germany's aspirations, to restrain the power of France, for they knew a dictated peace meant simply exchanging France for Germany as the dominant Continental power.

THE DIFFICULTY OF MAKING PEACE

But getting nations out of war is a difficult process, once the struggle begins. The spirits of the people have been aroused, they all have been promised victory. The armed forces are probably confident of eventual success, and would resent a negotiated peace. The public have been promised the redress of alleged wrongs, and will be satisfied with nothing less. Finally, any overture for peace may be mistaken for a sign of weakness and encourage the enemy to redouble his efforts. Only statesmanship of the highest order can find the basis of a negotiated peace before the suffering of the various belligerents has inclined the minds of the struggling nations towards peace without victory.

The German Emperor, as leader of the Central Powers, offered a negotiated peace to the Allies in December, 1916, immediately after their triumph over Rumania left no doubt in the mind of the neutral world that Germany's offer did not spring from weakness. If German

diplomacy had been a little less exacting and her negotiations more leisurely, Germany could have obtained very favorable terms.

Germany held in an unbreakable grip more than enough of Belgium and northern France to obtain the restitution of her colonies and her merchant marine. In the war of the Austrian Succession, England had returned Louisburg to France to recover much less of the Low Country than Germany held in 1916. With little effort Germany could have organized her home front to endure the increasing internal privations during the first six months of 1917 without resorting to ruthless submarine war. By that time the collapse of Russia would have become apparent to all the world; and then no Allied government could have endured a week that refused to enter into negotiations for peace with Germany.

The probable attitude of our country during such negotiations is clearly indicated by President Wilson's formula, "Peace without Victory." That is, our support would have been thrown towards restoring the pre-war status of Europe, with some effort made to prevent a recurrence of the conflagration. The neutral peoples of Europe yearned for peace almost as much as the belligerents. Japan was the only belligerent state in the world that was actually profiting by the war. Her participation was limited and inexpensive, she was flourishing industrially, and while Europe fought she was working her will in China.

The "Peace without Victory" formula of President Wilson was not only a humane suggestion for Europe, but was in accord with the real interests of the United States, for we have as much to gain as England in preserving the balance of power in Europe. A united and military continent across the Atlantic would be a constant menace to the United States, so we should be the last to upset the

balance of power in Europe. By reason of that neat European balance, the English were able to evict France from North America; our Revolutionary leaders were able to secure our independence; on account of it the Monroe Doctrine was possible and, in 1898, by completing the eviction of Spain from North America, we finally became the dominant Power in the Western Hemisphere. The development of the United States in a brief century and a quarter that included four years of civil war, would not have been possible in the face of a united Europe. Therefore the United States of America should support the balance of power in Europe.

Von Falkenhayn was the only German leader who seemed, and then only during a brief period in the fall and winter of 1915, to realize that there was a way to peace without actually defeating England. He thought he could turn England's mind to peace if he destroyed the French army at Verdun. He almost overcame the French will to fight, though at such heavy cost that he was removed from command. The newly created British army intervened in July, 1916, at the Somme barely in time to preserve the French army from destruction.

ARMCHAIR CRITICS

A fencing master first teaches the pupil the thrust and the parry; a military critic points out first a mistake by one participant and then a mistake by the other. If there is a parry for every thrust, what is the value of the thrust? A bewildered reader may question the value of learning of mistakes that the various leaders committed, many of which simply neutralized similar errors of an enemy.

Many civilian critics have condemned the military leaders on both sides as being equally sterile and stupid. Yet it is probable that there was more uniform excellence

in the conduct of the World War than in any that Europe, the world's greatest war-maker, has ever seen. In fact, it was the general excellence of the opposing leaders, military, naval and civil, and the high-spirited population of Europe, that caused the war to assume its desperate, bloody and for four years indecisive character.

Brilliant, bloodless victories are not won except over relatively inferior leaders or troops, or against inferior numbers. There was little to choose between the military abilities of the German, French and English army and naval chieftains. The military technique of Russia and Austria was decidedly inferior to that of the Western Powers. But Russia's enormous man-power and her loyal devotion to the common cause made her a tower of strength to her allies during the first two years of war. Austria, on the contrary, was a constant source of anxiety to Germany from September, 1914, when the Russians overran Galicia, and the necessity of succoring her feeble ally forced Germany on several occasions to withdraw troops badly needed on the French front.

Surveyed from another view-point, the extraordinary effort made by Russia in 1914 first saved France and then England, for it caused Germany to send men originally destined to France and Flanders, to Poland and Galicia. In 1915 it became Russia's turn to resist the main German onslaught. Although France and England, by their attacks on the Western Front caused the recall of ten German divisions, the Germans were still powerful enough to destroy the Russian army. The leaders on both sides attempted the proper moves. The military skill and endurance of the German troops, both on the offensive and defensive, enabled their leaders to accomplish their immediate purpose. But the numerical superiority of the Russians was so great that the margin of victory was small, and the German victors were so

resolutely opposed they did not realize the extent of their successes over Russia.

Thus, at all times, readers who really seek to understand war must remember its reciprocal nature. To every thrust there is a parry; to every weapon a defense; to every attack a counter-attack. In the execution of the wisest strategy mistakes are inevitable. The best leader is the one who makes the fewest mistakes. Eventually there comes a time when human endurance in the mass fails, leaders can no longer inspire their men, terms must be sought and a final military decision accepted. The casual reader, learning of many mistakes, is apt to conclude that the leaders are stupid and the decision reached by dull chance, whereas there have actually been comparatively few mistakes made and the result has come from a wearing-down process that has tested every fibre of every nation involved. And this perhaps is the obscure but real purpose of war.

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR AND THE WORLD WAR

To obtain a parallel to the latest World War it is necessary to turn back to the Seven Years' War, for the only other intervening World War, the Napoleonic War, was the product of the French Revolution and had essentially different basic causes. A comparison of the Seven Years' War with Europe's last conflagration will aid the serious student in reaching sound conclusions, for more than a century and a half separates these struggles; if phenomena occurring in the first recur in the second, they are bound to excite and probably justify the belief that they will repeat themselves in the future. The essential facts of the Seven Years' War are well established and easily accessible, so the comparison can be readily made by an interested reader.

The basic causes of both the Seven Years' War and the World War were the ambitions of states to increase their trade and territories either in Europe or overseas. These ambitions sprang from the vigorous growth of the nations concerned, and in themselves were natural and proper. The rivalries in eastern Europe for the former Austrian province of Silesia were comparable to those in 1914 for succession in the Balkan States; while in Western Europe, Britain and France, commercial and naval rivals, struggling for dominions in America and India, resembled very much Britain and Germany in their commercial and naval rivalry in 1914.

The period immediately prior to these two wars was marked by the same feverish readjustments of alliances, the same running-around of diplomats. Prussia and Austria, the best-governed states in Europe in 1755, made intensive preparation of their armies; Madame Pompadour in France and rapacious Whig ministers in England consumed the funds that should have equipped their fleets and armies. But in 1914 there was comparatively little corruption in governments, and funds voted for national defense were honestly expended. There was a distinct improvement in governments in Europe between the two wars.

To an American reader the comparison of these two wars will have an added interest because the Seven Years' War ejected the French from Canada and removed the last formidable obstacle to our independence, while during the last World War our forces became the deciding factor. In 1759 our future depended upon the outcome of battles in Central Europe, for had France and Austria defeated Frederick, France would have been left in possession of the Spanish Netherlands (Belgium) and Hannover, and, at the least, England would have had to return all her American conquests to restore the situation

in Europe. In 1917 the future of Europe depended upon the action of the United States; during a little over a century and a half we had passed from being a "pawn" in the play of the European powers, to dictating the course of a World War. And however much the World War cost us, no true American can fail to take a just pride in the enhanced power and prestige it brought to his country.

ENGLAND IN 1759 AND 1914

To an English student the comparison should be extremely illuminating, for in 1759 the English policy of maintaining the balance of power in Europe was already firmly established. The diplomacy during the two decades preceding these wars will be found to be strikingly similar; the Englishman can take a proper pride in the increased honesty and efficiency of the Cabinet of Asquith over that of the Duke of Newcastle, and he can note that the national transition from peace to war was accomplished much more efficiently in 1914 than in 1755-6.

The Cabinet of Asquith had no initial loss like that of Minorca and did not find it necessary to place any of their admirals before a firing squad on the quarter-deck of the *Iron Duke*. But as the war progressed the present-day Englishman must regret that Asquith had replaced Pitt, that Admiral Anson's seat at the head of the Admiralty table had been usurped by the civilian Churchill, sheltering his dangerous innovations behind the gray hairs of Admiral Lord Fisher, who was approaching his dotage.

An analysis of the Seven Years' War will show that, in his early career, Pitt dangerously exposed England to defeat by employing too much force in minor theatres like America and India, and neglecting to support Fred-

erick the Great in his terrific struggle on the Continent. But Pitt learned rapidly, and after 1757 he poured more money and men into Europe than into the minor theatres. His significant phrase "I will conquer Canada in Germany" is proof that he had learned his lesson. Lloyd George took longer to learn, and it required the destruction of Gough's army, in March, 1918, to cause him to desist from dispersing British forces. Patriotic Englishmen should be on guard during their next war against the dispersion of military effort that has so often accompanied their war-making.

The only major naval battle of the World War was the one off Jutland; two naval battles during the Seven Years' War were sufficient to establish Britain's control of the sea; during the Napoleonic wars, Nelson's three victories, plus the victory at Camperdown, were sufficient to re-establish Britain's command of the sea. Thus in three World Wars the sea battles were much less numerous than land battles. It should be a reasonable prophecy that in the future sea battles will continue to be fewer in number and consequently of greater relative importance than land battles.

It also follows that a naval commander-in-chief cannot depend upon learning his battle tactics in the hard school of experience. He will have to obtain his tactical concepts from study of previous battles, tactical games, the technical knowledge of his weapons and in peace-time manœuvres. His ability to execute these tactical ideas will depend upon the responsiveness of the fleet to his desires, and that will depend in turn upon the skill and courage of his subordinate commanders. And the development of these characteristics requires still more manœuvres.

Only in peace-time exercises did the German and French commanders learn to mobilize, concentrate and

deploy large armies. Those troop-train movements, which enabled the European high commands to launch attacks or to repair breaches in the line, were the mechanics of land war, and lacking experience in these, the finest tactical ideas could not be attempted. To an even greater extent is experience in the mechanism of a modern fleet necessary to the naval commander-in-chief, for although the intervals between naval battles are much longer than between land battles, when battles do occur at sea they develop and reach their climax much more rapidly than on shore.

It is said that both the German and British armies taunted their naval comrades for their inaction, and it is true that one of the motives for the naval attacks on Zeebrugge was a desire on the part of some high-spirited British naval officers to show the willingness of the British navy to accept some losses. Under the conditions existing in 1918, with their enormous naval superiority, it was possible for the Allies to accept heavy naval loss with equanimity.

But ordinarily when the naval balance is more even it would be pure folly for a nation to indulge in naval blood-letting to convince its army that their naval colleagues were willing to take their proper share of knocks. The officers of each service can become sufficiently acquainted in peace time with the powers and limitations of their sister service to understand the basic reasons for its actions.

RUSSIA'S CONDUCT

The course of Russia before and during the Seven Years' War closely resembles her record during the World War. Her policy during both wars, being dictated by an autocrat, could be changed overnight; neither her eighteenth nor her twentieth century allies ever felt

entirely sure of her, and neither Frederick the Great nor William II ever gave up hope of winning Russia to his side. By one of those rare strokes of fortune that occur just often enough to confound all predictions of war, the death of Czarina Elizabeth and the accession of Paul as Czar gave Frederick the assistance of Russia in 1761 just long enough for him to change defeat into victory, while the loyalty of Nicholas II to his engagement with his allies in 1916 denied victory to Germany until William II had forced the United States into the war.

This fidelity of Nicholas to his allies and the incompetency of his government exposed his subjects to more trials than their Slavic natures could endure. They revolted, taking Russia out of the war in 1917 in the same dramatic way that she departed in 1760. Her defection came perilously close to causing the downfall of her allies, as it had done in 1761.

PRUSSIA DURING THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR— GERMANY DURING THE WORLD WAR

Of all their wars, the Germans probably have taken most pride in the campaigns of Frederick the Great during the Seven Years' War. The magnificent manner in which he sustained himself against almost all Continental Europe has inspired each successive generation of German leaders to study his campaigns. It was not remarkable therefore that when, in 1890, France and Russia formed an alliance, and modern Germany had to contemplate a war on two fronts, her leaders should take the campaigns of Frederick as their model.

In frank imitation of Frederick, von Schlieffen modelled the German plan to meet France and Russia. Following the strategic idea of Frederick, he proposed to strike down the French army with the bulk of his army,

while a small portion in East Prussia delayed, as best they could, the advance of Russia into Germany. After rapidly disposing of the French army, von Schlieffen could then move the bulk of his army east to take the offensive against Russia.

This was the essence of Frederick's successful campaigns; and as an intellectual conception, it was easy to understand, and it was plain to all that this method offered the German army of 1914 its best opportunity of overcoming the numerical superiority of the enemy. Local superiority and rapidity of movement was the essence of the plan to crush France, and to facilitate its rapid execution the numbers mobilized were increased while the time of mobilization was reduced. In addition, the German civil leaders accepted the political risk of invading Belgium, again imitating Frederick, who opened the Seven Years' War by invading a neutral country, Saxony. Frederick was shrewd enough to produce evidence from the Saxon archives to justify his actions; his Prussian successors marched through Belgium and attempted, but unsuccessfully, to show that King Albert was in secret alliance with France.

It was easier to understand Frederick's mental process than to steel the minds of the German leaders to accept the risks, and the flesh of the German people to endure the hardships inseparable from Frederick's exceedingly bold methods. Even before the war broke out, von Moltke the Second, lacking the courage of his predecessor, von Schlieffen, in order to reduce the risk of a French rupture of his centre or left, lowered the strength of von Kluck's army on the right (offensive) flank and the force of its blow. Seeking, as many others have done, to escape the risks of war, he fell into fatal half-measures.

Nor could the modern Prussians, who by descent should have been the inheritors of Frederick's determina-

tion, endure the raids into their estates in East Prussia by the Cossacks during the Russian invasion in August, 1914. To protect their barns, their cattle and their crops, these East Prussian junkers appealed to the Emperor for help. Frederick allowed the ancestors of these same Russians to sack Berlin, but William II could not harden his heart to refuse his own caste. Three German army corps were taken from the western army and sent to the Eastern Front. This diversion was perfectly futile, for the troops so diverted did not reach the Eastern Front until the crisis there was past and the Russians were in retreat.

Whether or not three more army corps, something more than 100,000 men, would have proved decisive in France, no one can say positively, but it is plain that Germany would have had a much better chance to win if these three corps had not been diverted from the Western Front to the Eastern Front at a critical time.

It is easy to make a proper war plan, for mankind have spent the better part of their lives fighting, and war has been studied more persistently and thoroughly than any other activity of man. There is little left to be said of its theory. It has been treated as a science and an art, and as a major national operation. Any bright school boy can recite the maxims of war.

But the execution of war plans, even though simple and well-conceived, requires character and determination.

Frederick's successes were due more to his high resolve than to his strategic conceptions. He often called upon his men, already twice or thrice repulsed, for the last successful attack. He could scan death-thinned ranks with a cold appraising eye to determine just how much strength remained with his men. Then he dared to demand their all, and they responded. He did not spare

his own person, and in the crisis of battle he would return again and again with his men to the charge; when defeated it was necessary for devoted subordinates to lead him away from the field.

Frederick had as much confidence in the fortitude and endurance of his civilian population as in his army. He exposed most of his frontiers to the enemy at all times, and his capital more than once. He chose to rule over a country completely desolated, rather than to sign away a single acre of his recently conquered Silesia, and his people stood by him. To avert the invasion of Germany, von Hindenburg surrendered the German fleet and merchant marine, abandoned Alsace and Lorraine, and left Germany at the mercy of the Allies. The German leaders of the World War understood the methods of Frederick; intellectually they could follow his plans, but they failed to appreciate that only dogged determination of the leader and the utmost devotion of a nation could support the cruel and almost superhuman demands that the strategy of Frederick imposed upon his armies and his people.

To make war with the real desperate energy of Frederick was beyond the spirit of modern Germans and probably beyond that of any modern nation. It is impossible to weigh, as in a scale, human endurance, but by all the tests that can be applied, the people of Prussia under Frederick demonstrated infinitely greater capacity to endure the burdens of war than the Germans of William II.

GERMAN REFLECTIONS ON TWO WORLD WARS

Of all the participants in the World War, reflections on the two World Wars must bring the most poignant regrets to Germans. Entered among the Great Powers

by the undaunted Frederick, bowing before but withstanding the shock of Napoleon's armies, surviving the revolutionary movement of 1848, during the two decades before 1870 modern Germany was finally established as the great Continental Power of Europe. For over forty years she was the most feared state in Europe and under the empire of the Hohenzollerns her people, for ages among the poorest of the Continent, finally enjoyed a brief taste of prosperity. An efficient government alive to the needs of modern industry, a people painstaking, frugal and industrious, at home upon the water as upon the land, combined to carry German products to the world's remotest harbors. Already dominant upon the Continent, Germany was a rapidly rising menace on the sea.

Nor could the German nation divest itself of its inherent threatening potentialities without deliberately mutilating natural racial characteristics, the real basis of national greatness. The most peace-loving government in the world today, with all the existing peace treaties and pacts outlawing war, would not venture to prescribe such a sacrifice to its people. It is necessary to go to unhappy Carthage after the Second Punic War to find a nation sufficiently supine to commit national emasculation.

The patriotic German who mentally reviews the past century in German history must realize the inevitability of the general hostility Germany's too rapid rise to power excited in Europe. For a comparative newcomer among the powers to aspire to the army of a Napoleon and the fleet of a Nelson, was too much for Europe to bear. It is futile for German citizens to complain that German diplomats were not equal to preventing German isolation; the possibility of adding an invincible navy to the concentrated power of the German army could not be endured by the high-spirited European

states, and only the desperate need of Austria-Hungary for assistance and her small alliance value kept her attached to Germany.

The patriotic German can get much solace from the fact that his people had the ambition to aspire to such heights and that Europe alone could not have barred their progress. He can take pardonable pride in the enormous military powers that his armies developed, the skillful leadership of his officers and the determined courage in the offensive and defensive of his soldiers.

The world will not soon forget the German victories of 1914-1915-1916. It will always remember the last desperate campaigns during the spring of 1918 when summoned to battle by their Emperor, directed by their two chieftains, von Hindenburg and von Ludendorff, the German army in masses made their last effort to hammer their way through their investing enemies to a final victory. Perhaps the sincerest compliment paid the German army was the clarion call to the British armies to stand fast that initial German successes wrung from the imperturbable, almost inarticulate Scotsman, Field Marshal Haig, in April, 1918.

In the retreat from Mons, during the repeated offensives of 1915, 1916 and 1917, Haig had faced quietly those German armies; he knew their men were skillfully led and determined fighters; still, battle after battle left him unbowed, and he was unmoved when even the stolid Robertson was shaken by the German power of defense in 1916 and 1917. In Haig was enshrined the soul of the British army. Expanding from a small expeditionary force to one of the largest armies in Europe, the British army lost for a time much of its professional skill but none of its indomitable spirit that has so often made its squares unbreakable and its battalions invincible. To wring the "Back to the Wall"

exhortation from Haig was a triumph only short of winning the war.

And the superb manner in which those German armies, after four years of fighting greatly superior numbers, responded to the last call of their Emperor deserved the tribute. The German attack in 1918 was indeed worthy of all praise. They inflicted on the British army the greatest defeat in its history before they were held up at Amiens. They struck the British further north; failing there, they turned east and burst through the French army at Chemin des Dames in such force and so near Paris that the courageous Clémenceau trembled on his rostrum.

Their complete undoing followed rapidly, for their desperate efforts in this final drive left their exhausted troops massed in two large salients exposed to the dreaded counter-attack and immediately under the cold, glittering eye of Ferdinand Foch, who had barely managed to hold out some reserve divisions, looking forward to just such an opportunity for a counter-attack. Foch struck the Germans near Soissons, and with heavy loss they extricated themselves from that bag; on August 8 Haig completed the counter-stroke and kept up a continuous pressure thereafter. In September and October the American army made itself increasingly felt. So the German retreat, once begun, was never stopped.

THE EFFECT ON FRANCE

The Frenchman of today with the instinctive historical perspective of the oldest nationals of modern Europe will regard this last World War simply as beginning a temporary era of European domination by France. The Seven Years' War led France into a temporary eclipse compared with the old antagonist Eng-

land. France quickly emerged from this shadow by aiding the revolted colonists of England to gain their independence in 1781. These continued exertions overtaxed the economic strength of France and led to the French Revolution, but even her civil strife only revealed and increased her inherent strength and brought her to the Napoleonic era. In their hearts all true Frenchmen regard that period as their great era and the mighty Corsican as the real embodiment of the genius and spirit of France.

As an historically disposed Frenchman, severely logical, contemplates the Europe of today, he is bound to be skeptical of any fundamental change in the morals, manners or customs of himself or of his European neighbors. He will take an open pride in the present dominant position of his country and do his best to prolong the era. He will not be impressed by the various expedients offered to relieve the world of war, and being determined to retain his present dominant position in Europe with the least disturbance to his normal life, he will continue to keep his sharp sword at the throat of his long-time enemy, Germany. The French people accepted the hardships of the last war with a shrug of the shoulders and their now famous expression, "It is the war." They did not expect any mercy from German armies, and they are surprised that Germany of today expects any mercy from them.

On very few occasions has the French Government, monarchical or republican, served the French people efficiently during war, and in time of crisis they turn naturally to a Foch, Joffre or Napoleon to deliver them from their politicians. Having tested both kinds of government, at present they will have nothing to do with the monarchical form. But they are determined to retain their present hardly-gained European suprem-

acy. And as they are committed by strongly fixed custom to a stationary or dwindling population, this determination involves the dangerous experiment of introducing African soldiers to do an increasingly large part of the Frenchman's future fighting. If the modern Frenchmen cannot recall the result of the Romans leaving their fighting to imported pretorian guards, it is idle to remind them of the peril to their country of continuously recruiting an army in Africa and domiciling it in France.

THE RESULTS OF THE WAR

Those who expect mankind to rise unbrokenly to loftier and loftier heights have been puzzled to explain the advent, the progress and the observable results of the World War. It proved as bewildering to those who asserted a belief in war for its own sake as to those happy optimists of 1914, who, after forty years of European peace, regarded war as an anachronism.

Some of the last war's immediate results are plainly indecisive. Great Britain removed the menace of German sea power, but only to see the rise of the American and Japanese navies. So Great Britain, although victorious, did not attain unrivalled supremacy at sea. France was delivered from the immediate threat of Germany's army, but the latent threat of that warlike nation still remains. The common fear of Germany that brought France and England together being removed, the two Western Powers at first drifted apart, played many sharp tricks on each other, but have drawn rapidly together whenever Germany has appeared formidable.

Perhaps the most disillusioned nation of all the belligerents is the United States. Entering the war in the high hope of ending war, and in the confident belief that they were waging a war for lofty purposes, the Americans

gradually discovered that their allies were but human beings, dreadfully tired by their exertions, inclined to be querulous and very impatient with the progress of the American armies.

American leaders eventually realized that while the Allied purpose in the abstract might be noble, the Allied nations were bound together by a secret covenant that involved the dismemberment of the Central Powers.

According to Europe's code there was nothing reprehensible in such a covenant. To the victor belongs the spoils, was true of war before it was of politics. It was only natural, and very necessary to insure cohesion, for European chancellories to agree upon a subdivision of enemy territory to recompense their nationals for their losses and exertions. We should not take a "holier than thou" attitude towards Europe, for our American forefathers acquired this continent mainly by conquest.

Three empires, Russia, Austria and Germany, disappeared as such. It is still too early to venture a prediction on the permanence of these changes. But it is safe to say that the basic causes of the World War, namely, the rivalries in both western and eastern Europe, survived the war. Despite their idealism and their disillusionment at the results of the war, the people of the United States should bear that fact in mind. Nor should they forget that previous peace treaties have merely defined temporary political situations and outlined national frontiers that only endured as long as they could be supported by force, while treaties themselves have almost invariably concealed among their various clauses the seeds of future wars.

THE LESSON FOR AMERICA

The last and most important fact for Americans to remember is that the World War occurred; and that it

actually happened cannot be denied by the most optimistic pacifist. In spite of all the universally advertised terrors of war, in spite of the bonds of trade and commerce, in spite of the Hague Tribunal, in spite of exchange professors and Carnegie's Peace Temple, in spite of the churches, despite for the most part well-meaning governments in Europe, despite the certain catastrophe of national bankruptcy, the nations of the world went to war in 1914 and continued at war for over four years.

Not in the time of any American now living will mankind in the mass be substantially better, wiser or less selfish than in 1914, nor is there any reason to hope that in the same period the average of governments in the world will be any more honorable, skillful or generous than those in power in 1914.

The late war left a greater horror for war among most Americans than existed before. The lack of preparation of the United States greatly increased the expense of our war effort; this cost together with the necessity of financing our allies almost bankrupted this great commercial country. The payment of taxes will make any war very unpopular, especially during the next decade, and will probably curtail the money available for the maintenance of our military establishments.

But reluctance to pay taxes and endure hardships will not of itself prevent war if the clash of interest is great. So Americans should not let themselves be deluded into believing that the World War was our last, and that conflicting interests can always be peacefully settled. They should take more heed of their armed forces, and when in due course they or their children are called to arms, the generation that is summoned can go solemnly but gladly "rejoicing in its strength as a strong man to run a race." And Americans of the next war generation will be spared much of their blood if their statesmen,

admirals and generals in the meanwhile give thought to the mistakes made by the leaders of the two great democracies of western Europe, France and England, during the World War of 1914-1918.

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